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This dissertation examines how scientists and scientific editors have 
approached specific problems related to visualization and visual argumentation in 
scientific texts.  These problems are related to the following research questions: (1) 
How are new visualization practices established as scientifically credible?  (2) How 
do scientists modify existing instrument output to make new visual arguments?  (3) 
How do scientists use verbal and visual means to transform problematic data into 
acceptable support for novel claims?  (4) What are the practical and ethical 
boundaries of modifying visual artifacts for scientific arguments?  (5) How do 
scientists refute established (but incorrect) visualizations that have been widely 
accepted as accurate representations of reality?   
This project considers these issues rhetorically by examining a number of 
recent and historical cases.  The first three case studies explore how scientists created 
both compelling and uncompelling visual arguments by mediating the visual output 
  
of instruments with rhetorical strategies.  These case studies focus on visualizations 
from physical science: x-ray diffraction photographs, graphics establishing the theory 
of plate tectonics, and visualizations of atmospheric phenomena.  In each case, 
visualizations articulated invisible phenomena in new ways, transforming unclear or 
seemingly unremarkable data into convincing knowledge claims.  My analysis of 
these cases explores how scientists integrate visuals into the analogical, causal, 
transitive, symmetrical, and dissociation arguments that are so essential to the 
practice of science.  The later case studies examine broader concerns regarding ethics, 
persuasion, and modern scientific visualization.  I examine recent issues related to the 
digital generation and manipulation of scientific images and rhetorical issues related 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Neither the bare hand nor the understanding left to itself are of much use.  It is by 
instruments and other aids that the work gets done, and these are needed as much by 
the understanding as by the hand.  And just as instruments improve or regulate the 
movement of our hands, so instruments of the mind provide suggestions or cautions to 
the understanding. 
 




 In 2005, I was teaching a report-writing course to a group of pharmaceutical 
scientists at a local biotechnology company.  Though most of the course focused on 
strategies for writing and editing verbal scientific discourse, we discussed the visual 
components of their texts on the day we discussed the “results and discussion” section 
of the experimental report.  In developing the course, I had access to older drafts of 
documents from the company’s archives, and one of the visual arguments that I 
included as an example in the course materials had some unusual features.   
The graphic was a comparison of two chromatograms— in this case, line 
graphs indicating the time when specific substances passed a sensor.  The report 
author compared the two chromatograms to demonstrate how minute adjustments to 
specific settings would affect the runtime and effectiveness of a purification process.  
This was a routine optimization experiment, but it was unclear to me if some of the 
imaging practices were routine.  The author had adjusted the y-axis scale of one 
graph; it was in units that were half as large as the other graph.  However, the author 




Because of these oddities, it seemed that the figure would be a good prompt for a 
discussion about working with technical visuals.   
While the modification was interesting in its own right, the reactions of my 
students were even more interesting to me.  Some students were appalled that the 
authors did not document the scale adjustments; others did not care about the 
adjustment at all; still others thought the adjustment was appropriate and perhaps 
necessary for the report’s argument.  For the latter group, it was the x-axis position 
that was important, not the modified y-axis.  Moreover, they argued that the scale 
adjustment highlighted information in the one graph that they might not have seen 
otherwise.   
Different groups had different opinions, so I had no clear sense of what was 
“correct” in this institutional context.  However, it was clear to me that these simple 
graphics, produced by a standard instrument, were enmeshed in a network of 
rhetorical issues.  Rhetorical activities were taking place between the instrument 
recording the data and the visual arguments producing scientific “facts,” and different 
groups of readers were bringing different sets of assumptions to these images.  When 
I looked to rhetorical theory to explain these rhetorical activities, I found some studies 
on visual rhetoric in science; however, I also found this body of theory insufficient 
for guiding the study of new situations.  There was no comprehensive account of 
visual argumentation in science.  Further research directed my thinking toward a 
number of issues at the intersection of visual rhetoric and the rhetoric of science.  My 
curiosity also led me to a number of historical and contemporary cases whose visual 




analyzing these cases, I explored the complexity of rhetorical visualization in 
scientific discourse.    
This dissertation examines how scientists and scientific editors have 
approached specific problems related to visualization and visual argumentation in 
scientific texts.  These problems are related to the following research questions: (1) 
How are new visualization practices established as scientifically credible?  (2) How 
do scientists modify existing instrument output to make new visual arguments?  (3) 
How do scientists use verbal and visual means to transform problematic data into 
acceptable support for novel claims?  (4) What are the practical and ethical 
boundaries of modifying visual artifacts for scientific arguments?  (5) How do 
scientists refute established (but incorrect) visualizations that have been widely 
accepted as accurate representations of reality?  This project considers these issues 
rhetorically by examining a number of recent and historical cases where visuals were 
important components of rhetorical situations.  
My first three case studies explore how scientists created both compelling and 
uncompelling visual arguments by mediating the visual output of instruments with 
rhetorical strategies.  These case studies focus on visualizations from physical 
science: x-ray diffraction photographs, graphics establishing the theory of plate 
tectonics, and visualizations of atmospheric phenomena.  In each case, rhetorical 
visualizations articulated invisible phenomena in new ways, transforming unclear or 
seemingly unremarkable data into convincing knowledge claims.  My analysis of 




transitive, symmetrical, and dissociation arguments that are so essential to the 
practice of science.   
The later case studies examine broader concerns regarding ethics, persuasion, 
and modern scientific visualization.  I examine recent issues related to the digital 
adjustment of scientific images and issues related to scientists’ increasing dependence 
on complicated computer algorithms for creating visual arguments. 
This introductory chapter is divided into four parts.  First, I discuss what I see 
as fundamental similarities between the rhetoric of science and visual rhetoric 
regarding their places in rhetorical studies and the epistemic ground they claim.  
Second, I review important distinctions between historical, philosophical, 
sociological, and rhetorical approaches to science and scientific visuals.  Third, I 
describe the theoretical and analytical frameworks that I will use in my study.  Fourth, 
I provide a brief description of each of the chapters. 
 
Foundations and Tensions: Visual Rhetoric, the Rhetoric of Science, and Rhetorical 
Studies 
Current projects studying visual artifacts and scientific texts rhetorically share 
similar positions in relation to rhetorical studies at large: both of these subdisciplines 
stretch(ed) the limits of rhetoric’s territory.  Visual rhetoric extends rhetoric’s domain 
beyond the traditional ground of verbal arguments to encompass visual artifacts of all 
forms:  photographs, paintings, monuments, museum displays, advertisements, etc.  
The rhetoric of science lays claim to territory long held by philosophy, especially if 




science verifies truth(s) that exist outside of social contingencies.  In contrast, the 
rhetoric of science shows that knowledge claims are socially situated through 
persuasive discourses.  In the most extreme formulation of the rhetoric of science, 
knowledge claims are purely social constructions.  More moderate rhetorical 
approaches make less absolute claims about the role of rhetoric in science, but they 
still demonstrate that persuasion is a part of establishing knowledge claims.  
Regardless of the strength of its various incarnations, the rhetoric of science asserts 
that science is not merely the logical uncovering of an objective reality.   
The consequences of both of these rhetorical reclamations are significant; they 
broadened the scope of rhetoric from obvious sites of persuasion—political discourse, 
legal argumentation, celebratory occasions—to include endeavors that can be more 
subtle in their persuasive activity.  Visual rhetoric engages the perceived immediacy 
and “self-evidence” of images that can mask their persuasive qualities.  Likewise, the 
rhetoric of science engages the aura of constructed objectivity in scientific discourse. 
These expansions of the realm of rhetoric did not come easily; both 
subdisciplines faced watershed moments in the mid 1990s when they fended off 
critiques.  Argumentation scholars, such as J. A. Blair (1996) and David Birdsell and 
Leo Groarke (1996), had to argue for the status of nonverbal arguments, addressing 
claims that visuals cannot, by definition, be arguments.1  Similarly, rhetoric of science 
scholars had to defend their subdiscipline from claims that rhetoric was too “thin” to 
account productively for scientific discourse.  For instance, Dilip Goankar’s  critique 
of the field prompted a host of reactions from such rhetoricians as Alan Gross, John 
                                                 
1 This was not the first criticism of visual rhetoric.  Earlier critiques of the field claimed that that the 




Angus Campbell, and Carolyn Miller  (see Gross and Keith eds. [1997]).2  In the 
cases of both visual rhetoric and the rhetoric of science, rhetoricians broadened 
definitions of argument and rhetoric, and these discussions enriched both these sub-
disciplines and rhetorical studies at large.   
As Lester Olson noted in 2007, visual rhetoric is now “flourishing...despite 
some difficulties, obstacles, and overt resistance” (10).  The rhetoric of science has 
also grown; however, the subfield continues to come under attack from the other 
branches of science studies.  For example, Ceccarelli’s 2005 survey of reactions to 
her own work demonstrates that some historians and philosophers of science are still 
uncomfortable with rhetorical approaches to knowledge construction.  Arguably, the 
debates regarding both fields are more than just the necessary boundary work that 
accompanies any revision of critical practice.  These growing areas of rhetorical 
studies were (and continue to be) criticized precisely because of the epistemological 
ground each can claim.   
In the case of the rhetoric of science, rhetoricians push against the 
rhetoric/dialectic divide, arguing that rhetoric is essential to the creation and 
dissemination of knowledge: What we know about the material world is (at least 
partially) the product of addressed argument.  The most ambitious articulation of this 
view—Alan Gross’s claim that “science is rhetoric without remainder”—introduces a 
potentially uncomfortable relativism into the understanding of the foundations of 
scientific knowledge (Gross 1990).  In his revision to that earlier work (Starring the 
Text 2006), Gross himself has backed away from this extreme position, but the 
                                                 
2 Harris’ introduction to Landmark Essays in the Rhetoric of Science also offers a review of Goankar’s 




“science is only rhetoric” argument still serves as one terminus on the continuum of 
epistemological positions available to rhetoricians who study science.   
In the case of visual rhetoric, assumptions regarding both the epistemic status 
of visuals and the nature of visual arguments had to be challenged.  Throughout the 
history of rhetoric, visual description has been associated with pre-logical, non-
logical, or pathos-driven persuasion.  This is not to say that visual arguments and 
visually vivid verbal descriptions cannot or do not draw from the well of pathos, but, 
as scholars have demonstrated, it is not their only source of rhetorical force.   
Studies of visual arguments that appeared in two special issues of 
Argumentation and Advocacy in 1996 epitomize these demonstrations.  These papers 
refute the “visuals cannot be arguments” claim by extending argumentation theory to 
account for visual artifacts.  For example, Cameron Shelley’s “Rhetorical and 
Demonstrative Modes of Visual Argument” develops a two-category schema for 
understanding how viewers process visuals as arguments.  Shelly’s rhetorical visuals 
correspond to informal verbal arguments.  Her demonstrative visuals are the visual 
equivalent of formal verbal arguments.  Each class has specific features.  For 
example, rhetorical visuals present premises but not conclusions; demonstrative 
visuals present premises and conclusions.  As Shelley notes, “The point of analyzing 
pictures according to this dichotomy is not to separate them into two distinct classes, 
but to determine how they are understood to convey a message to the viewer  Any 
picture can make use of either or both modes of argument” (67).  Shelley’s work and  
other contributions—both in and since the Argumentation and Advocacy special 




that question is not the only important question addressed by studies of visual 
rhetoric.  
Scholars of visual rhetoric have also challenged the alleged objectivity and 
epistemic purity of modern “mechanical” visualization.  For example, Cara 
Finnegan’s work on photographs and the naturalistic enthymeme demonstrates that 
the medium of a visual argument calls on a matrix of typically unarticulated 
assumptions held by the audience; these assumptions must be satisfied for an image 
to function as an argument or evidence for an argument about the real world.  
According to Finnegan, a photograph is perceived as “natural” so long as the viewer 
accepts that it has representational, ontological, and mechanical realism.  That is, the 
viewer assumes that the image represents what it claims to represent, that the depicted 
scene really existed, and that the depicted scene was “…captured by the camera with 
no intervention from the photographer…”  (143).   A challenge to any of these 
assumptions will undermine a photographic argument.  Thus, even mechanically 
produced visual artifacts, like photographs, are not the objective epistemic objects 
they are often perceived to be.  In other words, they are not arhetorical in their 
construction or presentation.   
 Though there has been significant interest in visual rhetoric and the rhetoric of 
science separately, there has been very little rhetorical work done on scientific visuals 
and even less on scientific visual arguments specifically.3  Much of the study of 
                                                 
3 Lester Olson’s 2006 review of visual rhetoric since 1950 cites eighty-six sources, but only two of 
these sources are directly or even tangentially related to scientific visual arguments.  Of course, 
additional sources on scientific visuals have been produced over the last fifty years; some are reviewed 
later in this dissertation’s introduction.  Moreover, as Olson acknowledges, his review is partial to the 
studies that are typical in speech and communication departments.  Still, the small number of sources 
on scientific visuals in Olson’s review demonstrates that the studies of scientific visual have 




scientific visuals comes from scholars studying the history of science, philosophy of 
science, and sociology of science.  This is not to say that scholars working in these 
disciplines do not offer important insights on the history of scientific visualization.  
As the next section will show, they certainly do.  However, what we lack is a 
comprehensive understanding of scientific visual arguments in primarily rhetorical 
terms.  My project attempts to fill this gap by examining specific cases of rhetorical 
visualization.  Before previewing the methods I apply to these cases, I review other 
approaches to scientific visuals.  Such a review shows the value of these approaches, 
but it also reveals how a distinctly rhetorical approach can add value to the study of 
visual arguments in science. 
 
Approaches to Scientific Visuals 
 To understand the differences between a visual rhetoric of science and other 
approaches to scientific visuals, it is useful to consider the differences between the 
rhetoric of science in general and the other general areas of science studies:  history 
of science, philosophy of science, and social studies of science. 
 Scholars of the history of science are interested in the people and events 
involved in scientific discoveries and the development of disciplines.  Though 
historians of science do use text as evidence, they approach text as informational 
content.  For example, Bruce Wheaton references the letters and articles of William 
Henry Bragg, William Lawrence Bragg, and other physicists when describing the 
                                                                                                                                           
some rhetoric-of-science scholars have approached visual artifacts (e.g., Gross “Darwin’s Diagram” 
2007 and Prelli “Visualizing” 2006).  These are significant contributions to existing scholarship on 
scientific visuals; however, the rhetoric-of-science corpus is still predominately focused on textual 




Braggs’ role in the development of twentieth-century physics.  Including this material 
provides details about important events in the development of specific concepts and 
lines of research.  Philosophers of science investigate science from the perspective of 
how the history of ideas relates to theories of knowledge.  That is, they are interested 
in the logical operations that produce scientific knowledge, and they use episodes in 
the history of science as evidence.  For example, Karl Popper argues that scientific 
knowledge is based not on whether or not a hypothesis can be verified but rather on 
the falsifiability of claims; a claim must be falsifiable if it is to count as provisionally 
scientific.  While Popper does draw on specific examples from the history of science 
(for instance, he discusses Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle in The Logic of 
Scientific Discovery), he does so to show how the examples demonstrate specific 
points about the logic behind scientific knowledge.  Not surprisingly, the philosophy 
of science and the history of science mutually reinforce each other: the history of 
science is the history of ideas; the philosophy of science draws on this history to 
explain how ideas work.    
 Social studies of science approach science from the perspective of sociology, 
anthropology, organizational psychology, economics, etc.  Social studies of science 
have revealed how science functions as a cyclical economy of credit, funding, and 
discovery.  Resources are deployed to identify phenomena that increase the 
investigator’s prestige and lead to new resources.  Scholars who identify with this 
branch of science studies often use ethnographic methods, such as participant 
observation, to record and analyze the social activities that produce scientific 




Laboratory Life.  As part of the research for this work, Latour went so far as to take a 
position as a laboratory technician to get an insider’s perspective on the laboratory 
environment.  Latour and Woolgar also analyzed texts, but in light of how text 
functions in the social construction of facts in laboratory and disciplinary cultures.  
For example, the modality of claim statements, among other functions, marks the 
level of investment required to establish or critically engage a claim.  Arguing a 
“fact” into place takes a significant commitment of resources, while a less certain 
statement can be proposed or challenged by a single experiment or even a 
reinterpretation of existing data.  
 In some contrast to historical, philosophical, and social-studies approaches to 
science, the rhetoric of science focuses on the persuasive activities and rhetorical 
products of scientists.  Texts are the rhetorician’s primary objects of study, and his or 
her methods are the tools of rhetorical analysis:  argument analysis, discourse 
analysis, stylistics, figuration, stasis theory, reception study, and all the other tools of 
the classical and modern rhetorical traditions.  For example, in A Rhetoric of Science 
Lawrence Prelli uses a system of stases and topoi based on the systems of the 
classical tradition to account for the rhetorical invention of scientific arguments.  
Rhetoricians of science will use terms and apply concepts from other areas of 
science studies, but they do so to make rhetorical claims and observations.  For 
example, the recent collection Rhetoric and Incommensurability interrogates Thomas 
Kuhn’s notion of incommensurability.  Kuhn, a philosopher of science, argues that 
major advances in science occur when there are logical incommensurabilities between 




phenomena more completely than an older one, a paradigm shift occurs; the older 
theory is abandoned or incorporated into the structure of the newer one.  The essays 
in Rhetoric and Incommensurability show that total incommensurabilities are rare.  
Rather, in scientific discourse, incommensurabilities are typically either rhetorically 
negotiable situations or active rhetorical investments.  
The content and methods of historical, philosophical, social, and rhetorical 
studies of science can and do overlap.  It could be argued that these disciplinary 
distinctions needlessly divide the broader field of science studies; however, I find 
these distinctions useful for describing both the landscape of science studies in 
general and the scene of science visualization studies in particular.  When it comes to 
visuals, historians of science are interested in how new visualization technologies 
contribute to new scientific developments and how visualization practices change 
over time.  For example, Christoph Meinel documents the history of chemical 
modeling techniques and explains how they influenced chemistry instruction and the 
discovery of new chemical knowledge.  Philosophers of science treat images as 
objects of epistemological study.  For example, Robert O’Hara’s examination of 
representations of taxonomic systems shows the epistemological differences between 
pre- and post-Darwinian mindsets regarding the structure of the “Natural system.”  
Sociologists show how visuals are a part of scientific cultural practice.  For example, 
Michael Lynch shows how data is reduced into normalized forms that can function as 
standardized tokens of meaning in scientific cultures.  Sociological approaches also 
show how visualization practices contribute to visual cultures of science.  For 




for diagnosing tuberculosis were transformed through x-rays into medical tests with 
visual results that could be interpreted by trained practitioners.  
Historical, philosophical, and social studies approaches to visuals often 
converge.  For example, Peter Galison’s extensive study of nuclear physics, Image & 
Logic: A Material Culture of Microphysics, examines both the historical development 
of atomic particle visualizations and how these visualizations reflect two parallel 
traditions of scientific reasoning: the image tradition (where physicists look for 
individual pictures of “golden events”) and the logic tradition (where physicists 
analyze massive accumulations of instrument counts and other statistically analyzable 
data).  Galison’s work also reflects sociological approaches; he is interested in the 
organization of nuclear physics laboratories and how changes in lab organization 
influenced and were influenced by the material practices of visualization.  (It is 
interesting that the subtitle of this book is “A Material Culture of Microphysics.”)  
What Galison does not explicitly explore is the distinctly rhetorical dimensions of 
particle images and how they function as arguments.  For example, he explains how 
“golden event” photographs served as effective representative examples in arguments 
about particles even though there might have been only one or two images of a 
particular particle event; however, he does not explain these photographs in rhetorical 
terms.  That is, the “image” tradition of particle physics is not explicitly characterized 
as reasoning by example.  
Recent work by David Kaiser—a student of Galison—offers another example 
of this kind of interdisciplinary approach.  His Drawing Theories Apart: the 




Feynman’s diagrams of subatomic particles were circulated, adapted, and 
conventionalized in different contexts.  Like Galison’s work, Kaiser’s text is a 
thorough historical and social analysis, and it offers important insights into the 
circulation and reification of a visual genre.  For example, he documents the changes 
in the epistemological status of the Feynman diagrams over time and for different 
audiences.  Like Galison, Kaiser does not always raise rhetorical issues explicitly, but 
his thorough work does offer an interesting case for rhetorical theorists interested in 
the circulation, adaptation, and adoption of scientific images. 
In contrast to other science studies scholars, rhetoricians of science explicitly 
address how scientists construct visual arguments and how visuals affect the 
persuasiveness of science texts.  For example, regarding ethos and images, Anne 
Richards shows that the quality and number of visuals in a botany article can build 
the credibility of the author.  Similarly, she shows that otherwise uncompelling or 
even suspect images will be acceptable if the author is well respected.  Thus, there is 
a reciprocal relationship between images and the authority of knowledge claims.  
Images can build authority and authority can bolster the persuasiveness of images.  
While there are several interesting rhetorical studies of scientific visuals (for example, 
Shelley, Rosner, Dombrowski, Gross “Darwin’s Diagram”), the number is noticeably 
smaller than the number of rhetorical studies focused on the textual features of 
scientific documents.  There has not been sufficient attention paid to the connection 
between visual form and argumentative effects in the study of scientific visuals.  




visual forms in science and the sophisticated arguments deployed in scientific claims 
about invisible phenomena made visible.  My dissertation addresses this need. 
  
Theoretical Approaches, Analytical Tools, and Methodological Orientations 
This project analyzes how scientists visualize specific types of arguments.  
Two sets of tools are applied to this task: (1) a system of argumentation that accounts 
for some typical argument types used in science and (2) tools of visual analysis that 
can account for connections between visual form and intended meaning.  This section 
reviews these tools.  The claims enabled by these tools also require empirical support; 
thus, the last section of this methodological review describes issues related to context, 
reception, and circulation.   
 
Concepts of Argumentation  
 Chaim Perelman and Lucy Olbrechts-Tyteca’s The New Rhetoric: A Treatise 
on Argumentation is the primary source for the concepts of argumentation applied to 
each rhetorical case.  Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s work is useful for two 
reasons.  First, The New Rhetoric is well suited for engaging scientific arguments.  
Second, this system of argumentation has not been applied extensively to visual 
arguments. 
Though Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca are primarily interested in arguments 




also specifically address some rhetorical aspects of science.4  For example, Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca discuss issues of audience in scientific rhetorical situations.  
They note that the scientist communicates to the specialist audience as if the readers 
are members of the universal audience: “[The scientist] presupposes that everyone 
with the same training, qualification, and information, would reach the same 
conclusions” (34).  Recent work by Wynn (2007) suggests that scientists do not 
always make accurate presuppositions about their collegial audiences; still, the 
Belgians’ observation demonstrates that science is not outside the rhetorical 
framework of The New Rhetoric.   
The trajectory of that framework with respect to the techniques of 
argumentation is particularly pertinent to scientific situations.  Perelman and Lucy 
Olbrechts-Tyteca first define a series of quasi-logical arguments—such as arguments 
from incompatibility, transitivity, symmetry, and reciprocity.  These argument types 
are used in scientific situations more than one might think.  Much of the rest of their 
survey of the techniques of argumentation is organized according to the various 
arguments’ relationships with reality.  They discuss (1) arguments that depend on the 
structure of reality, such as causality arguments; (2) arguments that structure reality, 
such as arguments based on analogy; and (3) arguments that revise the structure of 
reality, what they call the dissociation of concepts.  While many of these arguments—
                                                 
4 In later reflections on the circulation of The New Rhetoric, Perelman notes that the project was begun 
as a treatise on the logic of values, but it soon evolved into a study of argumentation in general (“The 
New Rhetoric and the Rhetoricians” 189-190).  He also elaborates on the role of rhetoric in philosophy 
and the sciences: “Every philosophy is rhetorical to the extent that it is elaborated not by setting out 
from an intuition of clear and distinct ideas, but setting out from common language, always confused 
and susceptible to a great number of interpretations.  In order to avoid every misunderstanding, every 
ambiguity, the philosopher is obliged to clarify his intellectual tools, … adapting them each time in 
such a way as to establish systematic coherence” (194).  He then notes, “This way of adjusting the 
meaning of words to the necessities of coherent discourse is met with again in all the human sciences 




such as analogy and causality arguments—correspond to topoi that have been 
discussed in rhetorical theory since classical times, the arrangement of the Belgians’ 
discussion aligns well with the processes of scientific reasoning and discovery.  
Scientists develop existing hypotheses from known facts and controlled investigations 
of correlations and cause; they develop new hypotheses and conceptual models 
through analogy, example, and metaphor; and they revise and replace established 
conclusions and theories when those concepts cease to be the best reflection of 
reality.  Regarding the rhetorical restructuring of reality, Alan Gross notes in The 
Rhetoric of Science that  dissociation—the separation, negation, and or revaluation of 
appearance/reality pairs—is a fundamental activity of scientific discourse.  Moreover, 
for Gross, “The persuasive effect of science becomes just its ability to move from 
term I to term II as if moving from appearance to reality” (31).  In Starring the Text,  
the 2006 reworking of The Rhetoric of Science, Gross advances the claim that “This 
move is unique to the sciences” (40).  If dissociation is important to science and the 
seamless negotiation of the appearance-reality pair is unique to science, it is also 
important to understand if and how visuals participate in this powerful argument type. 
 My second reason for working with The New Rhetoric is that many concepts 
articulated by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca—such as the quasi-logical arguments 
and dissociation arguments—have not been discussed extensively in relation to visual 
forms.  Thus, in using this text as the basis for analyses of visuals arguments, I am 
testing the applicability of this rhetoric to the realm of visuals.  This test could have 
important implications for studies of visual rhetoric at large.  As Lester Olson 




historically-situated case studies [of visual rhetoric], we do not have a substantive 
treatise that might accurately be described as a theory of visual rhetoric” (14).  As the 
only complete rhetoric of the twentieth century, The New Rhetoric is conceptually 
rich enough to be the basis for a general theory of visual argumentation.  Though this 
dissertation is a set of “historically situated” case studies of persuasion in science, the 
consistent application of concepts from The New Rhetoric to these cases might yield 




My analytical framework depends on three interrelated aspects of 
visualization studies:  (1) visual figuration, (2) visual conventions, and (3) visual 
grammar.    
What I refer to as “visual figuration” is the application of argument patterns of 
verbal rhetorical figures to visualizations.  This subject has been articulated before in 
several contexts.  For example, Hanno Ehses shows how various playbill illustrations 
for productions of Shakespeare’s Macbeth included visualized rhetorical figures in 
their designs.  These visual figures range from antithesis and irony to synecdoche and 
periphrasis.  While Ehses’s examples are useful in demonstrating the existence of 
visual figures, the playbill illustrations are more ornamental than argumentative 
instances.  Also, the categories that Ehses uses in organizing the figures are drawn 
from pedagogical works, and these categories are not useful for engaging with figures 




Fahnestock’s treatment of visual figures in Rhetorical Figures in Science.  
Fahnestock argues that figures are more than mere ornaments; they are sources of 
invention that can take both visual and verbal forms.  For example, visual 
incrementum—a series whose terms increase (or decrease) in force—is deployed 
consistently in diagramming the evolution of species across the fossil record.  For 
example, in Figure 1.1 the constituent elements are arranged from bottom to top by 
increases in size, hoofedness, and time.   
 
 
Figure 1.1: An example of visual incrementum.   From bottom to top, over time the 
species increase in body size, the center toes get larger, and the other toes diminish and 
then disappear.  Source: Monroe, James.  “Basic Created Kinds and the Fossil Record 
of Perissodactyls” (11). 
 
The relationships expressed by rhetorical figures can be used to explain how rhetors 




serve as resources that scientists use when constructing and refashioning visual 
arguments. 
I also incorporate notions of visual conventions in my analysis.  In Shaping 
Information, Charles Kostelnick and Michael Hassett’s demonstrate how visual 
conventions are mutable forms, changing over time, forms that both constrain 
rhetorical action and invite inventional creativity.  Martin Rudwick’s 1976 “A Visual 
Language for Geology” is a good case study of how particular scientific visual 
conventions—the conventions of geologic strata diagrams—emerge from other 
technical and artistic contexts and traditions.  Rudwick, a historian, is concerned 
primarily with tracing the lineage of a visualization tradition.  I examine how 
scientific rhetors use and modify existing conventions to make new arguments. 
 The third slot in my analytical toolbox contains concepts of visual grammar 
and semiotics.  Though scholars from many fields have developed schemes to 
describe “visual language,” I find the most fully articulated visual grammar in the 
work of the discourse analysts Gunther Kress and Theo van Leeuwen.  Their Reading 
Images: A Grammar of Visual Design uses M.A.K Haliday's functional linguistics as 
a starting point for the semiotics of images.  While Kress and van Leeuwen 
investigate form-meaning pairings across Haliday’s divisions—ideational, 
interpersonal, and textual—for the purposes of this project, I am most concerned with 
their treatment of the ideational in what they describe as narrative, classificatory, and 
analytical representations.  For analyzing these classes of images, Kress and van 
Leeuwen provide a number of useful terms and observations.  For example, their 




groups.  Structured images are further defined according to spatial and temporal 
features.  Sorting images into these classes helps to identify how formal features 
create specific conceptual effects.  For example, a timeline turns individual elements 
into a narrative, a “set of successive stages of a temporally unfolding process” (107).  
Kress and van Leewuen’s distinctions between structured and unstructured images are 
particularly useful for this study, since in most of my cases, scientists transform 
unstructured (or semi-structured) inscriptions into highly structured visual arguments.  
In applying these concepts, I identify correspondences across the semiotic and 
rhetorical approaches to visuals.  That is, the study shows how specific concepts from 
Kress and van Leeuwen’s work correspond to specific lines of argument and figural 
resources. 
 
Accounting for Rhetoric: Context, Reception, and Circulation  
As visual rhetoric and the rhetoric of science developed, specific concerns 
emerged regarding issues of analytical accountability and legitimacy.  In responding 
to criticisms that rhetoric is too textual or too thin to account for visual and scientific 
artifacts respectively, rhetoricians refined analytical approaches that demonstrated the 
value of distinctly rhetorical analyses.  Part of that refinement involved greater 
attention to issues of context and reception.  In other words, if rhetoric is to offer a 
legitimate perspective on visual and scientific practice, that rhetorical perspective 
must be supported with evidence accounting for the context and reception of 
particular artifacts and arguments.  Some scholars of visual rhetoric became 




analysis of a visual argument must consider the immediate visual context, the 
immediate verbal context, and the contemporary visual culture of the artifact.  Some 
rhetoric-of-science scholars—for example, Davida Charney (1993); Paul, Charney, 
and Kendall (2001); Leah Ceccarelli (2001); Randy Harris (2005)—emphasize the 
importance of critically examining rhetorical context, audience reception, and 
intertextuality—what Paul, Charney, and Kendall call “moving beyond the moment” 
of rhetorical production.  
 For this project on scientific visuals, context and reception are important 
concerns.  Circulation is also an important concept to consider because specific types 
of visuals and specific images circulate and change both within scientific discourse 
communities and in broader cultural contexts.   
For each case, I assemble the best available evidence to support my rhetorical 
claims.  For my older historical cases, there are rich archives to tap for evidence of 
context and reception; the circulation of visuals within discourse communities can be 
tracked through citations and historical material.  For my more modern cases, the 
archives are more sparse, but supporting material is available.  For example, the case 
in Chapter Four (“Revealing the ‘Twilight Zone’”) is quite recent; the first article was 
published in April 2007, and the few works that cite this article are still in press.  
However, by interviewing one of the principle authors and contacting the first author 
to cite the paper, I have collected anecdotal evidence regarding the production and 
reception of specific visual arguments.  I have also been able to track the article’s 




 Finally, my thinking about accountability issues with respect to visual rhetoric 
in science has directed me toward some concepts from the work of Kenneth Burke, 
specifically the terministic screen.5  Burke’s chapter on terministic screens intrigues 
me because both images and science were critical to the development and explanation 
of the concept.  In the following passage, Burke relates the terministic screen to visual 
artifacts: 
When I speak of terministic screens, I have particularly in mind some 
photographs I once saw.  They were different photographs of the same 
objects, the difference being that they were made with different color 
filters.  Here something so “factual” as a photograph revealed notable 
distinctions in texture, and even in form, depending upon which color 
filter was used for the documentary description.  (115-116) 
Science also figures prominently in Burke’s discussion of terministic screens.  Many 
of his examples are scientific examples.  For example, he discusses the networks of 
terms used by psychologists John Broadus Watson and John Bowlby; Burke also 
applies the concept of terministic screens to the work of natural historian Charles 
Darwin.  Moreover, Burke comments explicitly on the capacities and limitations of 
scientific terminologies (120, 122).  It does not take an enormous intellectual move to 
use Burke’s terministic screen to conceptualize the convergence of the visual and the 
scientific.  Arguably, any scientific visualization technology acts like a Burkean 
terministic screen.  In the case of visualization, the variables that are measured by the 
recording instrument limit what the scientist knows about a phenomenon; therefore, 
                                                 
5 For Kenneth Burke, “Even if any given terminology is a reflection of reality, by its very nature as a 
terminology it must be a selection of reality; and to this extent it must function as a deflection of 




the inscription constrains the new claims that he or she can make.6  Thus, a given 
visualization technology has the potential to be both an asset and a liability in the 
rhetorical situations of science. 
 The terministic screen intersects with issues of rhetorical accountability.  For 
example, the terministic screen can help explain rhetorical contexts or reception-
based explanations of rhetorical effects.  Specifically, thinking about terministic 
selection can help elucidate both scientific visual cultures and immediate visual 
contexts.  It can also help to explain why specific visuals were received in specific 
ways.   
 
Chapter Summaries: Cases Studies of Visual Argumentation in Science 
My first three cases share a number of traits that make them interesting 
subjects for rhetorical analysis.  Each case explores the rhetorical activity that 
accompanies a new approach to visualizing otherwise unseeable phenomena.  Each 
case involves documents and events that had or will have revolutionary implications 
for both the history of science and the trajectories of specific disciplines.  In each 
case, visual arguments were central to the persuasiveness of new knowledge claims.  
In addition, each case demonstrates the persuasive activities needed to make specific 
visualization technologies or specific visuals acceptable to scientific audiences. 
                                                 
6 Burke explicitly addresses the role of terministic selection in scientific instrumentation; that is, 
terminological selection and deflection are built into instruments.  More specifically, he notes that 
instruments function like any other term system in that they are ultimately based on operators that 
either connect or divide: “And since all laboratory instruments of measurement and observation are 
devices invented by the symbol-using animal, they too necessarily give interpretations in terms of 




Chapter 2, “Articulating Atoms and Examining X-rays: Visual Arguments in 
the Early Years of X-Ray Crystallography,” examines how a new visualization tool 
was established rhetorically.  This chapter discusses rival interpretations of Max von 
Laue’s original x-ray diffraction patterns.  These images are symmetrical 
arrangements of dots; the dots are locations on a photographic plate that had been 
bombarded by x-rays intensified when diffracted by the atoms of a crystal lattice.  
Laue was correct in realizing that x-rays are waves that are diffracted by molecular-
level structures; however, both his assumptions regarding the geometrical 
arrangement of the diffracting crystal and his conjectures on the diffracted ray’s 
wavelengths were ultimately not convincing.  William Lawrence and William Henry 
Bragg articulated different methods for interpreting two-dimensional photographs to 
determine three-dimensional structures.  They reinterpreted Laue’s original 
photographs with mathematical and visual arguments based on principles of analogy 
and causality.  Their reinterpretations and later work in x-ray crystallography laid the 
foundations for some of the most important scientific developments of the twentieth 
century, including the revelation of the double helical structure of DNA.  
Chapter 3, "Showing the Motion under the Ocean: Visualizing Claims about 
Invisible Geologic Processes,” examines visual arguments from the early 
development of plate tectonic theory.  This chapter shows how geophysicists 
modified existing visualized remote-sensing data to create unprecedented visual 
arguments that justified the idea that sea-floor spreading is the mechanism of 
continental motion.  They deployed visual figures of thought and adapted visual 




and then, to depict a transitive relationship between segments of sea floor, magnetic 
resonances of those segments, and a timeline of known magnetic anomalies.  They 
argued that distance is related to magnetism and magnetism is related to time; 
therefore, distance is related to time.  Distance divided by time is the definition of 
velocity, the metric of motion.  In other words, these scientists used visual rhetoric to 
reveal imperceptible magnetism and motion under the ocean.  In doing so, they tipped 
the balance in favor of Wegener’s hypothesis that modern continents once formed a 
single land mass. 
 Chapter Four, "Revealing the Twilight Zone: Verbal and Visual Articulation 
of Invisible Atmospheric Properties," examines a 2007 article by NASA scientists 
who were making novel claims about the nature of the atmosphere.  These scientists 
faced significant scientific and rhetorical challenges because they were using atypical 
methods to support claims about data that others deemed dubious.  These researchers 
negotiated figural logics and adapted visual artifacts to make dissociation arguments 
that separated the appearance of a binary relationship between cloudy and cloud-free 
atmosphere from the reality of an atmosphere that is more complex.  They verbally 
and visually describe a complex invisible region around visible clouds where water 
vapor and solid atmospheric particles interact, reflect light, and hence affect global 
temperature.  The researchers called this area the “twilight zone” between clouds and 
aerosols.  Despite this evocative name, their discovery was initially rejected.  These 
scientists used an array of dissociation techniques to overcome resistance and argue 
the “twilight zone” into existence.  After demonstrating how their verbal and visual 




adapted for texts written for popular audiences.  Throughout the entire analysis, I 
draw upon my interviews with one of the NASA researchers who authored the 
“twilight zone” study.  Thus, I document some of the activities surrounding the 
production and revision of their images and texts.   
 My last two chapters explore some of the modern complications of using 
images to argue in scientific contexts.  Chapter 5, “(Ir)Responsible Mediation of 
Scientific Images: Enthymemes, Ethics, and the Visual Rhetoric of Science,” explores 
the ethical problems and rhetorical possibilities of adjusting images with digital tools.  
Recent cases of high-profile fraud—such as the 2006 Hwang stem-cell scandal—have 
drawn attention to the role of manipulated images in research misconduct.  These 
scandals and other kinds of cases—such as when honest scientists modify images 
inappropriately for presentational purposes—have forced editors of scientific journals 
to think about the lines between rhetorical presentation and dishonest fabrication in 
the Age of Photoshop.  This chapter examines recent editorials by scientific editors 
and recent revisions to journal submission guidelines to plumb the rhetorical 
dimensions of image manipulation.  By considering these disciplinary discussions of 
imaging practices in the light of such concepts as enthymemes, ethos, and objects of 
agreement, I explore the rhetorical and epistemological dynamics of the modern 
scientific visual.  Examining different editorial responses to both fraud and more 
ethically ambiguous manipulation reveals various assumptions about the status and 
role of visuals in scientific discourse.   
 Chapter 6, “Refutations and Revelations: Reflections on the Visual Rhetoric 




protein crystallographers had to refute an accepted visual argument produced by an 
accomplished colleague.  I juxtapose the details of this case against the observations I 
draw about the rhetorical dynamics of the other cases.  This summative juxtaposition 









Chapter 2: Articulating Atoms and Examining X-rays—  
Visual Arguments in the Early Years of X-Ray Crystallography 
 
Even Bertrand Russell is compelled to accept analogy as one of the postulates 
required to validate the scientific method because it provides the antecedent 
probability necessary to justify an induction.    
 
— Richard Weaver, “Rhetoric of the Social Sciences,” The Ethics of Rhetoric 
 
 
In 1953, James Watson and Francis Crick interpreted a now iconic photograph 
taken by Rosalind Franklin and Raymond Gosling.  Franklin and Gosling had used x-
rays to photograph a crystallized sample of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), the 
molecule that stores genetic information.  By analyzing the fuzzy two-dimensional 
crossed-ladder image of the molecule (Figure 2.1), Watson and Crick were able to 
determine the elegantly complex three-dimensional double-helical structure of DNA 
(e.g., Figure 2.2).  This achievement and other monumental discoveries in molecular 
biochemistry—such as Kendrew’s mapping of myoglobin (1958), Perutz’s mapping 
of hemoglobin (1959), and Hodgkin’s determination of insulin’s structure (1969)—
are part of a tradition of visual interpretation and argumentation that began decades 
earlier.  It was the interpretation and reinterpretation of x-ray photographs produced 





Figure 2.1:  X-ray diffraction photograph of DNA.  Franklin and Gosling.  May 2, 1952.  Source: 





Figure 2.2: Modern representation of DNA’s double-helical shape. Source: U.S. National Library 
of Medicine. 
 
In 1912 German scientists Max von Laue, Walter Friedrich, and Paul 




scattered the x-rays, and the scattered rays left highly symmetrical patterns of spots 
on photographic plates (e.g., Figure 2.3).  With some complicated mathematical 
analysis and some creative conjectures, Laue was able to make inferences about the 
wavelengths of the x-rays that made the patterns; he also read the spots as indicators 
of the relative positions of the atoms that had scattered the x-rays.  For the first time 
in the history of science, scientists had recorded visible traces of the arrangement of 
atoms in a crystal.  However, what they were seeing in the photographs and how the 
patterns were formed were not quite clear.  While the visual evidence itself intrigued 
many physicists, some scientists were unconvinced by Laue’s explanation of the 
pattern as a diffraction phenomenon.7  They were also skeptical of his claims about 
the composition of the formative x-rays.   
 
 
Figure 2.3:  Friedrich, Knipping, and Laue. Figure 5.  1912. Reproduced in X-ray and Neutron 
Diffraction.  G. E. Bacon.  1966. Unpaginated plate. 
                                                 
7 In their first paper, experimentalists Friedrich and Knipping described the experiment’s methods, 
while Laue, the theoretical physicist, interpreted the visual evidence.  Laue was responsible for 
interpreting the various results, so in most of this chapter I will refer to Laue singularly, a convention 




Laue’s interpretations of his images were based on traditional assumptions 
about the crystal structure of his mineral samples; these assumptions allowed him to 
make novel claims about the behavior and composition of the x-rays that interacted 
with these structures to form the spots.  He claimed that the photographs indicated 
that x-rays diffract like other forms of electromagnetic radiation.  At the time, it was 
not clear if x-rays were waves or particles or if x-rays were like or unlike visible light, 
so this claim to have observed diffraction—a wave phenomenon— represented a 
significant theoretical development.  Laue also conjectured that each spot could be 
attributed to x-rays with one of five possible wavelengths, and these wavelengths 
were related to specific kinds of atoms in the irradiated sample.  Though some of 
Laue’s initial conjectures would be challenged, his thorough use of visual artifacts to 
anchor a new visualization regime was remarkable for the time.  He used photographs 
and diagrams to construct a visual account of x-ray behavior; he also used visual 
evidence to refute counter arguments.  
Later in 1912, British father and son William Henry Bragg and William 
Lawrence Bragg replicated the Laue experiment, and the younger Bragg reinterpreted 
Laue’s photographic results to make different claims about crystal structures and the 
nature of x-rays.8  The Braggs used Laue’s photographs to support different claims 
about the molecular structures of the irradiated crystals; they also used the 
photographs to argue that the formative rays were selected from a heterogeneous 
bundle of x-rays that resembled heterogeneous white light.  For the Braggs, the 
                                                 
8 William Henry Bragg and William Lawrence Bragg both worked on x-ray diffraction experiments.  
They published jointly and individually on the topic, and they were jointly awarded the Nobel Prize for 
their work on x-ray crystallography.  In most instances, I refer to the Braggs collectively, though there 




spacing between atoms determined which x-rays were represented in the photographs.  
Ultimately, the Braggs convinced their contemporaries that this reinterpretation was 
more plausible; however, their means for describing the behavior of x-rays were 
based on heuristically efficient but technically imprecise analogies.  Their rhetorical 
and scientific success demonstrates the importance of persuasive analogies in 
affecting conceptual change in science.  Their success also demonstrates the role of 
incompatibility arguments in scientific debates; the Braggs used a range of 
argumentative tactics to show that Laue’s reading of his photographs was 
incompatible with the photographs themselves.  This line of argument allowed the 
Braggs to promote their own interpretation. 
 
This chapter examines verbal and visual arguments from the frontier period of 
the development of x-ray crystallography.  Analyses of the early crystallography 
papers of Laue and the Braggs show how each used the same visual evidence to make 
novel claims about the structure of reality and the nature of x-ray energy.  The 
exigence for this chapter comes from two sources.   
First, these articles and images have been discussed frequently from the 
perspectives of the history, philosophy, and sociology of science; however, they have 
not been examined from a rhetorical perspective.  Scholars taking other science 
studies approaches have not examined the range of visual arguments at work in 
Laue’s coauthored and single-authored texts.  Though the Braggs’ use of analogy is 
mentioned in some of the secondary literature, the extent and variation of this line of 




significance of their analogical reasoning is not elaborated from a rhetorical 
perspective.   
Second, this case is an interesting subject because it exemplifies the use of 
visuals to link instrumentation and argument.  X-rays were an “under known” 
quantity at the time, and the internal atomic configurations of the crystals were 
conjectures based only on mathematical hypotheses; consequently, the explanations 
accounting for these unseen rays and structures were highly speculative.  Unlike an 
instrument whose output allows some visual verification or uses the familiar medium 
of visible light, such as the microscope, x-ray diffraction photographs in 1912 were 
doubly ambiguous.  Both Laue and the Braggs relied on verbal, visual, and 
mathematical arguments to make claims with varying degrees of success about these 
rays and structures; both groups had to argue into place the premises governing the 
creation and hence the interpretation of the artifact. 
 
Scientific Background 
 The development of x-ray diffraction crystallography—the science of using x-
rays to study crystal structures—was the culmination of three separate lines of 
research: x-ray research, optics, and crystallography.  Each of these research areas is 
an important component of the scientific context of this case.  This section describes 
the state of each topic in the early twentieth century to clarify the concepts that Laue 







 In 1895, Wilhelm Conrad Röntgen was experimenting with a cathode ray 
tube.  This device is a vacuum-evacuated glass vessel containing a positive and a 
negative electrode.  When electric current is applied to the system, cathode rays (what 
we now call electrons) are emitted from the cathode and slam into the positive 
electrode (the anode).  If a phosphorescent screen is inserted within the tube, it will 
glow when struck by the free electrons.  While experimenting with this device, 
Röntgen noticed that in addition to the expected glowing of a screen within the tube, 
an unanticipated glowing occurred in phosphorescent screens outside the tube and 
even some distance away in his darkened laboratory (Mould 22-23).  By further 
investigating this strange phenomenon, Röntgen discovered what we now call x-rays.  
In homage to Röntgen, some early sources referred to x-rays as Röntgenstrahlen, a 
word that is sometimes translated as Röntgen-rays or röntgen rays. 
We now know that x-rays are forms of electromagnetic radiation whose 
wavelengths are approximately four hundred times smaller than the smallest visible 
light waves.  Though the information in Figure 2.4 was unknown during the early 
years of x-ray science, this depiction of the electromagnetic spectrum demonstrates 
the relationship between x-rays and other forms of electromagnetic radiation, such as 
visible light, microwaves, and radio waves.  The small wavelengths of x-rays allow 






Figure 2.4: The Electromagnetic Spectrum.  Source: NASA Langley Atmospheric Science Data 
Center. 
 
 Röntgen’s discovery of x-rays was a major contribution to both medicine and 
physics, but it was also a major cultural phenomenon.  The now iconic x-ray 
photograph of the hand of Röntgen’s wife (Figure 2.5) was widely circulated and 






Figure 2.5:  X-Ray Image of Anna (Ludwig) Rontgen’s Hand.  Source: Reynolds Historical 
Library.  University of Alabama at Birmingham. 
 
This photo and other images of “naked” bones unsheathed from surrounding tissue 
captivated the imaginations of both scientific communities and the public at large.  As 
a contemporary physician noted in 1896, “All the world seems to have gone off on 
two crazes—bicycles and x-rays” (Thompson qtd. in Pasveer 41).   
But in this early period of x-ray science, the phenomenon was not well 
understood.  Medical practitioners did not yet realize that x-rays could have harmful 
effects on living tissue exposed to strong x-rays for long periods.  Novelty 
applications—such as cosmetic x-ray hair removal and x-ray carnival attractions—
seem frivolously reckless by today’s standards; however, these applications of x-rays 
demonstrate how little was known about the rays during the early years of the 




The mysterious new x-rays also engaged the imaginations of physicists who 
wanted to determine the fundamental laws of matter and energy.  Initially, x-rays 
confounded physicists.  Some experiments indicated that they were wave phenomena, 
while other experiments suggested that they were fast moving particles, like alpha 
particles.9  At the time, the wave-particle dualism was not yet accepted as a working 
premise.  Many physicists approached the “What is an x-ray?” problem with binary 
logic: it was either a particle or a wave.  Thus, establishing the category into which 
the x-ray fit was an important research project for many of the most eminent scientific 
minds of the early twentieth century.   
A problem that further complicated the task of classifying the new 
phenomenon was determining which type of wave x-rays might be, if they were 
indeed waves.  Röntgen believed they were longitudinal waves, like sound waves.  
Other physicists thought they were transverse electromagnetic waves, like light.  In 
addition, researchers who were invested in the wave hypothesis disagreed about the 
regularity and composition.  Were x-rays periodic continuous streams of waves or 
aperiodic wave impulses?  Were x-rays homogenous radiation consisting of only a 
few distinct wavelengths?  Were they heterogeneous composites like white light?  
Was there only one kind of x-ray?  How did x-rays change when they interacted with 
matter? 
 One line of research that was especially important to the development of x-ray 
crystallography—especially to the projects of Laue and the Braggs—was Charles 
Barkla’s work on x-ray spectra.  In 1911, Barkla reported that, when x-rays interact 
with matter, they excite the atoms and cause them to emit a second (and sometimes 
                                                 




third, fourth, etc) “fluorescent” x-ray pulse.  This pulse has a wavelength that is 
unique or “characteristic” of the atoms excited by the primary x-ray beam.  This 
discovery was important to the development of x-ray crystallography because it was 
unclear if the x-rays forming the earliest spotted patterns were Barkla’s secondary 
rays or if they were mere variations of the original x-ray beam.  Laue and the Braggs 
disagreed on this important point. 
By 1912, scientists had conducted dozens of other experiments to determine 
the nature of x-rays.  For the purposes of this chapter, the specific experiments and 
developments are not significant for understanding the case; however, it is important 
to understand both how high the level of interest was in x-rays and how little was 
known about their basic characteristics.  It is also important to note that Max von 
Laue’s early work was situated in this context of uncertainty and experimentation.  
He wrote of that time at the University of Munich, “One lived there in an atmosphere 
saturated with the problems concerning the specific natures of x-rays” (292).  
 The genesis of Laue’s landmark idea—that atomic crystal lattices could be 
used to diffract x-rays—is described at greater length later in this chapter; however, 
this “brainstorm” will make more sense after brief primers on optics and 
crystallography.    
  
Optics: Reflection, Refraction, Diffraction, and Interference. 
 Optics is the branch of physics that studies the behavior of light, and it has 
been a subject of inquiry for philosophers and scientists since ancient times.  




and the study of light became more sophisticated throughout the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries.   
Before the advent of quantum mechanics and the operational acceptance of 
the wave-particle dualism, theories of light were either particle based (corpuscular) or 
wave based.  By the end of the nineteenth century, most physicists believed that light 
was a wave phenomenon; the first few decades of the twentieth century brought 
developments that began to destabilize this view.10  However, at the turn of the 
century, the wave model was dominant because it could better explain a wide range 
of known optical phenomena: reflection, refraction, diffraction, and interference.   
Mathematically, a wave is a function that has two properties: a wavelength 
and amplitude.  The wavelength is the distance between the crests of the wave.  The 
amplitude is the height of the wave crest.  Figure 2.7 demonstrates the relationship 
between these parts of a wave.   
 
                                                 
10 As Wheaton notes, the period between 1896—the year x-rays were discovered—and 1927—the year 
Schrödinger published his wave equation—was a tumultuous time for theories of matter and energy.  
His book The Tiger and the Shark is a thorough historical review of developments in physics during 





Figure 2.7:  A waveform.  Source: Oleg Alexandrov. Wikimedia commons. 
 
 
Phenomena that obey wave functions behave predictably when encountering 
specific kinds of objects.  When a wave changes direction after making contact with a 
solid object, the wave is reflected.  This is the behavior exhibited by light bouncing 
off a mirror or sound bouncing off the walls of a canyon.  Figure 2.8 is a diagram of 
specular or mirror reflection.  When wave P encounters the mirror, it reflects as wave 





Figure 2.8:  Specular (mirror) reflection.  The angle of incidence equals the angle of reflection on 
a mirror.  Source: Johan Arvelius. Wikimedia commons. 
 
When a wave changes direction after entering a new medium, it is refracted.  For 
example, a straight pole looks bent when partially submerged in water because the 
light waves behave differently in water than they do in the air.  Diffraction occurs 
when waves change direction and interact with each other after encountering a barrier 
with holes or gaps.  Such a barrier is called a transmission grating.  When light rays 
hit the grating obstacle, some rays pass through the slits or holes at new and different 
angles.  Two phenomena can occur when waves interact after they encounter a 
diffraction grating —destructive and constructive interference.  If two of the altered 
waves meet each other when their wavelengths are out of phase (i.e., the wavelengths 
of parallel waves do not align), they cancel each other out in a process called 
destructive interference, which is demonstrated in Figure 2.9.  If two waves are in 
phase (i.e., the wave crests and troughs of two waves are aligned), they are 




constructive interference is demonstrated in Figure 2.10, and it is sometimes referred 
to as amplification. 
 
  
Figure 2.9.  Destructive interference. 
  
Figure 2.10: Constructive interference. 
 
When visible light waves are diffracted, the combination of constructive and 
destructive interference creates visible diffraction effects.  For example, in the 
“double slit” experiment (Figure 2.11), a solid obstacle with two slits is placed before 
a light source.  Some waves travel straight through the gaps in the screen, while 




waves emerge from the slits, they interfere with each other.  Some waves interfere 
constructively and others interfere destructively, and these interactions result in a 
pattern of intense stripes.  
 
 
Figure 2.11: The double-slit experiment.  
 
Different gratings—i.e., different patterns of slits or holes—create different 
interference events resulting in different diffraction patterns.  For example, a single 
hexagonal opening will create a pattern like the one in Figure 2.12.  A cross-slit 







Figure 2.12: A hexagonal diffraction grating produces a pattern with six-fold symmetry.  
    
Figure 2.13:  A cross-slit diffraction grating produces a pattern with four-fold symmetry. 
 
Basic optical concepts—especially reflection and diffraction—were important 
premises for researchers studying x-rays.  From 1896 through 1912, scientists 
developed an array of experiments in their attempts to justify or deny that x-rays had 
the same properties as visible light.  If they observed or failed to observe diffraction 
and reflection under controlled conditions, they could determine if x-rays were 
particles or waves.11  Max von Laue's ultimate contribution was his demonstration 
that x-rays interfere and hence diffract like visible light waves when they interact 
with crystal lattices.  Though the Braggs ultimately agreed that x-rays are waves that 
interfere, they mathematically and visually explained the process that formed the 
Laue photographs in terms of reflection from crystal planes.  Crystals and crystal 
                                                 
11 For a thorough review of various successful, failed, and inconclusive x-ray diffraction experiments, 




lattices are described in the next section to clarify the relationships between the 
optical phenomena just described and the crystal structures that these scientists 
claimed to elucidate.   
 
Crystallography  
Like optics, philosophical discussions of crystals can be traced back to the 
ancients.  However, the science of crystallography—the formal study of crystal 
structure—emerged toward the end of the eighteenth century with the work of Roma 
d’Isle (1736-1790) and Rene-Just Hauy (1743-1822) (Senechal 43).  These natural 
historians developed early laws of crystal structure that were extended and enhanced 
over the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  By the end of the nineteenth century, 
crystallographers had revealed that all solid crystals at the macro-scale are formed by 
regularly repeating microstructures, now called unit cells.  A unit cell can be thought 
of as the smallest regularly repeatable volume within a solid crystal; they are the 
invisible “building blocks” of larger visible structures.  According to historian and 
crystallographer José Lima-de-Faria, early conceptions of the microstructures of 
crystals likely developed from scientists’ experiences with cannonball configurations 
(100).  Figure 2.14, a plate from José Lima-de-Faria’s Historical Atlas of 
Crystallography, demonstrates various geometry-based visualizations of crystal 





Figure 2.14: Conceptions of how crystals are formed by smaller units.  Source: José Lima-de-
Faria.  Historical Atlas of Crystallography.  (101). 
 
Of special significance is figure (e) (enlarged in my Figure 2.15), which comes from 
Hauy’s 1801 treatise on crystallography.  Unlike his predecessors, Hauy believed that 




were not spheres but angular units—parallelepipeds.  As Hauy envisioned them, these 
polygonal solids were stacked in various configurations that could account for the 
various crystal faces of visible mineral crystals.  Hauy’s work would be influential on 
later theorists who classified and defined the finite set of microstructures that could 
produce all solid crystals.  
 
Figure 2.15: Enlarged view of Hauy’s drawing of crystal packing. 1801.  José Lima-de-Faria.  
Historical Atlas of Crystallography.  (101). 
 
 
In the early nineteenth century, crystallographers began incorporating 
Dalton’s atomic theory into their considerations of crystal structure.  That is, they 
began thinking of the polygonal molecular microstructures of crystal in terms of inter-
atomic arrangements.  By 1851, using only physical observation and mathematical 




unit cells, could only take one of fourteen atomic arrangements.  These forms are now 
called Bravais lattices after Augustine Bravais (1811-1863), the crystallographer who 
defined six of the fourteen configurations.  In Figure 2.16, the fourteen lattice 
configurations are sorted into six categories: triclinic, monoclinic, orthorhombic, 
tetragonal, hexagonal, and cubic.  These categories of the unit-cell taxonomy are 
based on polygonal shapes; i.e., they are based on the angles formed between the 
atoms that make up the cell and the relative distances between the atoms.  For 
example, in a triclinic cell, each of the angles forming each corner has a different 
value and none of the axial lengths is equal to any other length.  In an orthorhombic 
unit cell, each vertex angle is a right angle, but none of the axial lengths is equal.  The 
cubic unit cell has right-angled vertices in each direction, and all axial lengths are 
equal.   
Additional unit-cell forms occur when additional atoms are part of the same 
unit-cell shape.  For the purposes of this chapter, I will focus on the cubic unit cells 
because this class of cells figured prominently in the work of Laue and the Braggs.  
There are three kinds of cubic unit cell: the primitive (one atom at each corner of the 
cell), the body-centered (one atom at each corner of the cell and one in the middle of 
the cell), and face-centered (one atom at each corner and one in the middle of each 
cubic face).  These cubic forms are demonstrated in the bottom row of Figure 2.16.  
Figure 2.17 demonstrates how the different cubic unit cells “stack” up to form larger 





Figure 2.16:  The fourteen Bravais lattices.  Figure 1-7a of X-Ray Crystal Structure.  Each point in 






Figure 2.17: The cubic Bravais lattices in eight-cell formations.  Figure 3-3(1) from Ewald, Fifty 
Years of X-ray Diffraction.  
 
In any crystal lattice, a unit cell repeats millions of times.  Imagine the forms 
in Figure 2.17 extending in all directions.  With so many repeated atoms, there are 
other ways to conceptualize crystal space.  One way is to think of a crystal in terms of 
different geometric planes.  These planes can be defined by the three points where a 
specific plane intercepts the axes of an individual unit cell.  The reciprocals (1/x) of 
these intercepts are known as Miller indices.  Figure 2.18 shows a macro crystal 
whose faces have been identified by their Miller indices.  Each digit in the three-digit 
code identifies where the plane crosses an axis.  The first digit is the x-axis intercept, 
the second digit is the y intercept, and the third digit is the z intercept.  A bar above 
the number indicates a negative value for the intercept.  If a plane does not intercept 





Figure 2.18: Figure 1-12 of X-Ray Crystal Structure. 
 
These indices can be used to describe the geometry of crystals at the macro and micro 
levels.  For example, the 113 plane (read as one-one-three) in Figure 2.18 cuts 
through a unit cell of dimensions a, b, c at the points a/1, b/1, c/3, while the 010 plane 
cuts across a set of unit cells at 0, a/1, 0.  This relationship is demonstrated for a 
different crystal at the unit-cell level in Figure 2.19; the 312 and 100 planes of a cubic 
lattice are diagramed.  Figure 2.20 demonstrates how a diagonal plane would 









Figure 2.20.  A plane with Miller indices of (221).  Adapted from Christophe Chan. Wikimedia 
Commons.  
 
Thinking of crystals as sheets of atoms in sets of parallel planes allowed 
crystallographers to move from macroscopic observations to inferences about 
microscopic structures.  By studying the different macroscopic forms of crystals 
(including their visually observable cleavage planes), crystallographers could infer 




Understanding the architecture of crystal structure is important because Laue 
and W.L. Bragg each based their claims on particular unit-cell geometries.  Laue 
based his calculations on the assumption that zinc sulfide (ZnS), the crystal used to 
produce the symmetrical pattern, is a simple cubic lattice; this assumption was based 
on the work of Groth, the chief crystallographer in Munich.  Bragg thought ZnS 
formed a face-centered cubic lattice; he cited British crystallographers Pope and 
Barlow.  These small differences in sources and premises had significant 
consequences for each of their interpretations of the visual evidence of x-ray 
diffraction.  
Before the work of Laue and the Braggs, experimental verification of the 
specific structures of complex crystals was impossible.  Optical microscopes could 
only resolve the surface features of crystal structures, and these observations were 
limited by the resolving power of the available microscopes.  Though macro-
examination of a visible crystal suggested the invisible structure of the molecular unit 
cell, no instrument could verify the arrangement of the invisible atoms; thus, these 
claims were inferential and in many cases inconclusive.  Crystallographers 
accomplished much with the tools they had, but they could not verify crystal 
structures at molecular scales until Laue and the Braggs developed the fundamental 
science for x-ray crystallography.  Their work allowed scientists to cross the 
molecular-resolution threshold in the observation of crystals.  However, this was not 
the purpose of originally applying x-rays to crystals.  The earliest work was directed 




grating.  The inspiration for this project developed during a casual conversation 
between Max von Laue and an advice-seeking doctoral student.  
 
Munich 1912: The Immediate Context of the Laue Experiments 
 Max von Laue (1879-1960) was a student of the renowned physicist Max 
Planck.  After completing his doctoral work under Planck in 1909, Laue joined 
Arnold Sommerfield’s Institute for Theoretical Physics at the University of Munich, 
where he worked primarily on mathematical problems related to traditional optics.  In 
February of 1912, Sommerfield sent his student Paul Ewald to Laue, so Laue could 
help Ewald with some theoretical problems related to his dissertation on the 
diffraction of visible light through polarized crystals.  Laue could not help Ewald with 
his specific problems, but during the course of their conversation, Laue suggested, 
“someone should irradiate crystals with shorter waves, i.e. x-rays” (Laue “My 
Development” 293).  Pursuing this casual suggestion would earn Max von Laue a 
Nobel Prize (1914) and an esteemed place in the history of physics. 
Laue’s brainstorm was the coalescence of two ideas.  First, it had been 
conjectured that atoms of solid substances were spaced nanometers apart.  Second, 
some experiments suggested that x-rays were waves of very small wavelengths—10-8 
to 10-9 cm.  Combining these two ideas, Laue hypothesized that solid crystal lattices 
with nano-scale spacing were small enough to interact with the nano-scale 
wavelengths of x-rays.  Presumably, the interaction would cause the x-rays to diffract 




Laue’s “suggestion” was taken seriously by Walter Friedrich and Paul 
Knipping, two young scientists who offered to help Laue design an apparatus to test 
his idea.  Both Friedrich and Knipping had studied x-rays under Röntgen, and their 
expertise with x-ray equipment allowed the project to proceed quickly.  After 
resolving a few design issues, they developed a method for testing Laue’s intuition.  
Figure 2.21 is a photograph of their device.  Figure 2.22 is a schematic diagram.   
 
 






Figure 2.22.  Friedrich, Knipping, and Laue.  Figure 1.  1912. Reproduced in X-ray and Neutron 
Diffraction.  G. E. Bacon.  1966: 98. 
 
As represented in Figure 2.22, the x-ray source (A) emits rays that are focused 
into thin beams of x-rays by passing through an aluminum screen and a series of lead 
shutters (B1-B4).  These beams strike a crystal sample that is held at a measurable 
angle with respect to the incident beam.  Photographic plates P1 to P5 are positioned 
around the sample to record the beams that scatter in different directions when they 
interact with the crystal.  Figure 2.23 contains four of the eleven x-ray photographs 





Figure 2.23.  Friedrich, Knipping, and Laue.  1912.  Plate 1, Figures 1-4.  Reproduced in X-ray 
and Neutron Diffraction.  G. E. Bacon.  1966. Unpaginated plate. 
 
Though these spotted images might look insignificant, they and others like 
them were vital for subsequent arguments about the process that formed them.  The 
real “prize” of the early work was Laue’s highly symmetrical photograph of the cubic 
crystal zinc sulfide (ZnS) (Figure 2.24).  The four-fold symmetry of the pattern 
provided the visual evidence Laue needed to validate equations he had been 





Figure 2.24.  Figure 5 of Friedrich, Knipping, and Laue. 1912.  Reproduced in X-ray and Neutron 
Diffraction.  G. E. Bacon.  1966. Unpaginated plate. 
 
Much of Laue, Friedrich, and Knipping’s paper and much of Laue’s separate 
simultaneously published article are dedicated to describing the development and 
verification of equations that could account for three-dimensional diffractions events.  
I will not rehearse these mathematical proofs here; however, the three equations in 
Equations 2.1 indicate the conditions for an intensity spot to appear: 
  




Because zinc sulfide (ZnS)—the target crystal that produced the image in 
Figure 2.24—was assumed to be a simple cubic lattice—the distances between atoms 
were assumed to be equal in all directions.  This allowed Laue to equalize many of 
the variables in the general equations, which simplified the math.  The Laue equations 
for the simple cubic lattice could be reduced to the following three equations: 
α =   h1 * λ/a  
β =   h2 * λ/a  
1 - γ =   h3 * λ/a  
In these equations, α, β, and γ are the cosines of the vectors that form the spots; h1, h2, 
and h3 are integers; λ is the wavelength; and a is the length of the unit cell. 
Laue’s equations explain the spots by articulating the conditions required for 
multiple waves moving in 3-dimensional space to interfere constructively to produce 
an amplified wave that could leave the intensity spots.  As the elder Bragg later 
commented in a lecture to the Royal Institution, “[Laue’s] mathematical analysis is 
too complicated to describe now, and indeed it is not in any circumstances easy to 
handle” (W. H. Bragg 797).  This complexity might have directed Laue’s decision to 
support his equation by creating an explicit analogy to optical phenomena: 
The curves 1 - γ =   h3 * λ/a, which are due to the periodicity in the 
direction of the ray, have an analogy in optics, known since the days of 
Newton, in the so-called Quetelet rings.  These are formed in the 
presence of dust on a smooth glass plate, strongly reflecting on the 
back….  What occurs is that the incident and reflected light waves at 




perpendicular incidence, the maxima lie on the curve given by 
equation (9), but are much flatter than in the case we are considering, 
since only two waves undergo interference.  If the dust particles could 
be arranged in a regular cross lattice then the analogy with the 
interference at crystals would undoubtedly be closer (95). 
This comparison, though conceptually and mathematically plausible, was not 
convincing to others.  Though internal peer responses to the Laue, Friedrich, and 
Knipping experiments were positive, some colleagues at Munich were skeptical of the 
theoretical and mathematical explanation.  Ewald’s recollection of Röntgen’s visit to 
the lab indicates a mixed reaction: “He was deeply impressed by the photographs, but 
[Röntgen] held back on the interpretation as diffraction” (Ewald 44).   
Laue, Friedrich, and Knipping communicated their results to the Bavarian 
Academy of Sciences through Sommerfield (a member of the academy) in June of 
1912.  Laue presented the results at the Berlin Physical Society in June.  Reactions 
there were positive.  As Max Planck recalls, “When the first typical Laue diagram 
became visible…a general, slightly restrained ‘ah’ propagated through the gathering.  
Each of us felt that a great achievement had been made” (qtd. in Eckert et al. 50).  
The symmetry of the ZnS image was immediately obvious and compelling to this 
scientific audience.  
On his way back from Berlin to Munich, Laue visited Wurzburg and 
discussed his work with Wilhelm Wien’s physics group.  Among the attendees at the 
Wurzburg discussion was a visiting Norwegian physicist, Lars Vegard.12  Vegard, a 
                                                 
12 There is some inconsistency in the historical scholarship regarding how the Braggs first heard of the 




friend of British physicist William Henry Bragg, requested a copy of one of Laue’s 
photographs, and Laue gave it to him.  Vegard sent the image to Bragg with a letter 
describing Laue’s lecture.  In this letter dated 26 June 1912, Vegard notes that there 
are gaps in Laue’s explanation of the photographs: 
Regarding the explanation, Laue thinks that the effect is due to 
diffraction of the röntgen-rays by the regular structure of the crystal…. 
He is however, at present unable to explain the phenomenon in its 
details, and there are several difficulties from the diffraction point of 
view. 
On the other hand… it is not easy to see how the corpuscular 
theory of röntgen-rays can explain the scattering into such sharp 
bundles of parallel rays….  But whatever the explanation might be, it 
seems to be an effect of the most fundamental nature.  (Vegard qtd. in 
Jenkin 380) 
William Henry Bragg showed the letter and the photograph to his son William 
Lawrence Bragg.  The Braggs replicated the Laue experiment and reinterpreted his 
results.  Their story is described at length in the next section.   
While the Braggs were busy thinking about the Laue experiment, Laue and his 
collaborators were busy publishing.  Two papers were published in the Proceedings 
of the Bavarian Academy of Science in 1912: a coauthored paper by all three 
scientists and a theoretical paper authored solely by Laue.  Each of these articles was 
republished in the Annalen der Physik (Annual of Physics) in 1913.  Laue would 
                                                                                                                                           
(2001) included passages from the letter, in which Vegard explicitly states that he sent the photograph 




eventually win the Nobel Prize (1914) for this work; however, his papers were not the 
last word on x-ray diffraction. 
 
Leeds and Cambridge: 1912: The Intellectual Context of the Bragg Reaction 
 By 1912, William Henry Bragg was an established figure in British science.  
Beginning his career and starting a family in Adelaide, South Australia, the elder 
Bragg established his research credentials with his work on alpha particles and his 
critique of the exponential law of absorption (Wheaton 82).  This research program 
led the elder Bragg to believe that x-rays were particle phenomena, and he developed 
a hypothesis—the neutral-pair hypothesis—to account for his position.13  The elder 
Bragg was one of the staunchest supporters of a corpuscular (or semi-corpuscular) 
conception of x-rays, and he publicly debated this position with Charles Barkla—a 
British proponent of wave-based x-rays —in the pages of Nature in 1908.  
Ultimately, Barkla’s work and the Braggs’ own work with the Laue photograph 
would undermine the neutral-pair hypothesis, and Bragg eventually accepted that x-
rays were at least partially wave phenomena.  I mention these earlier events here 
because the initial response of both Braggs to the Laue photograph was to explain the 
diffraction pattern in terms of the elder Bragg’s corpuscular neutral-pair hypothesis.   
                                                 
13 According to Bragg’s short-lived neutral-pair hypothesis, x-rays and gamma rays are particle 
phenomena and the particles are paired elements—a negative electron and a partially positive particle.  
For Bragg, the neutrality of the particle pair could account for the penetrating power of x-rays and 
gamma rays, since the small neutral particles would not be deflected or attracted as they interacted 
with charged matter at the atomic level.  Differences in the behavior of x-rays and gamma rays initially 
confounded Bragg, when he tried to account for both phenomena with the neutral-pair concept.   
When this thesis was challenged by evidence that x-rays were waves, Bragg sought a 
conceptual compromise.  In a 1907 paper entitled, “The nature of Röntgen Rays,” Bragg proposed that 
x-rays were a composite phenomenon of fast moving electromagnetic impulses and slower moving 
neutral-pair particles.  In some respects, Bragg’s work conceptually prefigures the wave-particle 




William Henry Bragg returned to England in 1909 as Cavendish Professor at 
the University of Leeds.  William Lawrence Bragg followed his father into a career as 
a research scientist, studying science at Cambridge University.  In 1912, the younger 
Bragg was just twenty-two years old, and he had just finished his first year as a 
research assistant at the Cavendish laboratory at Cambridge.   
The Bragg family was on a summer holiday on the Yorkshire coast, when the 
elder Bragg shared the letter and image that Lars Vegard sent to him from Wurzburg.  
Father and son discussed the discovery on this vacation and conducted some initial 
experiments upon returning to the family home at Leeds.  William Lawrence 
conducted additional experiments upon his return to Cambridge.  The younger 
Bragg’s recollection of this important summer describes the corpuscular approach 
that he brought initially to the case:  
During the summer of 1912 we had discussions on the possibility of 
explaining Laue’s patterns by some other assumption than that of 
diffraction of waves, and I actually made some unsuccessful 
experiments to see if I could get evidence of “x-ray corpuscles” 
shooting down the avenues between the rows of atoms in the crystal.  
On returning to Cambridge to ponder over Laue’s paper, however, I 
became convinced of the correctness of his deduction that the effect 
was one of wave diffraction—but also convinced that his analysis of  
the way it took place was not correct.  (W.L. Bragg qtd. in Ewald 60) 
 William Lawrence Bragg presented a reinterpretation of the Laue photograph 




talk was published in the society’s transactions in 1913.  Bragg first presented Laue’s 
argument and then replaced it with his own interpretation of the evidence.  After the 
publication of this paper, the two Braggs collaborated on several works, including 
papers explaining how they used x-ray techniques to determine the crystal structure of 
salt and diamond.  Further individual projects and collaborative endeavors developed 
new instruments and new methods for determining the structure of crystals.  
 
Though there is an extensive archive of primary material that covers decades 
of work in x-ray crystallography, this chapter focuses on the earliest documents of 
both groups.  The specific documents are described later.  The next section reviews 
previous studies that have approached this case.   
 
Review of Previous Studies 
The significance of early work in x-ray diffraction to later developments in 
protein crystallography (e.g., the characterization of DNA) and theoretical physics 
(e.g., the wave-particle dualism) has made this episode in the history of science a 
popular subject for historical, philosophical, and sociological treatments.  This section 
reviews significant contributions from these disciplines and demonstrates that the 
diffraction episode has not been the subject of thorough rhetorical consideration. 
Historical studies of this case tend to focus on the Braggs, though there is 
material on Laue.  These historical texts range from biographical sketches written by 
family members to reflective biographies and sketches by former students and 




Hunter’s Light is the Messenger (2004) is the first “full-length” biography of W.L. 
Bragg, but this text has had mixed reviews (see Holmes; James; and Thomas).14  
There are also volumes commemorating the anniversaries of both the discovery of x-
rays  and the discovery of x-ray diffraction specifically.  P. P. Ewald’s 
commemorative collection Fifty Years of X-Ray Diffraction is especially rich; it 
contains autobiographical material by Laue, W. L. Bragg, and other early x-ray 
crystallographers.  All of these texts are valuable sources for understanding the 
context, production, and reception of the arguments about x-ray diffraction. 
The Braggs never published complete autobiographies, though some scholars 
quote from the younger Bragg’s unpublished memoirs.15  Ewald reproduces a brief 
fragment of W.L. Bragg’s recollection of important events.  The younger Bragg also 
documented some of the episode’s history in various commemorative addresses.  For 
example, he delivered a speech before the Franklin Institute in 1967 to “reminisce” 
about fifty years of x-ray diffraction research.  Bragg also wrote a posthumously 
published history of the development of x-ray analysis, though this text is more 
technical than biographical.  Also, both Laue and the younger Bragg delivered Nobel 
speeches in 1915 and 1922 respectively, where they include some commentary on 
historical details. 
This case has also been included in thematic histories of physics, such as 
Wheaton’s The Tiger and the Shark: Empirical Roots of Wave-Particle Dualism and 
the collection Out of the Crystal Maze: Chapters from the History of Solid State 
                                                 
14 Reviews are particularly critical of Hunter’s claim that Bragg “had no great influence” on twentieth 
century physics.  Some reviews criticize Hunter’s understanding of the science. 
15 Currently, this text is housed in the archive of the Royal Institution, which is closed for renovations 




Physics.  Both texts offer additional historical commentary on the significance of the 
Laue experiment and the Braggs’ extensions of it.  These texts are rhetorically useful 
because they include reactions of individual physicists to specific developments. 
 The most critical analysis of the historical corpus is Forman’s 1969 
“Discovery of X-Ray Diffraction by Crystals: A Critique of the Myths.”  Forman 
argues that the story of Laue’s sudden inspiration during his meeting with Ewald is a 
clever myth perpetuated to give the community of crystallographers an origin 
narrative.  He then asserts that Laue’s thinking was directed by the unique intellectual 
climate in Munich and its legacy of crystallographic work.  Critiques of Forman, 
including L. D. Gasman’s “Myths and X-rays” and Ewald’s own reply have 
addressed Forman’s argument.  For my purposes, the particulars of this intellectual 
exchange are not significant, since the details of Laue’s “eureka” moment are even 
less verifiable today than they were in 1969.  Moreover, for my purposes, the 
generation of the idea is less important than the means that were used to communicate 
it persuasively.  However, the exchange is interesting because it demonstrates the 
differences between strictly historical and more socially oriented approaches to 
science and the “turf wars” that these kinds of orientation differences can inspire.16 
 The early x-ray diffraction photos have also been incorporated into 
philosophical accounts of the role of images in scientific thought and scientific 
culture.  Philosophical accounts use the case of the first x-ray diffraction photographs 
                                                 
16 Gasman’s critique of Forman’s sociological orientation previews some of the same criticisms that 
would be leveled at later rhetorical approaches to science studies.  Gasman defends science from 
Forman’s claim that the problems of studying cultures of science are similar to the problems of 
studying primitive societies: “Is science then to be regarded as just another belief system, 
epistemologically on par with the beliefs of primitive societies?  Perhaps science as the traditional 




to make claims about the conceptual mechanics of the scientific inference.  For 
example, David Gooding’s “Envisioning Explanations – the Art in Science” applies 
his dimensional model of visual scientific inference to describe Bragg’s reasoning.  
While Gooding’s interpretation of W.L. Bragg’s work is interesting, it is oriented 
toward Bragg’s own thought process more than Bragg’s communication to and 
persuasion of others.  For example, Gooding describes some pinpricked pages found 
in Bragg’s collected papers to describe how Bragg developed specific inferences 
about the relationship between the distance of the photographic plate and the shape of 
the interference maxima spots.  Though Gooding’s analysis does add to our 
understanding of Bragg’s invention process, it does not explain all of the rhetorically 
interesting features of Bragg’s visualizations.  
There are few studies of this case from rhetorical or cultural studies 
perspectives.  Suzanne Black’s “Domesticating the Crystal: Sir Lawrence Bragg and 
the Aesthetics of X-ray Analysis” is a notable exception.  Black’s work is in dialogue 
with James Elkins’ work on artistic traditions in crystallography.  Black notes that 
few scholars have been “tempted” to follow up on Elkins’ observation that “abstract” 
x-ray diffraction photography and cubism were developing at the same time (257-
258).17  Black contends that a close examination of W.L. Bragg’s writing can 
“reshape existing hypotheses about gender and crystallography and about 
crystallography and modern art” (258).  Her arguments regarding Bragg’s support of 
                                                 
17 Elkins, an art historian, argued that the history of art could be reconfigured by looking to the 
development of non-art images, such as drawings of crystals.  That is, major artistic developments, 
such as linear perspective or cubism, occur simultaneously in both high art and non-art settings, and  
specific kinds of images, such as crystallographic images, offer alternative ways to consider artistic 
traditions.  Elkins also argues that the art history of crystallography could be a meaningful alternative 
narrative of the history of representation. Elkins is focused primarily on crystallographic 




women crystallographers and his “domestic” late-Victorian aesthetic are compelling; 
however, Black primarily addresses events and texts that were written after the texts 
that I examine in this chapter.  I mention Black’s work because she both frames the 
critical neglect of x-ray crystallography in cultural studies of science and 
demonstrates the conceptual richness of the x-ray crystallography texts as subjects for 
analysis.     
Finally, some studies have documented interesting parallel episodes in which 
x-rays were incorporated into other scientific cultures.  Sociologist Bernike Pasveer 
demonstrates how medical practitioners worked with x-rays to develop new tests for 
tuberculosis.  X-ray photographs of soft tissue, like that of the lungs, were not nearly 
as clear as images of harder materials, such as bones or bullet fragments.  By 
comparing x-ray images of the lungs with the results of the contemporary tuberculosis 
tests—such as percussion (chest thumping), ausculation (stethoscope observation), 
and bacteriological studies of sputum—practitioners were able to transform 
ambiguous x-rays into more precise diagnostic instruments.  The process that Pasveer 
documents is an interesting parallel to the development of x-ray crystallography.  As 
mentioned previously, the x-ray photograph that captured the public’s imagination 
was the skeletal hand (and wedding ring) of Rontgen’s wife.  Such an image was 
easily and immediately acceptable because everyone knew what bones looked like.  
But few people knew what a tubercular lung looked liked, especially in a live patient.  
The shadowy images of lungs needed to be argued into place as indications of healthy 
or diseased lungs.  The fixation of this visual regime was possible because there were 




regime could be built.  The visual evidence was even more indirect in the case of the 
x-ray diffraction images.  These photographs are not images of internal structures that 
people already knew without question, and there were no other empirical tests for 
verifying the structures.  Thus, the crystallographers faced significant rhetorical tasks 
as they established the nature of x-rays and developed them into powerful means for 
elucidating crystal structures. 
 
Methodological Review  
As stated in the introduction, I align concepts from modern rhetorical theory, 
classical rhetoric, and other sources with semiotic concepts to tease out the 
relationships between visual forms used by scientists and the underlying structures of 
their arguments.   
 In this case, I am interested in arguments from sequential relations—such as 
causal arguments—and how scientific visuals participate in such arguments.  As 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca note, causal links enable three types of 
argumentation:   
(a) argumentation tending to attach two given successive events to 
each other by means of a causal link;  
(b) argumentation tending to reveal the existence of a cause which 
could have determined a given event;  
(c) argumentation tending to show the effect which must result from a 




I show how the apparatus of the Laue experiments and the visual artifacts it produced 
under controlled conditions provided the raw material to establish new causal links 
through which Laue and the Braggs made larger causal claims.   
Cognition theorists Uwe Oestermeier and Friedrich Hesse have explored the 
possible roles and limitations of visuals in causal arguments.  Synthesizing research 
from cognitive science, philosophy, and argumentations studies, they identify eleven 
types of positive (pro) causal arguments, ten types of negative (con) causal 
arguments, and six qualifications to causal arguments.  They then compare this 
taxonomy to a taxonomy of visual representations (e.g., graphs, time-series diagrams, 
tables, photographs, animations, etc.) to show if and how specific types of visuals can 
support specific kinds of causal arguments.  For example, they claim that photographs 
can support arguments based on covariation (“A caused B because B changes with 
A”), but they cannot support arguments based on counterfactuals (“A caused B 
because B would not have happened if A had not happened”).  I introduce this 
clarification here because, as I will show, the various representations of x-ray spots 
offer specific advantages and disadvantages in the causal claims made by Laue and 
the Braggs. 
 For this case, I also am interested in arguments from analogy and how 
rhetorical analogies factor into the rhetorical structuring of visual artifacts.  Laue and 
the Braggs both argue from analogies by comparing the ambiguous domain of x-ray 
optics with the more established domain of visible light optics.18  These analogies 
                                                 
18 When examining the application of analogy in this case, it is important to keep a historical 
perspective.  Now we know that x-rays are electromagnetic phenomena like light.  The differences 
between them are differences in quantity (i.e., the sizes of their wavelengths) and not differences in 




generated arguments that were translated to visual artifacts, which constrained the 
inferences that could be extrapolated from the images. 
Many rhetorical theorists have discussed the role of analogy in scientific 
argumentation.  As Alan Gross notes, “Scientific reports and scholarly arguments are 
alike in the value they place on the heuristic function of analogy and on the rules of 
inference and evidence with which analogies and the hypotheses they generate must 
be examined” (Starring the Text 39).  Belgian theorists Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca acknowledge a role for analogy in science; for them, it is a limited role:  
In the natural sciences, analogy—in our conception of the term—does 
nothing but provide support for creative thought.19  It is here a 
question of going beyond analogy in order to infer a resemblance, with 
the possibility of applying the same concepts to both theme and 
phoros.  By making the same methods applicable to them, the scientist 
tries to unite theme and phoros in a single field of investigation.  (396) 
Later in the same section of The New Rhetoric, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
further discuss the relationship between scientific analogies and rhetorical invention: 
As a link in the chain of inductive reasoning, analogy finds a place in 
science, where it serves rather as a means of invention than as a means 
of proof.  If the analogy is a fruitful one, theme and phoros are 
transformed into examples or illustrations of a more general law, and 
                                                                                                                                           
important rhetorical tool.  Laue and the Braggs had to establish an appropriate analogical relationship 
between the light domain and the x-ray domain to account for the visual evidence in the diffraction 
photographs. 
19 The Belgians’ definition of analogy derives from the generic formulation A is to B as C is to D, 
where A and B taken together are the theme, or conclusion, and C and D are the phoros, or supporting 
terms.  According to their definition, the theme and phoros must be from separate domains.  If they are 





by their relation to this law there is a unification of the fields of the 
theme and the phoros.  (396-397)  
I include these extended passages from the Belgians to demonstrate what they saw as 
the function of analogy in scientific rhetorical situations.  Arguably, the eventual 
conflation of x-rays and visible light follows the generic move from analogy to 
identity described in The New Rhetoric; however, analogy seems to have played a 
significant and more argumentative role in the early crystallography papers. 
More recently, rhetoricians have complicated and thickened the concept of 
rhetorical analogy in science.  Keith Gibson (2008) has argued that analogy in science 
is not as limited as theorists have claimed.  After surveying various treatments of 
analogy in science, Gibson shows how an Artificial Intelligence researcher used 
multiple analogies to establish a persuasive enthymeme; thus, in Gibson’s example, 
analogies were essential components of the argument and not just preliminary tools of 
invention.  In the same issue of Technical Communication Quarterly, Joseph Little 
(2008) notes that rhetoricians often acknowledge the role of analogy in science, but 
they tend to approach analogies macroscopically and to overemphasize the rhetor’s 
ability to choose the domains of comparison.  Such an approach limits the value of 
analogy as a lens for rhetorical analysis.  Little summarizes his criticism in the 
following passage:   
Put another way, our history of scholarship shows that we tend to 
leave analogies in their aggregate form, choosing as our unit of 
analysis the analogy itself rather than the specific points of comparison 




also shows that when we do acknowledge that enlistment, we tend to 
frame it as a decidedly voluntary act, conferring almost unmitigated 
agency on the rhetor (220). 
Gibson’s and Little’s recent studies demonstrate the need to study rhetorical analogies 
in science more closely.  My analysis of the roles of analogies in this case contributes 
to this “thickening” line of scholarship in the rhetorical studies of science. 
Different theorists have different views on the role of analogy in science; 
however, none seems to have addressed issues related to analogy and the scientific 
visual.  In analyzing the visual interpretation done by both Laue and the Braggs, I 
demonstrate ways in which analogy participates in the process of technical 
visualization.   
 The third rhetorical concept highlighted in this chapter is the argument from 
incompatibility, and I am particularly interested in how visuals participate in 
incompatibility arguments.  Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca observe that these quasi-
logical arguments are based on the logical reasoning of contradiction; however, 
incompatibilities are rhetorically negotiable.  For example, if a political candidate 
made two incompatible statements, he or she can resolve the incompatibility by 
claiming that the statements refer to different times or different contexts.  As I show, 
Laue and the Braggs had to negotiate rhetorically the incompatibilities that threatened 
to undermine their respective explanations of the x-ray diffraction photographs; they 
used both verbal and visual means to preserve the consistency of their respective 




 In this chapter, I also consider the classical rhetorical concept of taxis, the 
selective division and arrangement of a subject.  In “Visualizing a Bounded Sea: A 
Case Study in Visual Taxis,” Lawrence Prelli discusses the persuasive effects of 
arrangement in visual arguments.  He explains that “the Greek word taxis, the Latin 
word dispositio, and the English word ‘arrangement’ all pointed to the same 
phenomenon: the materials of a speech had to be strategically structured within 
coherent patterns of thought for maximum persuasive effect with particular target 
audiences” (92).  Prelli argues that rhetorical taxis can help explain graphical choices.  
Laue and the Braggs both make rhetorical choices about arrangement to give 
coherence to their visual arguments. 
 Finally, with respect to semiotics, I am interested in how the argument types I 
just reviewed are coded with specific semiotic markers.  Analogies are encoded 
through graphed equations that are similar to known optical forms.  Causality is 
encoded through the semiotic differentiation across “before and after” photographs 
and with technical illustrations.  Through these markers, Laue and the Braggs 
transform the naturally structured arrays of diffraction spots into highly structured 
visual arguments about complex physical phenomena.   
 
Document Summary 
 The documents that mark the birth and early development of x-ray 
crystallography were published in a number of professional journals and societal 
transactions.  I am primarily interested in the foundational studies of each group 




activity is most pronounced.  These documents are summarized in Table 2.1.  The 
Laue articles and the younger Bragg’s first article are the primary objects of analysis. 
 
Date Authors Title Publication 
August 1912 Laue, Friedrich, 
and Knipping 




August 1912 Laue “A Quantitative Test of the Theory 
of  X-Ray Interference 
Phenomena” 




1913  Laue20 “A Quantitative Test of the Theory 
of  X-Ray Interference 
Phenomena”  
(Same as Laue 1912 with 
additional notes at the end.) 
Annalen der 
Physik 
November 1913 William 
Lawrence Bragg 
“The Diffraction of Short 
Electromagnetic Waves by a 
Crystal” 
Proc. of the 
Cambridge 
Phil. Soc. 
July 1913 William Henry 
Bragg and  
William 
Lawrence Bragg 




Table 2.1: Documents 
                                                 
20 The Laue, Knipping, and Friedrich article and the sole authored Laue article were both republished 
in the journal Annalen der Physik in 1913.  Laue’s sole authored piece had not been translated into 
English, so I have had this text translated by a professional scientific translator.  My translation of the 
document is based on the 1913 version because the 1912 version was not available as a base copy.  
However, sources indicate that the 1913 text is identical to the original 1912 Laue paper with the 





Summary of Laue’s Arguments 
As I show, Laue and his colleagues carefully develop their verbal, visual, and 
mathematical arguments.  They explicitly document the changes they made to their 
apparatus, and they explain experiments that were conducted to justify specific 
premises.  The primary argument is an argument about the nature of x-rays based on 
analogical reasoning.  This argument is concisely stated in the following passage:   
If X-radiation truly consists of electromagnetic waves, it would be 
expected that when these atoms [of a crystal] are excited [by being 
struck with x-rays]…then the spatial lattice structure would give rise to 
interference phenomena; it would also be expected that these 
phenomena would be of the same nature as the lattice spectra already 
known in optics (89). 
In other words, if x-rays are like visible light waves, by analogy they should interfere 
as visible light waves interfere.  Laue’s secondary claim is that the x-rays can be 
sorted into five distinct wavelength groups.  Here I summarize the structure of both 
arguments as they were articulated in published papers: 
Premise:  X-rays are electromagnetic waves. 
Claim:   X-rays interfere with each other after interacting with crystal  
lattices. 
 Evidence:   X-ray photographs (photograms) with symmetrical spots. 
Analysis:   Most of the spots can be mathematically explained by 




geometry and trigonometry and supported by specific 
assumptions.   
Secondary claim:  Secondary x-rays of one of five specific wavelengths 
form each spot in the photogram; these rays are created 
when the x-ray beam resonates the atoms in the lattice. 
Evidence:   Mathematical reconstruction of a photogram.  
Supporting assumptions:  (1) ZnS forms a simple cubic lattice.  
          (2)  The lattice structure is significant to the pattern.   
(3) The x-rays forming the spots are homogenous 
characteristic radiation determined by the nature of 
the atoms struck by the x-rays.  This assumption is 
supported by analogy and precedent; i.e., Barkla’s 
work on characteristic x-ray radiation. 
The various components of this argument were articulated verbally, mathematically, 
and visually. 
 
Images to Arguments, Arguments to Images: Visual Rhetoric and the Laue 
Experiments 
 Laue’s first two articles—the co-authored “X-ray Interference Phenomena”  
and the sole authored “A Quantitative Test of the Theory of  X-Ray Interference 
Phenomena”–each refers to a common set of six image plates containing twelve 
figures—eleven photographs and one diagram.  Though the forms of the eleven 




in the first text.  The diagrammatic “Figure 6” is only referred to in the second paper.  
It is a visual rendering of the results of Laue’s equations; its close correspondence to 
one of the photographs was a rhetorical demonstration of the equations’ ability to 
explain the photographs.  Because the diagram shares a plate with the most important 
photograph, it is often reproduced in scholarly treatments of this case; however, most 
sources do not discuss the figure and its complicated rhetorical purpose.  
My Figures 2.25, 2.26, 2.27, 2.28 and 2.29 are Laue’s plates 1 through 5.  I 
refer to the individual figures in these plates by putting Laue’s original figure 
numbers after my figure numbers.  For example, “Figure 2.25.1” refers to Laue’s 






Figure 2.25:  Friedrich, Knipping, and Laue.  1912. Plate 1, Figures 1-4.  Reproduced in X-ray 






Figure 2.26: Friedrich, Knipping, and Laue. 1912. Plate II, Figures 5 and 6.  Reproduced in X-






Figure 2.27: Friedrich, Knipping, and Laue.  1912. Plate III, Figures 7 and 8.  Reproduced in X-
ray and Neutron Diffraction.  G. E. Bacon.  1966. Unpaginated plate. 
. 
 
Figure 2.28.  Friedrich, Knipping, and Laue.  1912. Plate IV, Figures 9 and 10.  Reproduced in X-





Figure 2.29: Friedrich, Knipping, and Laue.  1912. Plate V, Figures 11 and 12.  Reproduced in X-
ray and Neutron Diffraction. G. E. Bacon.  1966. Unpaginated plate. 
 
Each of the eleven photographs serves one or more functions in the argument.  
The first four images are from early experiments with copper sulfate crystals.  The 
seven other photographs are images of zinc sulfide.   
Figures 2.25.1 to 2.25.4 explain the development of the experimental 
apparatus and the establishment of some foundational premises through causal 
reasoning.  Each of these images is a photograph of copper sulfate (CuS), the first 
mineral they imaged with their machine.  Copper sulfate is a triclinic crystal (no equal 
sides, no equal angles), thus it is not symmetrical like the ZnS that the group would 
latter use in the experiment   Figure 2.25.1 is the image of the first exposure taken 
with the “definitive apparatus.”  In the text, Friedrich, Knipping, and Laue also refer 
to other images which are identical to 2.25.1 but which are not reproduced in the text.  




x-ray source or the angle of incidence; thus, they irradiated a different portion of the 
crystal.  The subsequent image was identical to Figure 2.25.1; thus, they claimed, “the 
phenomenon is independent of the portion of the crystal which is irradiated” (101).  
That is, the images are caused by the atomic lattice and not the macrostructure of the 
crystal. 
Figure 2.25.2 demonstrates that the crystal structure is part of the causal chain 
forming the patterns.  This image is of a crystal sample that has been ground into a 
fine powder.  The impressive pattern in 2.25.1 disappears when a box of this powder 
is the irradiated specimen.  There are a few “irregular” spots near the large spot made 
by the x-ray source; however, these small spots are barely visible.  Thus, Figure 
2.25.2 shows that the lattice structure is involved in the pattern-forming process 
because demolishing the lattice destroys the pattern.  A difference of effect in the 
second image supports their claims regarding the mechanism of the cause. 
Figures 2.25.3 and 2.25.4 demonstrate improvements to the lead shutters that 
narrowed and focused the x-ray beam.  Each pattern is similar to the pattern in 2.25.1, 
but the more focused x-rays created smaller spots.  Figures 2.25.3 and 2.25.4 are 
slightly different because the plate (P4) for 2.25.4 was positioned 35 mm from the x-
ray source and the plate (P5) for 2.25.3 was set 70 mm from it.  Laue compares 
Figures 2.25.3 and 2.25.4 to conjecture about the nature of crystal-x-ray interaction 
based on the differences:   
It is noteworthy that the ratio of the distances crystal-P4 to crystal P5 
is the same as the ratio of the sizes of the patterns on P4 and P5, from 




crystal.  It should also be noted that the size of the individual 
secondary spots, in spite of the greater distance of Plate P5 from the 
crystal has remained unchanged.  This may well be an indication that 
the secondary radiation leaves the crystal in the form of a parallel 
pencil. 
As I will show in the discussion of Figures 2.28.9 and 2.29.10, Laue pays close 
attention to the positions and sizes of the spots, but he does not note the differences in 
shape.  This would be an important argument for Bragg. 
 Figure 2.26.5 is now the iconic photograph associated with the Laue 
experiments.  This image is the diffraction pattern of zinc sulfide (ZnS), also known 
as zinc blende.  Zinc blende was chosen as a crystal sample because its crystal lattice 
was supposed to be formed of simple cubic unit cells.  Also, other researchers 
indicated that heavy zinc atoms should be especially good x-ray resonators.  Thus, the 
experimental setup that produced this image reflects two of the foundational 
assumptions of the Laue group: (1) the lattice is a simple cube and (2) the pattern is 
formed by the characteristic radiation emitted by atoms when struck by the x-rays.  
Both of these premises would be tempered by later work, but at the time of the 
experiment, they seemed like plausible ideas.  The perfect symmetry of the resulting 
spot pattern seemed to justify the validity of these choices. 
 Figure 2.27.7 demonstrates how changes in the planar orientation of the 
crystal change the pattern of spots.  While Figure 2.26.5 was set so that the x-rays 
struck the 100 face of the crystal perpendicularly, Figure 2.27.7 was formed by x-rays 




differences between these two planes.  The black arrows demonstrate the direction of 
the incident radiation to show how the x-rays would strike the crystal differently with 
adjustments to the plane of exposure. 
a. b.  
Figures 2.30a and 2.30b:  X-rays (black arrows) striking the 100 plane (a) and 111 plane (b). 
 
Figure 2.29.12 functions in the same way as Figure 2.27.7, except that image is of 
plane 110.  In other words, it is a top down shot of the crystal.  The “two fold” 
symmetry is what one would expect based on the known information about the crystal 
structure.  Figure 2.30c demonstrates how the-x-rays would strike the crystal in this 
case. 
 




Figures 2.27.8 and 2.29.11 demonstrate the effect of changing the angle of the 
incident radiation by three degrees.  Figure 2.27.8 is taken from the same planar 
orientation as Figure 2.27.7, but the three-degree change results in less than perfect 
symmetry.  Figure 2.29.11 shows the same three-degree shift performed on the 100 
plane, i.e., the image in Figure 2.26.5.  The images of these slight shifts were taken 
“to show that an accurate orientation of the crystal is necessary in order to obtain 
identical pictures on repetition of an experiment” (103).  The subsequent 
unsymmetrical patterns demonstrate the importance of precise orientation. 
Figure 2.28.9 and Figure 2.28.10 are only mentioned in a footnote.  Together, 
they demonstrate how the distance of the photo plate from the incident x-ray beam 
affects the spot pattern.  Both images show a formation similar to the pattern in 
Figure 2.26.5.  However, the spots in 2.28.9 are closer together, and in 2.28.10, they 
are spread further apart.  Though all three images are of the same crystal face, the 
plate for Figure 2.26.5 was 35 mm from the x-ray source, and the plates for Figures 
2.28.9 and 2.28.10 plates were set at 10 mm and 70 mm respectively.   
The relative neglect of these two figures in historical studies is unfortunate 
because they demonstrate an important point that Laue overlooked but that Bragg did 
not.  Specifically, these photograms demonstrate that the shape of the spots becomes 
more elliptical the further the photo plate is from the crystal.  In this first paper, Laue 
is only concerned with the size of the spots, their arrangement, and their intensity 
(i.e., their relative darkness); thus, he missed this important point. 
Kenneth Burke’s concept of the terministic screen might offer some insight 




an analogy to optical interference in which he extended the concept of a one-
dimensional optical diffraction grating to the three dimensional crystal lattice.  In 
such an analogy, shape is not a term of interest, though size and spatial position are.  
In other words, Laue did not see the shape differences because his attention was 
directed by a different set of visual terms. 
 Though much is made of the photogram in Figure 2.26.5, the ten less 
glamorous photographs are important and understudied aspects of this case.  These 
images provided a visual narrative of the experiment that parallels the verbal 
narrative.  They become significant comparative and causal arguments that visualize 
the relationships between distance, angle, planar orientation, and lattice structure, and 
thus they provide important clues about the underlying process.  The regularity of the 
changes provided stability to the case, demonstrated that the process is a reliable 
method for visualizing crystal structure, and justified that x-rays are waves.  
The photographs also provide visual verification of a number of premises 
essential to Laue’s reading of the iconic image.  Specifically, they demonstrate that 
the apparatus is creating images that depend on the structure of the crystal.  
Ultimately, this portion of Laue’s argument would be extremely successful.  No one 
doubted that the group photographically captured traces of x-rays interacting with the 
crystal.  Nor did they doubt that the photos demonstrated that x-rays are waves.  
However, colleagues did doubt the particulars of his explanation.  Specifically, W. L. 
Bragg and others challenged the mathematically derived claim that the spots are 




fascinating mathematical and visual argument that is also an understudied portion of 
this case. 
In Laue’s sole-authored “Quantitative Proof of X-Ray Interference,” Laue 
attempts to reconstruct mathematically the image in Figure 2.26.5, and the results of 
this work are shown in Figure 2.26.6. 
 
Figure 2.26.6 
This image is not (as some have suggested) simply a key to Figure 2.26.5 (the 
best and most symmetrical x-ray image).  It is, instead, a visualization of Laue’s 
equations that corresponds to the photograph.  Essentially, Laue “rebuilds” the 
photograph of Figure 2.26.5 in diagrammatic form through deductive reasoning based 
on some known premises and his equations.  As far as I know, this aspect of the 
diagram is largely overlooked, though Laue clearly explains how readers should read 
the diagram: 
To make the comparison with past experience easier, in Figure 6, Plate 




reconstructed directly from the numbers given here, h1, h2, h3, 
according to the equations (13b) and assuming z = 3.56 centimeters.  
By measuring with the protractor, the reader can check on the 
agreement of the figure with the photogram.  Omitted in the drawing 
are only the two points whose absence was not explained in the 
photogram and some points in the outer parts of the photogram, which 
so far have not been calculated all the way through/ (998)   
The visualization’s mathematically generated spots coincide with spots in Figure 
2.26.5; hence, Laue’s explanation is validated.  The generation of the same pattern 
both by the apparatus and by his equations was the critical point for Laue.  The 
similarity of effect indicates a similarity of cause; i.e., the phenomena producing the 
photographic spots obey the same principles as the mathematically derived spots.  He 
concludes the second paper with the following declaration:  “Figure 6 with the 
Photogram 5 constitutes extensive confirmation of the interference theory on these 
phenomena” (999).  By recreating the image with his equations, Laue argued that his 
equations—and hence his interpretations of the photographs—were correct.  
Interesting from a rhetorical perspective is Laue’s invitation to the reader to 
verify his work by measuring the diagram and the photogram.  The reader becomes 
complicit in affirming the argument.  Laue’s decision to code the constructed spots 
with symbols identifying five λ/a values (i.e., their relative wavelengths) is interesting 
from both semiotic and rhetorical perspectives.  Semiotically, it transforms the spot 
pattern through what Kress and van Leeuwen would call a “classificational process.”  




have been marked as distinct members of a genus with five species of visual 
entities—species constructed by Laue’s mathematical analysis.  In rhetorical terms, 
Laue is engaged in visual rhetorical taxis—the selective division and arrangement of 
the subject.  Though this division of the spots into five categories was compelling to 
Laue and compelling within the article itself, it was not compelling to others.  As later 
sections show, parts of his argument ultimately fail because of several faulty 
assumptions, including the assumption that ZnS has a simple cubic lattice.  Before 
examining the reception of Laue’s argument, I first examine how Laue attempted to 
address some perceived incompatibilities in his images and arguments both before 
and after the debut of his photograms and diagram. 
 
Preemptive and Reactionary Refutation:  Constructing and Resolving 
Incompatibilities 
 Recall that Laue argues two claims: (1) x-rays are wave phenomena, and (2) 
the spots are formed by five specific wavelengths.  Laue deploys arguments from 
incompatibility to support both of these claims. 
 When arguing for the claim that x-rays are waves, Laue uses incompatibility 
arguments to dismiss the only available alternative hypothesis—the hypothesis that x-
rays are corpuscles.  Laue refutes this alternative by identifying contradictions that a 
corpuscular phenomenon would entail: 
Let us imagine that the atoms of the crystal in the cast of Fig. 5, Plate 
II [Figure 2.25.5], are exited by means of a corpuscular radiation.  […]  




would be brought into coherent oscillations, which would only apply 
to the series of atoms parallel to the z-direction.  Atoms at a definite 
distance from each other in the x- or y- direction would be excited by 
different corpuscles, a definite phase difference between their 
oscillations could therefore not arise.  Because of this, in the intensity 
expression (6) only one sine-quotient would remain; we would have 
only one condition for an intensity maximum, which as symmetry 
considerations also indicate, would be fulfilled along circles around 
the point of impact of the primary ray.  The broken character of these 
circles which is actually observed would be completely 
incomprehensible.  (96) 
In other words, a corpuscular cause is incompatible with the photographed pattern.  A 
corpuscular phenomenon would create unbroken circles, rather than the rings of dots 
that appear in Figure 2.26.5.  Figure 2.26.6a demonstrates how the spots in Figures 






Figure 2.26.6a:  Laue’s Figure 6, my circles. 
 
Since a corpuscular cause is incompatible with the images as they appeared, the cause 
must be wave-based.  This conclusion was ultimately convincing.  Less convincing 
were Laue’s claims about the number and source of the x-rays producing the spots. 
Laue believed that when the atoms were struck by the incident beam, they 
oscillated and released secondary x-rays of specific wavelengths unique to the 
resonating atomic element.  Technically, such a process does occur; however, this 
was not the process forming the first x-ray diffraction spots.  The counter claim 
eventually forwarded by Bragg (but apparently mentioned by others) was that the 
spacing of the lattice structure determined the wavelengths of the radiation that 
ultimately marked the photographic plates.  Laue addresses this claim in a note added 
to his second paper when the paper was reprinted in the 1913 Annalen der Physik.  He 




been expressed “in the course of normal conversation” (1000).  In the note, Laue uses 
tactics similar to his refutation of the corpuscular explanation of x-rays; he invokes an 
incompatibility argument that depends on what is not in the visuals:  
The very strange and as yet unexplained fact, that the spectrally high-
grade nonhomogeneous pulses of incident X-ray radiation in the 
crystal caused oscillations of very precise wavelengths (in my opinion, 
that is the only way we can explain the accuracy of the observed 
interference points), in the course of normal conversation occasionally 
was explained by saying that the selection of these sinusoidal 
oscillations, from all of those that are present in the pulses, is 
presumably a function of the spatial grid.  In contrast, we want to show 
that the possible interference maxima, according to [equations] (12) (in 
the presence of the required oscillations), everywhere lie so densely 
that the photographic plate would have to be blackened completely, 
unless the properties of the grid elements, stated in the function ψ (α, 
β), would eliminate a certain number of finite numbers from the 
infinitely many wavelengths of the original radiation.  (1000, my 
emphasis) 
According to Laue, the actual photograms were incompatible with the alternative 
lattice-filtering hypothesis because that hypothesis would entail either a completely 
blackened photograph or a spatial lattice of infinite filtering capacity.  For Laue, this 




 Laue worked with and against visual evidence to fend off counter arguments; 
however, there were some inconsistencies he was unable to overcome rhetorically.  
Specifically, his equations predicted some spots in his photographs that do not appear.  
He acknowledged these inconsistencies between his images and his math, and he 
attributed them to the uncertainty involved with the development of a new theory.  
Laue’s peers did not accept this rhetorical mitigation of contradictory evidence, and 
some of his rivals pointed to these inconsistencies as support for alternative 
explanations.  
Reception  
 As noted previously, the diffraction photographs intrigued Laue’s German 
colleagues, though some—including Röntgen—were unconvinced that they proved a 
diffraction/interference phenomenon.  British reactions were also a mix of admiration 
and skepticism.  Chemist Oliver Lodge, who had been in Munich around the time of 
the Laue experiment, commented on the work in a lecture to the Chemical Society: 
This [photographing of atomic positions], if it be a fact, will have to be 
recognised [sic] as a striking and admirable case of scientific 
prediction, the various crystalline structures and accuracy of 
characteristic facets having been indicated by theory long before there 
was any hope of actually seeing them; so that once more—always 
assuming that the heralded discovery is substantiated—the theoretical 





After the photographs were published, other physicists in Britain were impressed by 
the images but uncertain about Laue’s explanation.  For example, in an October 1912 
letter to British physicist Ernest Rutherford, Charles Barkla wrote, “I have had a copy 
of Laue’s paper for some little time and certainly am skeptical of any interference 
interpretation of the results.  A number of features do not point that way” (qtd. in 
Foreman 55).  However, Barkla’s skepticism was directed toward the specific results 
and not the general model of x-rays as waves:  “This in no way affects my absolute 
confidence in the truth of the wave theory of x rays” (qtd. in Foreman 55).  In a letter 
to the journal Nature in 1912, the elder Bragg noted the significance of Laue’s image, 
but he was also unconvinced by the explanation:  “Until further experimental results 
are available, it is difficult to distinguish between various explanations which suggest 
themselves.  It is clear, however, that the diagram is an illustration of the arrangement 
of the atoms in the crystal” (“X-rays and Crystals” 219).21   H. G. J. Moseley, another 
British physicist, was entirely unconvinced by the explanation.  As historian J. L. 
Heilbron notes, “When [Moseley] looked more closely at the German work he 
concluded that Laue and company “entirely failed to understand what it meant and 
gave an explanation that was entirely wrong”” (Heilbron 70).   
One can read this reception evidence as an indication that Laue’s work 
succeeded as an argument for existence, but failed with respect to its arguments of 
definition and cause.  For these readers, the photographs indicated that something 
regular and predictable happens to x-rays as they interact with the crystals; however, 
the interpretation of the photographs as the diffraction of x-rays of specific 
wavelengths was not convincing.   
                                                 




 This was the reaction of both Bragg’s to the Laue project, and the younger 
Bragg’s first paper was a detailed replacement of the Laue explanation.  His claims 
rest on a number of visual objects, including a diagram that reinterprets the most 
essential Laue photogram. 
 
Summary of W. L. Bragg’s Argument   
As noted previously, both Braggs worked on replicating Laue’s experiment 
and reinterpreting the results, but it was the younger Bragg who first published a 
revision of Laue’s interpretations.  A sketch of W. L. Bragg’s first argument is as 
follows. 
Claim:  X-rays interfere with each other after passing through a crystal; 
however, it is mathematically and conceptually convenient to describe 
this process in terms of reflection.  
Evidence:   (1) Bragg’s equation (later referred to as Bragg’s law) can 
account for all the spots on the photograph.  This equation is 
based on optical reflection. 
(2) The spots become more elliptical the further the plate is 
from the crystal, an indication of reflectance phenomena.  
(3) Patterns obey the equations of the reflection geometry 
when offset (e.g., a 3 degree offset makes a 6 degree 
change to the pattern)  




(2) The x-ray source emits a range of 
heterogeneous wavelengths; specific 
wavelengths are “selected” by the distances 
between crystal planes.  
Bragg’s rhetorical task was to demonstrate that his basis for interpreting the 
photographs was superior to Laue’s, and he relied heavily on visual means to 
accomplish this task. 
According to historical and autobiographical texts, Bragg was inspired by 
specific features of the x-ray photograms.  In an autobiographical account, Bragg 
explains the following diagram (Figure 2.31), which he reproduced from his first 
article, to explain how he came to rethink Laue’s work in terms of reflection. 
 
 
Figure 2.31: Figure 2 from W.L. Bragg 1913.  Reproduced in X-ray and Neutron Diffraction.  G. 






Bragg’s description of this graphic is as follows: 
When the plate was placed at P1 near the crystal the spots were almost 
circular like C1, but when placed farther back at P2 they became very 
elliptical (C2).  Now Laue had ascribed his pattern to the diffraction of 
certain specific wave-lengths in the X-ray beam by the regular pattern 
of the crystal.  Given a fixed wave-length, optical theory tells us that 
the diffraction must take place at a definite angle, and this means that 
the diffracted rays drawn in the picture should all have been parallel.  I 
had heard J. J. Thomson lecture about Stokes’ theory of the X-rays as 
very short pulses of electromagnetic radiation.  I worked out that such 
pulses of no definite wave-length should not be diffracted only in 
certain directions, but should be reflected at any angles of incidence by 
the sheets of atoms in the crystal as if these sheets were mirrors.  (qtd. 
in Ewald 60) 
Though the diagram is part of the text of Bragg’s article, it is only a supporting 
argument.  Bragg is almost casual in his introduction of the diagram: “A curious 
feature of the photographs may be explained by regarding the spots as formed by 
reflection” (123).  He then describes why the differences in shape support reflection.  
However, by the time Bragg gets to this “curious feature” in the text, he had already 
developed a strong case for treating crystals as sets of mirroring planes and treating 
the spots as traces of reflection.  The analogy with optical reflection was a major 





Resolving Visual Inconsistencies: “Reflection” as Analogy and Cause 
In the text, Bragg first explains and then critiques Laue’s interpretation.  
Bragg bases his critiques on incompatibilities between the predictions of spots made 
by Laue’s math and the real spots in a photogram: 
However, [Laue’s] explanation seems unsatisfactory.  Several sets of 
numbers h1 h2 h3 [the integers from the Laue equations] can be found 
giving values of λ/a approximating very closely to the five values 
above [that Laue had calculated] and yet no spot in the figure 
corresponds to these numbers.  (Bragg 111) 
Laue’s math conflicts with the reality of the photographic evidence because the math 
should produce spots that are not there.  The inconsistency reduces the credibility of 
Laue’s account of the spots’ formation.  Bragg offers an alternative explanation that is 
a more complete account: 
I think it is possible to explain the formation of the interference pattern 
without assuming that the incident radiation consists of merely a small 
number of wavelengths.  The explanation that I propose, on the 
contrary assumes the existence of a continuous spectrum over a wide 
range in the incident radiation, and the action of the crystal as a 
diffraction grating will be considered from a different point of view, 
which leads to some simplification.  (Bragg 111) 
Bragg’s “different point of view” is to consider the diffraction photographs in terms 




The atoms composing a crystal may be arranged in a great many ways 
in systems of parallel planes….I propose to regard each interference 
maximum as due to the reflection of the pulses in the incident rays in 
one of these systems.  (W.L. Bragg 112; italics his, underline mine) 
Bragg’s selection of reflection as an operational analogy is an interesting choice in 
the light of what rhetorical theorists note about analogical reasoning in controversies.  
As Perelman observes in the Realm of Rhetoric, “In criticizing a thesis illustrated by 
analogy, we must either adapt the analogy so that it corresponds better to our own 
conceptions, or replace it by another, thought to be more adequate.  The two 
procedures are found in controversies” (119).  In this case, Bragg adapts the analogy 
of x-rays and traditional optics to argue for a different explanation of the formative 
waves.  Dissatisfied with Laue’s optical analogy that the crystal acts like the three-
dimensional counterpart of a two-dimensional optical diffraction grating, Bragg 
describes the photographic output in terms of a different optical phenomenon—
reflection.  Like Laue, Bragg supports his selection with references to older examples 
from traditional light optics: 
Regard the incident light as being composed of a number of 
independent pulses, much as Schuster does in his treatment of the 
action of an ordinary line grating.  If it falls on a number of particles 
scattered over a plane which are capable of acting as centers of 
disturbance when struck by the incident pulse, the secondary waves 




reflected from the plane, as in Huyghens’ construction of a wave front.  
(112) 
It is important to note that Bragg does not disagree with Laue’s assessment that the 
spots represent diffraction phenomena.  After all, Bragg titled his article “The 
Diffraction of Short Electromagnetic Waves by a Crystal.”  However, for Bragg, the 
process, and hence the math that can explain the process is more like reflection.  The 
difference is partially one of the rhetorical arrangement of the crystallographic 
subject.   
 Bragg’s reinterpretation of the photographs begins by conceptualizing the 
crystal lattice not as specific cells with atomic corners, but as sheets of atoms formed 
into planes.  This move is another example of visual rhetorical taxis, as articulated by 
Prelli.  More specifically, Bragg rhetorically divided and arranged the components of 
his crystalline subjects in ways that helped explain the interference events; Bragg 
conceptualizes the crystal as a composite of sheets rather than as composed of atomic 
points at the corners of individual cubes.  As historian Graeme Hunter observes, 
“Laue viewed the crystal as a three dimensional array of points; Bragg as a one 
dimensional array of planes” (32).  Optical analogs, planar geometry, and 
trigonometry then led Bragg to an equation that explained the conditions for two 
parallel waves to be reflected in phase from successive planes.  This equation, now 
known as Bragg’s Law, describes the conditions that will result in an amplified wave, 
i.e., one that would appear as an intensity spot in the diagram.  Specifically, crystals 




times the distance (d) between atomic planes, multiplied by the cosine of the incident 
angle(θ): λ  =  2d  cos  θ.  Later, the equations would be conventionalized as 
λ = 2d sin θ to reflect preferences in which angle is the angle of interest.  Figure 2.32 
is a visualization of the equation, though a similar figure did not appear in Bragg’s 
text.  While the figure only shows two waves interacting, the relationship applies for 
an infinite number of equally spaced planes.  As historian and scientist Robertson 
notes, Bragg’s Law “…is equivalent to the Laue conditions for diffraction but 
expressed in a form much easier to visualize” (636). 
 
 
Figure 2.32: Visualization of Bragg’s Law.  Encyclopedia Britannica. 
 
Historian Graeme Hunter notes that Bragg’s law was not new; Schuster 
developed a similar equation for ordinary line gratings (i.e., those that would be used 
in slit experiments) three years earlier.  That equation— 2e sin θ = nλ —looks quite 
similar to Bragg’s equation; thus, according to Hunter, “The only reason Bragg’s 
name became associated with this relationship was that he showed it could be applied 




gratings” (36).  However, in a review of Hunter’s book in Nature, Kenneth Holmes 
criticizes Hunter’s dismissal of Bragg’s novelty: “Apart from the θ being different, 
Hunter misses the point first made by von Laue that diffraction from a three-
dimensional lattice is subject to constraints not pertinent for a one-dimensional 
grating.  The Bragg law imposes two conditions: specular reflection and the Bragg 
equation” (1038).22  Hunter’s gaffe and Holmes’s response might seem like one 
historian quibbling over another’s understanding of scientific details; however, the 
exchange offers an interesting comment on the analogical nature of Bragg’s 
argument.  That is, the novelty of the idea is not derived from the form of the 
equation.  Rather, the application of the mathematical form to a rhetorically 
restructured crystal space is the novel development.  In other words, it takes both the 
equation and the analogical transformation of atomic points into mirroring sheets to 
make sense of the x-ray spots, and the analogy is “built into” the law.  In the next 
section, I show how Bragg develops the reflection analogy with technical 
visualizations that support and are supported by Bragg’s Law. 
 
Tables and Diagrams: Visual Supports for a Productive Analogy 
In his first article on x-ray diffraction, Bragg argues that the diffraction of x-
rays captured in the Laue photographs can be conveniently described as a reflection 
phenomenon.  To make this case, Bragg had to link the specific spots to specific 
invisible planes, and he needed to show that this connection explains the photographs 
more completely than Laue explained them.  Bragg would use two kinds of visual 
                                                 
22 Specular reflection occurs when a wave from a single source is reflected with mirror-like symmetry; 




representation to support his argument:  tables and diagrams.  These visuals provided 
a critical bridge between Bragg’s analogy (and its consequent mathematical formula) 
and Laue’s original photographs.  He used tables to identify planes and to link planes 
to particular spots.  He then recodes a selective reduction of Laue’s best photogram 
with semiotic markers that demonstrate how the various reflections create spots of 
varying intensity.   
Figure 2.33 is the first of four tables included in the text.  The first four 
columns are coordinates for two of the three points that define each invisible 
reflection plane.23  Like Laue, Bragg could not determine precise wavelengths or 
precise inter atomic distances during these early experiments, but he could calculate 
values that involved both of these unknown quantities based on all of the other known 
variables.  Thus, λ/a is the fifth column.  The sixth column indicates the intensity (or 
invisibility) of the spot formed by a beam reflected by the plane.  The last three 
columns (h1, h2, and h3) are the integers from the Laue equations, which can be used 
to calculate the coordinates of the spots on Laue’s best photograph (my Figure 
2.26.5); h3 is always constant because the plate is a fixed distance from the sample.  
Bragg includes these variables in his table to show the correspondences between his 
work and Laue’s work. 
 
                                                 
23 A plane is defined by three points.  In a three dimensional space, each point has three coordinates (x, 
y, z).  By taking the origin (0, 0, 0) as one point in each atomic plane, Bragg only needed to define two 
other points in the table, and each of those points has a zero coordinate.  Only four values (p, q, r, and 
s) need to be in the table because each plane is defined by only four variables across the three points.  
Thus the xyz coordinates of the three points defining the plane are [0 0 0], [pa 0 qa], [0 ra sa]), where a 






Figure 2.33: Table 1 from W.L. Bragg 1913.  Reproduced in X-ray and Neutron Diffraction.  G. 
E. Bacon.  1966: 117. 
 
This tabular display of data may seem mundane; however, these tables are critical to 
Bragg’s argument, yet they get little explicit attention in other studies of this case.  As 
Fahnestock has observed, the verbal and visual parallelism of tabular forms is highly 
rhetorical: 
A table reduces each individual instance to its minimal identifying 
feature …, and it reduces the uniqueness of each individual instance to 




of visual parallelism unproblematizes the data and diminishes 
occasions for refutation.  (Fahnestock “Verbal and Visual Parallelism” 
139-140).   
In other words, a table is more than just a way to display data. 
The following passage demonstrates how the tables participate in Bragg’s 
visual and mathematical argumentation: 
Every spot in the [best Laue] photograph is accounted for in the 
following tables.  I think it is evident that the sets of planes which 
actually reflect spots can be arranged in a very complete series with 
few or no gaps.  Though at first sight it may appear that in the tables 
the parameters are selected in a somewhat arbitrary way, they are in 
reality the simplest possible.  For instance, in Table III the first values 
for p, q, r, s considered are 1, 1, 3, 5.  This is so because ‘r + s’ must 
be positive.  If r = 1, s must be odd, 1, 1, 3, 1 and 1, 1, 3, 3 would 
reflect the beam so as to miss the photographic plate.  1, 1, 3, 5 and 1, 
1, 3, 7 are considered.  1,1,3,9 has already been considered as 1,1,1,3 
[in Table I], and 1, 1, 3, 11 gives a value for the wavelength outside 
the ‘visible’ range. (119) 
Unlike Laue’s explanation, Bragg’s tables account for all of the spots in Laue’s most 
important photograph (my Figure 2.26.5), providing a “complete series” supported by 
mathematical warrants.  Bragg also explains why specific planes are in the tables and 








Figure 2.34:  Figure 3 from W.L. Bragg 1913. Reproduced in X-ray and Neutron Diffraction. G. 
E. Bacon. 1966: 125.  NB:  the three-digit labels for the ellipses are not Miller indices.  They are 
specific points in a three-dimensional grid space.  Bragg learned the specifics of the Millerian 
system after the publication of this paper. 
 
The following passage explains how the reader should understand this “key” to the 
Laue graphic: 
Consider a reflecting plane which passes through the atom at the origin 
[0, 0, 0] and a neighboring atom, let us suppose the atom whose 
coordinates are  a, o, a.  As the plane is turned about the line through 
these two points the reflected beam traces out a circular cone, which 
has for an axis the line joining the two points and for one of its 




the atom through which the plane passes is in the xz plane as above, 
the ellipse touches the y axis on the photographic plate at the origin.  
Now take a plane passing through the origin and a point 0, a, 3a.  The 
locus of the reflected spot as it turns is again an ellipse, which touches 
the x axis.  The intersections of the two ellipses will give the position 
of a spot reflected by a plane passing through all three points, the 
origin, the point a, 0, a, and the point 0, a, 3a. 
In simple terms, Bragg uses propositions based on geometric principles to explain the 
appearance of specific spots in the photograph.  
This image is rhetorically interesting for several reasons.  First, though Bragg 
had replicated the Laue experiment, he uses Laue’s photograph as his example.  
Laue’s photograph was the authoritative image of x-ray interference, and any 
reconfiguration of the Laue theory would need to explain this photograph.  Second, 
Bragg demonstrates his method selectively; he codes a drawing of only some of the 
Laue spots, and he only indexes one table’s worth of planar data.  This illustration 
was sufficient to demonstrate the sufficiency of Bragg’s explanation.  Third, Bragg 
only inscribes half the image; the reader is able to see the relationship between the 
given information of the photogram and Bragg’s new geometric interpretation.  
Visuals in later documents, such as Figure 2.35, do not have this hybridity; i.e., they 
are not naturalized drawings of the spots combined with diagrammatic indexing.  
Rather, the later representations become purely diagrammatic.  Taken together, these 








Figure 2.35: Diagrammatic rendering of the x-ray diffraction pattern of KCl.  NB: In this 
diagram, the three-digit numbers are Miller indices.  Source: Bragg, William Lawrence. “The 
Structure of Some Crystals as Indicated by Their Diffraction of X-rays.” Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society.  89 (1913): 253. 
Instrumental Extensions of the “Reflection” Analogy  
After the reading and publication of W. L. Bragg’s first paper on x-ray 
crystallography, both Braggs enthusiastically engaged in extending the new science.  
The younger Bragg quickly published another paper on the simple structures of NaCl, 
KCl, KBr, and KI crystals, and both Braggs authored a paper on the more complex 




development of a new instrument whose conception emerged directly from the 
younger Bragg’s pioneering conceptualization of the simplifying reflection analogy.  
As the elder Bragg noted in a 1914 lecture to the Royal Institution that was 
republished in Science, “This simpler conception led at once to a simpler procedure.  
It led to the construction of the X-ray spectrometer” (798).  In this section, I briefly 
discuss the x-ray spectrometer to demonstrate the feedback loop that can develop 
through the application of rhetorical analogies—instruments produce images that 
become structured by analogies; analogies lead to interpretations that structure new 
instruments.   
 The x-ray spectrometer is a hybrid of the Munich group’s x-ray imaging 
apparatus and an optical spectrometer.  As Bragg explained in his 1914 lecture, the x-
ray spectrometer “…resembles an ordinary spectrometer in general form, except that 
the grating or prism is replaced by a crystal and the telescope by an ionization 
chamber and an electroscope” (198-199).  An ionization chamber is a gas-filled 
vessel whose gaseous atoms produce measurable ions when excited by x-rays; an 
electroscope measures electric charge in a body, and it could measure the current 
produced by the ionized gas in the ionization chamber.  The combination of these 
devices with a turnable sample-mount table allowed the Braggs to quantify both 
specific x-ray wavelengths and interatomic distances for specific crystals.  The elder 
Bragg explained this process in his lecture to the Royal Institution: 
In use a fine pencil of X-rays is directed upon the crystal, which is 
steadily turned until a reflection leaps out; and the angle of reflection 




same crystal, but keep the rays the same, we can compare the 
geometrical spacings of the various sets of planes.  If we use the same 
crystal always, but vary the source of X-ray, we can analyze the latter, 
measuring the relative wave-lengths of the various constituents of the 
radiation.  (W.H. Bragg 798) 
The “leaps” to which Bragg refers are spikes in ionization measured by the 
electroscope.  In the next passage, Bragg explains the possibilities of the new device: 
We have thus acquired a double power: (1) We can compare the 
intervals of spacing of the atoms of a crystal or of different crystals, 
along various directions within the crystal; in this way we can arrive at 
the structure of the crystal.  (2) We can analyze the radiation of an x-
ray bulb; in fact we are in the same position as we should have been in 
respect to light if our only means of analyzing light had been colored 
glasses, and we had been presented with a spectrometer or some other 
means of measuring wavelength exactly. (798) 
The elder Bragg supports his explanation of x-ray resolution with a fitting analogy to 
traditional optics.  Even more interesting from a rhetoric-of-science perspective is the 
embodiment of the reflection analogy in the apparatus itself.  Figure 2.36 is a 
schematic diagram of the x-ray spectrometer.  As explained in the original caption 
text, O is the x-ray bulb slit, P is axis of the sample stage and, PR and PR’ are crystal 
positions, and Q is the opening of the ionization chamber.  The geometry of the 
apparatus clearly demonstrates reflection.  What I find interesting is the presence of 




clearly used to preserve the purity of the reflection phenomenon; without the screen, 
the chamber would be affected by stray rays from the x-ray source.  Thus, the 
apparatus has been designed to fit the reflection analogy; it only collected reflected 
rays. 
 
Figure 2.36: Diagram of the x-ray spectrometer. Source: Bragg, William Henry and William 
Lawrence Bragg. “The Reflection of X-Rays by Crystals.” Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society. 88 (1913): 433. 
 
Reception, Credit, and Scientific Ethos in the Early Twentieth Century 
Like Laue, William Henry and William Lawrence Bragg won the Nobel Prize 
in Physics (1915) for their work with x-rays.  They are the only father and son to win 
the award for work on the same project.  More important for the history of science, 
their work on x-ray crystallography would revolutionize structural chemistry and lead 
to some of the most important discoveries in twentieth century biochemistry, such as 




these projects was related technically and personally to the Braggs.  W.L. Bragg 
would become a major figure in the administration of British science, but in the early 
days of crystallography and until W. H. Bragg’s death, the younger Bragg was over-
shadowed by his father.  Max Perutz explains how the scientific public attributed the 
credit for the early work: 
It seems hardly believable that the scientific public tended to attribute 
most of the credit for these discoveries to the father, sometimes with 
the undertone that the son had cashed in on the father’s success.  The 
son must have suffered a great deal from these thoughtless and lazy 
judgments.  Lazy because people could not be bothered to read the 
literature.  (Perutz 187) 
Perutz’s comment is interesting because of its implications for understanding the 
rhetoric of science in the early twentieth century.  Were people not bothering to read 
the literature?  Or did other rhetorical factors influence perceptions of which Bragg 
was more responsible for these monumental achievements?  The following source-
less quotation by W.L. Bragg (reproduced in Perutz’s account) hints at some possible 
complicating factors: 
Inevitably the results with the spectrometer, especially the solution of 
the diamond structure, were far more striking and far easier to follow 
than my elaborate analysis of Laue photographs, and it was my father 
who announced the new results at the Solvay Conference, lectures 
[sic] up and down the country and in America, while I remained at 




There is not enough evidence to make definitive claims about which specific factors 
influenced how people received these arguments; however, “laziness” is not the only 
explanation for unbalanced assessments of each Bragg’s contribution.  As an 
established researcher, the elder Bragg possessed greater scientific gravitas.  
Moreover, as the younger Bragg’s comment indicates, the elder Bragg was a more 
prominent public figure both at important conferences and in scientific circles at 
large.  Finally, the joint work was, according to W.L. Bragg, more “striking” and 
easier to understand.  A scientist could have reasoned that the clearer and seemingly 
more significant work was performed by both Braggs; it would have been reasonable 
to assume that the elder’s influence made this work better.  In other words, the style 
and significance of specific texts guided public perception.  The early reception 
history of this case indicates that the circulation and perception of scientific texts are 
complicated and influenced by factors external to the journal publication itself.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how different scientists used the same visual evidence 
and different interpretive strategies to make different claims about invisible 
phenomena.  Laue and the Braggs used photographs and diagrams to invoke and 
support analogical, causal, and incompatibility arguments; these arguments helped 
define the nature and behavior of x-rays.  Their scientific and rhetorical work led to 
new ways of determining the physical configuration of invisible atoms. 
In the next chapter, I show how geophysicists in the middle of the twentieth 




invisible geologic processes.  Like Max von Laue and the Braggs, these scientists 
were both constrained and inspired by the visual artifacts derived from invisible 
forces.  They rhetorically reconfigured these artifacts to restructure the history of the 
Earth.  In this next case, reading practices and secondary communication channels, 
such as conferences, also seem to have influenced the recognition, acceptance, and 





Chapter 3: Showing Motion under the Ocean— 
Visualizing Claims about Invisible Geologic Processes  
 
And since all laboratory instruments of measurement and observation are devices 
invented by the symbol-using animal, they too necessarily give interpretations in 
terms of either continuity or discontinuity. 
 
—Kenneth Burke, Language as Symbolic Action 
 
 
The idea that the seven continents once formed a single land mass is now 
standard fare even in the science textbooks read by elementary school students.  But 
the acceptance of what we now call plate tectonic theory is a relatively recent 
development in the history of science.  As late as the 1960s, a majority of 
geophysicists believed in a stabilist position—the continents are where they always 
have been.  Though Thomas Kuhn did not write about this case in The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions, the intellectual sea change from the stabilist position to a 
mobilist position—the continents have moved away from each other over time—has 
all the markings of a paradigm shift.  Anomalies that were incommensurable with a 
stabilist system accumulated, and the strength of this evidence led some scientists to 
develop revolutionary mobilist hypotheses.  New research programs and persuasive 
activities produced new evidence and new arguments that eventually made it 
impossible to accept the old stabilist orthodoxy.  The mobilist regime became the 
dominant paradigm for a new period of normal science.  




that persuaded people need to be explained.  Though there have been numerous 
sociological, philosophical, and historical treatments of this case, no thorough 
rhetorical studies exist.  To begin to fill this gap, I analyze the role of visual rhetoric 
in developing and evangelizing hypotheses supporting continental mobilism.  
Specifically, I examine how visualized data produced by magnetism detection 
instruments were adapted to produce world-moving arguments.   
 
Background: 1915-1945 
The continental drift hypothesis—an early version of continental mobilism—
was proposed by Alfred Wegener in 1915.  Though Wegener was not the first person 
to notice the seeming correspondence between distant continental coastlines (e.g., 
South America’s eastern and Africa’s western coast), he was original in overlaying 
additional evidence—such as the locations of mountain ranges and geological and 
paleological correspondences—on the reconstructed Pangaea/Gondwanaland image 
(Giere 281).  Figure 3.1 is one of the images from the 1922 German edition of 
Wegener’s The Origin of Continents and Oceans.  The text was translated into 





Figure 3.1: Wegener, The Origin of Continents and Oceans, 1922. 
 
Though we accept this geologic story today, the “puzzle piece” image 
sequence was not a satisfying visual narrative for most geologists in the early 
twentieth century.  Scientists rejected mobilist hypotheses because Wegener and later 
proponents of mobilism could not sufficiently explain the mechanism of motion.  If 
the continents had moved, what moved them?  Though centrifugal force, planetary 
expansion, and planetary contraction were all possibilities, the available evidence did 
not support the hypothetical physics of these options.  Wegener’s belief that the less 
dense continents “sailed” on top of heavier material did not make sense in light of 
geologic formations; expansion and contraction hypotheses based on conjectures 
about the warming or cooling of the Earth’s core were refuted by mathematical and 
physical arguments (Oreskes Rejection 21-53).  Moreover, the best contemporary 




explained by land bridge/isthmus hypotheses, rafting hypotheses, and other 
“reasonable” accounts of cross-ocean migration (Le Grand 56).  Logically, prehistoric 
plants and animals did not require continental drift to leave similar remains in distant 
parts of the world.  The cartographic evidence was also refutable.  Continents could 
be “reasonably” rearranged according to coastal correspondences that were 
impossible even under the drift model (Giere 285).  Furthermore, Wegener’s maps 
could be challenged as inaccurate representations of the available data.  H. E. Le 
Grand discusses Wegener’s “questionable” presentations of geologic and cartographic 
evidence:   
Wegener got his fit, as represented in his famous maps, by massaging 
the continents.  He had distorted the shapes and unfolded the 
mountains in an arbitrary fashion.  Wegener was able to match some 
patterns of mountains and strata, but with bent and distorted 
continents, and though he had produced some evidence for matching, 
there were other features he did not mention which did not seem to 
have analogues on the opposite side of the Atlantic.  Further, some of 
his data were erroneous or taken out of context or misinterpreted.  (56) 
Thus, there were numerous grounds for dismissing Wegener’s maps as fanciful 
claims.  Finally, elaborate research projects designed to verify drift did not produce 
convincing evidence.  Figure 3.2 is a 1925 New York Times article announcing an 
international collaboration that used a network of radio beacons to determine if 






Figure 3.2 William Bowie, New York Times, 1925. 
 
Ultimately the research did not support drift (“Study Fails” N9).  The failure of this 
experiment can be partially attributed to margins of error and measurement.  The 
project’s margins of error were in tens of feet; later work supporting continental 
mobilism would show that the actual movement is in centimeters per year (Oreskes 
Rejection 236).  Regardless of the project’s retrospectively identified inadequacies, its 
failure provided another reason to reject the drift hypothesis. 
Despite some support for drift in Europe and discussions of the drift 
hypothesis in the popular press, the idea was destined to (temporarily) languish.  
Wegener, the greatest early champion of the drift hypothesis, died in 1930 while on 
an ill-fated expedition to Greenland.  More than thirty years would pass before a 
revised mobilist hypothesis would become widely accepted in the scientific 
community.   
It is important to note that Wegener’s hypothesis did not disappear completely 
from disciplinary discussions between the time of his death and the development of 
plate tectonic theory.  During the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, some scientists did accept 




refined their arguments, as did their stabilist counterparts.  For example, “heated 
debate” at a 1950 meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science 
demonstrated a range of new paleological and geological arguments for both sides 
(“Britons Weigh” 14).  But these new arguments did not settle the debate.  Paleo-
magnetism data collected and interpreted in the late 1950s and early 1960s ultimately 
transformed “drift” into a viable hypothesis that would become the basis for 
successful geologic theory. 
 
Finding New Evidence, Establishing New Hypotheses: 1945-1963 
The triumph of the mobilist paradigm was the result of a series of conceptual 
and technical developments: the conceptual developments of mantle convection, sea-
floor spreading, and magnetic pole shift; the development of instruments to measure 
the magnetism in rocks remotely; the development of potassium-argon dating 
systems; and new discoveries about the topography of the ocean floor.  In the 1960s, 
researchers synthesized all of these developments to produce paradigm-shifting 
arguments.  This section identifies key researchers, discoveries, and publications 
contributing to this episode in the history of geophysical science.   
 The end of the Second World War marked the beginning of a productive new 
chapter for geophysical and oceanographic research.  Before the war began, military 
strategists understood that knowledge of marine topography, temperature dynamics, 
and magnetic and gravitational anomalies was important for a new era of naval 
warfare relying on technologies like submarines (Le Grand 171-172).  Spurred by its 




into geophysical research.  Funding for the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution in 
Massachusetts, the Scripps Institution of Oceanography in California, and the Lamont 
Geological Observatory at Columbia University increased exponentially after the war 
(Menard 37-39).  The U.S. also supported research at Cambridge University in Great 
Britain, another important site for geophysics research in the post-war period.  All of 
these institutions benefited from a windfall of surplus war material, including 
submarine-detection equipment that could be modified for geologic sensing and naval 
vessels that could be refitted for research voyages.   
Discoveries from these voyages would reveal key pieces of evidence for 
solving the puzzles of the Earth’s history.  The Midpac expedition of 1950 revealed 
that the oceanic crust of the Pacific was young and, contrary to expectations, 
topographically rugged.  The U.S.S. Pioneer survey was launched by Scripps in 1955 
to collect bathymetric (depth) data for submarine maps of the eastern Pacific; the 
survey team also collected data revealing unprecedented magnetic anomaly patterns 
embedded in the sea floor.  Research voyages conducted by the Lamont Geological 
Observatory throughout the 1950s produced accurate maps confirming the existence 
and extent of the mid-Atlantic ridge.  Scripps’ Downwind, Dolphin, and Doldrums 
expeditions of 1957 and 1958 confirmed the presence of mid-ocean rifted ridges in all 
of the oceans.  All of this new evidence helped develop and support new hypotheses. 
Another boon of the post-war period was the opportunity for some scientists 
to return to ideas without military application that had been set aside during the war.  
One of these “peace-time” concepts was the sea-floor spreading hypothesis developed 




researcher with Scripps.  Hess built on the work of Arthur Holmes.  Holmes, a British 
geologist who supported Wegener’s continental drift hypothesis, was the first to 
propose that mantle convection might be the mechanism for continental motion (Le 
Grand 111-116).  The mantle convection hypothesis posits that currents of magma 
beneath the Earth’s crust behave like oceanic currents; hot magma cyclically rises 
toward the underside of the crust, cools, and sinks back toward the Earth’s core.  
While Holmes was the first to conceive of these convective currents, his assumptions 
about how they might move the continents were incorrect.  He assumed that the 
continents were carried atop these convective currents.  Hess, with new knowledge of 
the mid-ocean ridge system, asserted that the force moving the continents derives 
from small quantities of magma that well up and harden inside the rifts of oceanic 
ridges.  Convection pushes hot magma to and through the rifts, and the magma is 
cooled by seawater.  When the cooling material becomes solid rock, the sea floor 
spreads and the continents move with it.  As Le Grand explains, “The crucial 
difference is that Holmes’s continents moved through a rigid seafloor; Hess’s, with 
the seafloor” (199).  Dietz’s contributions included the role of oceanic trenches in the 
spreading process and the name of the process itself, sea-floor spreading.  Though 
Hess and Dietz were publishing around the same time in the early 1960s, Dietz 
acknowledged Hess’s priority.  I mention both here, since the reception evidence I 
refer to later—quotations from key researchers—cites both Hess and Dietz as 
originators of the sea-floor spreading hypothesis. 
When Hess and Dietz were publishing in 1960 and 1961, sea-floor spreading 




Support for sea-floor spreading would come in the form of magnetic data that allowed 
spreading rates to be measured indirectly.  Three concepts—remnant magnetism, 
magnetic pole reversal, and potassium-argon dating—were important in developing 
this indirect measurement scheme.  The remnant magnetism hypothesis posits that the 
atoms of solids that are formed with intense heat (such as fired clay or cooling 
magma) align with the Earth’s magnetic field; this alignment is preserved after the 
material cools.  The strength and orientation of the magnetic field is recorded in a 
solid’s structure, even if the material is moved or properties of the Earth’s field 
change.  These magnetic signatures can be measured with instruments called 
magnetometers.  The magnetic pole reversal hypothesis posits that the Earth’s 
magnetic pole occasionally reverses over the course of geologic time.  Potassium-
argon dating is an isotopic dating method, like carbon dating.  Measuring quantities 
of isotopic argon (the byproduct of potassium isotopic decay) allows scientists to 
extrapolate the age of rock samples.  Potassium-argon dating is very accurate for 
samples between 100,000 and ten million years old (Glen 15).  This technique 
allowed researchers in the 1960s to identify the age of terrestrial rock samples with 
increasing accuracy.  When the ages of these samples were compared with magnetism 
measurements of the same material, a timeline of magnetic reversals emerged.  The 
timeline of magnetic reversals would be synthesized by Fred Vine, Drummond 
Matthews, and independently by Lawrence Morley into one of the most important 
geophysical hypotheses of the twentieth century.   
  When twenty-two-year-old graduate student Fred Vine arrived at Cambridge 




Indian Ocean surveying the Carlsberg Ridge.  Vine’s first assignment was to review 
the existing studies on marine magnetism surveys, a project which led him to 
computer-based methods for analyzing and modeling magnetic data.  Matthews 
returned from his expedition with striking new data; a profile of the Carlsberg Ridge 
revealed magnetic anomalies that were not always correlated with topographical 
features, as was expected.  While he was analyzing this data, Vine formulated what 
would become his greatest intellectual achievement—the Vine-Matthews hypothesis.    
  As Vine and Matthews note in their first publication, their hypothesis is a 
corollary of the sea-floor spreading hypothesis.  According to the Vine-Matthews 
hypothesis, the ocean floor spreads as volcanic material wells up and cools within 
oceanic ridges; this spreading process is recorded in the remnant magnetism of the 
sea floor.  When the new rock hardens, it acquires a magnetic signature aligned with 
the Earth’s magnetic pole.  As noted earlier, this pole occasionally reverses over the 
course of geologic time; after a reversal, newly formed oceanic rock will have a 
reversed magnetic signature in relation to adjacent rock.  According to the Vine-
Matthews hypothesis, measurement of the remnant magnetism should reveal distinct, 
symmetrically arranged stripes of “normal” and “reverse” magnetism that run parallel 
to the ridge axis.  These stripes should correspond to timelines of specific magnetic 
reversals.  The young rock at the center of the ridge should correspond to our current 
magnetic epoch, and older rock farther from the ridge center should correspond to 
older magnetic epochs.  Thus, magnetic signatures record a slow but consistent 
motion under the ocean.  Fred Vine summarized this process in a 1966 Science 




fossil, and the tape recorder: 
The [sea-floor spreading] hypothesis [of Hess] invokes slow 
convection within the upper mantle by creep processes, drift being 
initiated above an upwelling, and continental fragments riding 
passively away from such a rift on a conveyor belt of upper-mantle 
material; movements of the order of a few centimeters per annum are 
required. 
 **** 
Vine and Matthews have suggested that variations in the intensity and 
polarity of the Earth’s magnetic field may be “fossilized” in the 
oceanic crust, and that this condition in turn should be manifest in the 
resulting short-wavelength disturbances in “anomalies” in the Earth’s 
magnetic field observed at or above the Earth’s surface.  Thus the 
conveyor belt can also be thought of as a tape recorder.  (Vine “Sea-
floor” 1405, emphasis mine) 
Vine and Matthews’ first research report appeared in Nature in 1963, making them 
the first to publish this hypothesis; however, another scientist developed the same 
idea at the same time.   
Lawrence Morley, a geologist with the Geological Survey of Canada, was not 
associated with an institute making grand research voyages, but he did read widely in 
the geophysics literature.  Morley’s inspiration for his version of the magnetically 
tracked sea-floor spreading hypothesis came from the magnetic anomaly maps 




U.S.S. Pioneer survey of the Pacific.  Morley also submitted a description of what 
historians now call the Vine-Matthews-Morley hypothesis to Nature in 1963, but his 
paper was rejected.  His subsequent submission to the more specialized Journal of 
Geophysical Research also met with rejection.  The paper was never published by 
contemporary journals, though the manuscript has been reprinted in historical 
treatments of this case.   
There are numerous possible—and obviously rhetorical—reasons for the 
success of Vine and Matthews and the failure of Morley in publishing their respective 
works.  Historian Naomi Oreskes notes a few possibilities: 
In retrospect, Vine and Matthews’ presentation was much more 
developed, including a sophisticated analysis of existing sea-floor 
magnetic data.  While many people believe that ideas are the key to 
science, the difference in the treatment of the two papers shows that 
good ideas are not enough; you need good data, too, and you need to 
show how the data fit with the idea.  And perhaps Vine and Matthews’ 
Cambridge credentials carried weight at Nature that Morley’s 
Canadian ones did not.  (Plate xx) 
Though Vine and Matthews were far more influential in changing the course of 
geophysical research and geological thought, I mention Morley for two reasons.  
First, one of the objects I analyze is the magnetic survey map of Raff and Mason.  
Morley’s reaction to and citation of this map are important in understanding its 
persuasive effects.  Vine incorporates Raff and Mason’s work into later arguments, 




1963 paper.  Second, in fairness, Morley did conceive of the same idea, and historians 
have subsequently recognized his activity, even if it was not recognized at the time.  I 
follow several historians in referring to this hypothesis as the Vine-Matthews-Morley 
hypothesis. 
 
Evangelizing the Vine-Matthews-Morley Hypothesis: 1963-1968  
Vine and Matthews’ 1963 article initially met with perhaps the worst possible 
reaction for scientists—silence.  Vine recalls that only one researcher—Scripps’ 
Victor Vacquier—even mentioned the article at the 1964 Royal Society Discussion 
Meeting on Continental Drift; Vacquier’s comments dismissed the hypothesis 
(“Reversals” 58).  Matthews recalls that “the paper dropped into a sort of vacuum” 
and that “American labs wouldn’t hear anything of it—thought it was all nonsense” 
(qtd. in Glen 303).  Vine describes 1964 as a “fallow year” for their hypothesis 
(“Reversal” 59).  Drift-related papers published through 1965 either ignored or 
opposed it, but interest spread, and other researchers would eventually support the 
idea.   
In 1965, Canadian geologist J. Tuzo Wilson and Princeton professor Harry 
Hess both came to Cambridge on sabbaticals.  Both professors supported the 
hypothesis, and the exchanges between them and Vine helped to refine it.  Specific 
discussions between Vine and Wilson influenced Wilson’s conception of transform 
faults.  A transform fault occurs when plates move horizontally in relation to each 
other (Wilson 482).  These tectonic features could account for a range of topographic 




graphic published in Wilson’s first paper on transform faults; it demonstrates four 
variations of transform faulting.  The doubled vertical lines represent ridge sections, 




Figure 3.3: Wilson, Science, 1965, Figure 1. 
 
These fault types were useful in explaining why magnetic patterns were offset in 
specific ways.   
 Another important development of the 1963-1966 period was the consistent 
refinement of the time scale of magnetic-polarity epochs originally described in 1963 
by U.S. Geological Survey researchers Allan Cox, Richard Doell, and Brent 
Dalrymple.  Figure 3.4 is a graphic from Allan Cox’s 1969 review article that 
describes the scale’s development.  The black bands are positive polarity epochs; the 






Figure 3.4: Cox, Science, 1969, Figure 3. 
 
Of special significance was the Jaramillo event, the thin black stripe at one million 
years on the 1966a and 1966b scales.  This event would provide a clear marker for 
calibrating distance and time with magnetic measurements.  When researchers from 
the Lamont Geological Observatory applied the refined reversal timeline to new 
visualized data, they created the most significant visual argument in support of the 
Vine-Matthews-Morley hypothesis.   
Initially, researchers at Lamont, including the director of marine magnetics 
Jim Hiertzler, were stabilist in orientation.  They opposed the implications of the 




articles were among those that “continued to flay it forever” (qtd. in Glen 303).  The 
position of the Lamont team changed after a research voyage to the Pacific-Antarctic 
ridge off the southern tip of South America.  Magnetometers aboard the U.S.S. 
Eltanin collected a revolutionary set of data that both confirmed the Vine-Matthews-
Morley hypothesis and swayed previously skeptical researchers at Lamont and 
elsewhere.  Making a number of passes over the ridge, the crew of the Eltanin, which 
included Hiertzler’s protégé Walter Pitman, collected magnetic data.  When these 
data were later analyzed and rendered as magnetic profiles, the results were 
astounding.  One of the profiles was an almost perfectly symmetrical curve of 
positive and reverse magnetism extending for hundreds of kilometers perpendicular to 
the ridge segment.  This highly symmetrical data fulfilled the predictions of Vine and 
Matthews.  Pitman and Hiertzler published their findings in Science in 1966; two 
weeks later Vine published a new review article that also incorporated a version of 
their graphic.  Vine, Pitman, and Hiertzler would use this same graphic in various 
presentations throughout 1966, including presentations delivered at the April meeting 
of the American Geophysical Union and at a November conference hosted by the 
Goddard Institute for Space Studies.  Researchers attending these conferences 
included the world’s most eminent geophysicists.  After these publications and 
meetings, support for the hypothesis was nearly universal.  As I will show, this 
conversion was directly linked to visual arguments; therefore, there is exigence to 
study the rhetorical construction, distribution, and reception of these essential 





Review of Previous Studies 
Because this episode in the history of science occurred relatively recently, the 
available archive of primary sources is extensive, and there are numerous scholarly 
accounts of it.  However, some accounts contain inaccuracies that are revealed when 
these accounts are verified against the primary sources.  This case has been the 
subject of traditional scientific histories (such as William Glen’s Road to Jaramillo), 
retrospective autobiographies (such as the essays collected in Naomi Oreskes’ Plate 
Tectonics), and philosophical and sociological analyses (such as H. E. Le Grand’s 
Drifting Continents, Shifting Paradigms).  This episode has also been used as a test 
case for philosophical models of scientific decision making, and it has been included 
in sociological accounts of the role of visualization in constructing knowledge.  While 
many of these studies incorporate or mention visual artifacts, typically visuals are not 
the primary focus.  The most explicitly visual-oriented analyses are Giere’s essay 
“Visual Models and Scientific Judgment” and Gooding’s “Visualization, Inference 
and Explanation in the Sciences.”  Each of these essays discusses a few of the images 
that I analyze, but they do not examine invention, circulation, and reception issues 
extensively.  For example, Giere’s philosophical approach traces the development of 
ideas at the macro level, but this approach neglects important intra-textual and intra-
graphical elements.  Similarly, Gooding makes incorrect assumptions about the 
influence of texts based solely on their publication dates; reception evidence indicates 
that the patterns of influence are more complex.24 
                                                 
24 The limitations of Giere’s and Gooding’s readings of these images might demonstrate the 
differences in orientation between rhetoric of science and the other branches of science studies.  Giere 
and Gooding are interested in broad issues of cognition, inference, and decision making with regards to 




To support my conclusions, I draw on several of the biographical and 
autobiographical sources that document the reactions of geophysicists to new visual 
arguments.  William Glen’s Road to Jaramillo (1982) incorporates material from 
thousands of hours of interviews with researchers.  A more recent collection, Naomi 
Oreskes’ Plate Tectonics: An Insider’s History of the Modern Theory of the Earth 
(2001), offers a series of retrospective essays written by the researchers themselves.  
Mason, Vine, Morley, and Pitman each contributed to the volume, as did other 
researchers who extended and refined the early research.  Though these retrospective 
accounts were written forty years after the key events, they are the best reception 
evidence available for this case.  Time could have affected the memories of these 
individuals, but the fact that so many of them recall when and how they reacted to 
specific images is evidence for the persuasive significance of these maps and profiles. 
 
Document Summary  
As is the case with many other developments in modern science, the 
documents that articulated the Vine-Matthews-Morley hypothesis were distributed 
across multiple journals and conferences.  Some of these venues had a broad 
scientific audience, while others were more specialized.  Table 3.1 lists the sources I 
discuss throughout my analysis. 
 
                                                                                                                                           
networks of texts.  What texts enable is the rhetorical analysis of arguments constructed and received 
at specific cultural moments.  The rhetorician is not as interested in how a communicator arrived at the 
idea; rather, he or she wants to know what strategies were used to articulate the idea, and if these 
strategies were successful in persuading others to accept the new knowledge claim.  As I will show in 




Year Authors Publication 
1961 Raff and Mason GSA Bulletin 
1963 Vine and Matthews Nature 
1966 Pitman and Hiertzler Science 
1966 Vine Science  
1966  Vine  Goddard Institute of Space Studies 
Conference  
1968 Pitman, Herron, and Hiertzler Journal of Geophysical Research 
Table 3.1: Document list. 
 
I analyze two sets of visuals culled from these texts in terms of the graphics’ 
features, the visual arguments they encode, and the circumstances of their circulation 
and reception.  In both sets of images, the invisible magnetic properties of the sea 
floor are made visible and incorporated into an array of evolving arguments.   
The first set of images is composed of three iterations of the same magnetic 
anomaly map.  Affectionately named “zebra stripe” maps in some retrospective 
accounts, these images visualize a pattern of magnetic anomalies off the coast of 
Vancouver Island in the Pacific.  Though each version presents the same visual data, 
variations in mediation strategies change the knowledge claims presented in each 
map.  This study is the first comparative analysis of these three figures.   
The second set of images uses magnetic anomaly profiles to develop the 
visual arguments that enabled the Vine-Matthews-Morley hypothesis to become a 
viable model for explaining and asserting continental motion.  The key feature of this 
visual data is the bilateral symmetry of some anomaly profiles.  Authors use a number 
of strategies to amplify this symmetry, and these amplification strategies become 






As outlined in Chapter 1, my methods include a number of analytical 
techniques and rhetorical concepts: semiotics, argument analysis, visual figuration, 
terministic screens, convention analysis, and circulation and reception study.   
This chapter considers how Burke’s terministic screens can account for the 
successes and failures of the rhetorical activities of this episode in science.  As Burke 
notes, “Even if any given terminology is a reflection of reality, by its very nature as a 
terminology it must be a selection of reality; and to this extent it must function as a 
deflection of reality” (115).  I argue that the rhetorical history of specific magnetic 
anomaly maps demonstrates this reflection-selection-deflection dynamic.   
This chapter also considers Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s comments on 
rhetorical presence in light of the relationships between presence, selection, and 
visual figuration.  Like the terministic screen, the concept of presence can help to 
explain the successes and failures of specific visual arguments.  As Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca explain, “By the very fact of selecting certain elements and 
presenting them to the audience, their importance and pertinency to the discussion are 
implied.  Indeed, such a choice endows these elements with a presence, which is an 
essential factor in argumentation and one that is far too much neglected in 
rationalistic conceptions of reasoning” (116).  They also note, “Presence acts directly 
on our sensibility” (116).  In this case, rhetorical choices created data graphics that 
acted directly on the sensibilities of geophysics researchers.  
Finally, I am interested in the visualization of transitivity arguments and in the 




Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, “The use of transitive relations is valuable in cases 
where it is a matter of ordering beings and events which cannot be directly compared 
with each other” (229).  In this case, scientists used graphed magnetism data to 
connect distance and time visually when they could not compare those variables 
directly.  Scientists also relied on the visual presentation of symmetry to separate the 
appearance of stability from the reality of a mobile sea floor.  
Though the magnetic survey maps and the magnetic profile graphics appear in 
the literature of this case across the same span of time (1961-1968) and sometimes in 
the same document, the discussion is divided by image type.  I first discuss the 
changing rhetorical landscape encoded in the magnetic maps.  I then discuss the 
strategies used to turn magnetic profiles into compelling knowledge claims 
supporting sea-floor spreading and the Vine-Matthews-Morley hypothesis. 
 
Zebra Stripes: The Iterations and Arguments of Magnetic Anomaly Maps 
The “zebra stripe” image set is comprised of three images (Figures 3.5, 3.6, 
and 3.7).  Figure 3.5 is the original map that appeared in Raff and Mason’s 1961 
article in the Geological Society of America Bulletin.  Figure 3.6 appeared in Vine’s 
seminal 1966 review article in Science.  Figure 3.7 is a colorized version; colors 
correspond to a magnetic reversal time scale that appears beside the map.  Vine 
presented this image during his November 1966 presentation at a conference hosted 
in New York by the Goddard Institute for Space Studies.  It was republished in a 




1966 conference.25  Figures 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7 appear after this paragraph.  Other 
supporting figures (Figures 3.8-3.16) are distributed throughout the discussion.
                                                 
25 Though technically Figure 3.7 was presented before Figure 3.6, Figure 3.6 was developed first.  
Figure 3.7 was presented November 12, 1966; Figure 3.7 appeared in print December 16, 1966.  






















Raff and Mason’s most referenced magnetic anomaly map (Figure 3.5) 
depicts a pattern of magnetic anomalies in the oceanic rock off the coast of 
Vancouver Island.  This map is an adaptation of another magnetic anomaly map of 
the same area; Raff and Mason’s Plate 1, my Figure 3.8.26   
 
 
Figure 3.8: Raff and Mason, GSA Bulletin, 1961, Plate 1.   
 
Figure 3.8, like Figure 3.5, presents magnetic data in what Kress and van Leeuwen 
would call a topographic structure.  That is, the visualization of the data accurately 
reflects the real spatial relationships between constituent elements (101-102). 
However, Figure 3.8 records specific magnetic values in addition to polarity and 
shape.  As the enlarged section of Figure 3.8 shows, these features are encoded 
                                                 
26 Raff and Mason’s Plate 1 covers the same area as the summary map; however, it is in the form of a 




through solid and dashed lines with values and polarity signs near the lines.  Though a 
thorough examination of this map might indicate linear magnetic anomalies, these 
patterns are not as immediately visible as they are in Figure 3.5.  To give additional 
presence to distinctions between the anomalies, Raff and Mason used an antithetical 
black-and-white color scheme to encode only for positive or negative polarity in the 
summary map.  As Fahnestock notes, the figural move from graded series to binary 
distinctions is a basic conceptual process that can be rendered both visually and 
verbally (Rhetorical Figures 45-85).  In Figure 3.5, positive magnetic anomalies are 
shown in black, and negative anomalies are shown in white.  The form of the 
anomalies will not change much in later iterations of this map.  What does change are 
the mediating visual elements that make specific features of the mapped data more or 
less salient.  Early arguments rely primarily on the antithetical logic of two-tone 
coloration; later graphics apply different strategies for conceptually reorganizing the 
“terms” that emerge from the data. 
In this first iteration (Figure 3.5), Raff and Mason use alphabetically labeled 
lines to identify specific features in the anomaly pattern.  Though the labels are not 
explained in textual descriptions on the image or in the caption, they are explained in 
the text of the article.  Table 3.2 summarizes the textual descriptions of the labels.  
Noteworthy from a semiotic perspective is the artificiality of the group created 
through the labels.  Beyond the common carrier of the alphabetically labeled lines, 
the identified elements do not share a common feature to define them as a class.  As 
Table 3.2 summarizes, some of the lines are magnetic features, some are topographic 




carriers of specific attributes; it is not immediately clear when scanning the visual 
what each line encodes.   
 
Label Identified Feature 
A Linear structures bend smoothly 
B No topographic counterpart 
C Boundary with a gradient density similar to continental shelf 
D Row of three sea-mounts 
E, G, and H Magnetic gradient density change not indicated by the topography 
J and K Faults in the magnetic linear trend 
L, M, and N All the same feature with the center section having slipped to the 
east 
Q Trough 800 fathoms deeper than the surrounding area 
R 500 fathom ridge with no magnetic counterpart 
S Suggestion of a fault, but nothing indicated from the topography 
T Area of magnetic depression 
U, V, and W Partial breaks in the linear pattern 
Table 3.2: Textual explanation of alphabetic labels summarized from Raff and Mason (1961).  
The map does not identify features with the labels F, I, O, P, X or Z. 
 
The primary argument of this image is one of identification, what classical 
stasis theory would call an An Sit (“It is”) argument.  According to Prelli’s stasis grid 
for scientific arguments, the image is an evidential/conjectural argument: “Is there 




the image and the article only claim that a phenomenon exists; the extant 
phenomenon is an anomaly pattern with a roughly linear organization.  As Mason 
explains in an autobiographical essay, “The discovery of sea-floor magnetic stripes 
was serendipitous: We were not looking for them, nor could we have been, because 
no one knew they existed!” (“Stripes” 43).  Thus, the rhetorical task of this article and 
its primary image is to show that this newly discovered phenomenon exists.  
Visualization indicates existence.  
Though the authors do identify additional attributes with the labeled lines, 
these graphical features lack a common trait that would allow the taxonomy to encode 
any additional visual arguments beyond an “it is”/“they are” identification.  
Moreover, the authors themselves admit that the cause and meaning of the pattern is 
unclear:  “There is as yet no satisfactory explanation of what sort of material bodies 
or physical configurations exist to give the very long magnetic anomalies” (1269).  
This statement indicates that the conceptual separation of magnetic and physical 
topography is not yet in operation for Raff and Mason.  That is, they expect existing 
topographic features, such as seamounts, ridges, and troughs, or physical features, 
like rock type or sediment density, to account for all of the magnetic differences.  
Later arguments developing the Vine-Matthews-Morley hypothesis rhetorically 
negotiate the relationship between magnetic and physical geography. 
The New Rhetoric’s concept of presence helps to explain the authors’ decision 
to code the image with only two signifying tones—one for positive and one for 
negative magnetic anomalies.  This design feature clearly marks the linear anomaly 




making antithetical distinctions rather than graded ones, which would reflect the data 
values more closely, the linear pattern of polarity differences is readily visible.  The 
clearly presented pattern might account for the intense reaction other scientists had 
when seeing the image (Figure 3.5) for the first time.  Lawrence Morley recalled his 
initial reaction in his retrospective essay “Zebra Stripes”:  “I literally freaked out 
when I saw it!”(80). Fred Vine shared a similar experience while viewing the map 
with Harry Hess and J. Tuzo Wilson in 1965 after retrieving the 1961 article from the 
library to corroborate some of their coalescing ideas: “All three of us stared at it in 
amazement” (60).  The contrasting tones allowed patterns in the data to be recognized 
immediately by these scientists whose new ideas were guiding their vision.  
On the other hand, Burke’s notion of the terministic screen might help explain 
why the map received little attention from 1961 until more than two years after its 
publication.  As noted earlier, Burke asserts that the terms we choose to reflect reality 
must also deflect other possibilities.  Raff and Mason effectively foreground the 
magnetic pattern through terministic selection, but other variables are overwhelmed 
by the pattern.  For example, seamounts, troughs and other physical features cannot 
be represented effectively on the map because the graphical space is filled with the 
visualized magnetic data.  The arbitrarily labeled lines do not help the viewer to see 
significant patterns in the relationship between magnetism and topography.  Though 
Vine and Wilson were able to “see” the underlying correspondence between some of 
Raff and Mason’s linear anomalies and the crests of oceanic ridges, this was possible 
only after they anticipated the existence of the physical ridges in the same area that 




Further complicating the situation is the relationship between science, 
international politics, and military affairs during the middle of the twentieth century.  
As Vine notes, “The irony of the discovery of the Juan de Fuca Ridge [the largest 
ridge in the Raff and Mason survey area], or rather its non-discovery at an earlier 
date, is that because the survey was undertaken for military purposes during the Cold 
War—detailed maps of bathymetry and gravity field were required for the nuclear 
submarine deterrent—only the full details of the magnetic data were declassified” 
(60).  The selection of data by Raff and Mason reflected the magnetic attributes of the 
northeastern Pacific sea floor, but at the same time, the realities of military-funded 
science forced them to exclude clear details about the physical topography.  Vine 
claims that the absence of these details slowed the development of the Vine-
Matthews-Morley hypothesis: “Had the detailed bathymetry been released at the same 
time as the magnetics, this would have been a very different story” (60).   
Alternatively, Raff and Mason’s nebulous conclusions, as encoded in their 
graphic, contributed to the curiosity of Morley.  He notes the effect of this 
underdetermined work on his thinking:  
In retrospect, what stands out for me is how Mason and Raff frankly 
admitted to having no plausible explanation for the “zebra stripes,” 
which they had spent so much time and effort to acquire.  If they had 
suggested that one of their interpretations was indeed correct, I would 
probably have accepted it, thinking that they had the situation in hand.  
Instead, their forthright approach created a space for a young scientist 




Ambiguity provided an opening for Morley’s correct but unpublished conjectures.  
 Raff and Mason’s map can be interpreted as a vetted artifact of Cold War 
science or as an example of an honest but unassertive scientific claim.  Regardless of 
the motivation for selecting or not selecting data to present, the rhetorical effect of 
these choices was the same.  Raff and Mason’s choice of visual terms affected the 
inferences about reality that the map could generate on its own for its viewers.  The 
Vine-Matthews-Morley hypothesis developed because later scientists could bring new 
concepts to their theory-laden readings of this image.  
 
Circulation and Iterations of the “Zebra Stripes” 
From a circulation and reception perspective, Raff and Mason’s map (Figure 
3.5) is fascinating.  Not only was the map significant for Morley and Vine in the 
development of their thinking, but it also has an interesting though sometimes 
troubling circulation history in the broader science studies literature.  Specifically, in 
several works (for example, Oreskes’ Plate and Henry Frankel’s “From Continental”) 
Vine’s 1966 version (Figure 3.6) is falsely reproduced as Raff and Mason’s original 
map.  My analysis of the 1966 image might help explain why this false attribution 
occurs.  
Vine’s 1966 review article was a watershed argument in the establishment of 
sea-floor spreading.  (When Current Contents dubbed it a “Citation Classic” in 1986, 
it had been cited in more than 440 articles.)  Though Vine and Matthews articulated 
their hypothesis in 1963, they did not have sufficient evidence to convince many 




magnetism of oceanic rock.  Vine’s 1966 review article marshaled a host of new 
visualized data, including magnetic profiles and magnetic anomaly maps.  An 
iteration of Raff and Mason’s map was an important supporting argument.  As noted 
earlier, the version of the map appearing in the Vine article is often cited as the Raff 
and Mason map; however, there are subtle differences between the two, and these 
differences have significant rhetorical consequences.   
Like Raff and Mason’s map, the Vine version (Figure 3.6) is what Kress and 
van Leeuwen would call a topographical-conceptual system.  System features are 
represented in relation to one another according to a scale that is accurate to these 
relationships in physical space (101).  However, in his version, Vine has replaced 
Raff and Mason’s relatively uninformative alphabetically labeled lines with more 
revealing carrier/attribute pairs.  Specifically, he uses thin lines to represent 
exclusively the faults that have affected the anomaly pattern; he uses arrows to point 
to the axes of oceanic ridges associated with specific magnetic anomalies.  
Essentially, Vine layers Wilson’s identification of transform faults and sea-floor 
ridges off Vancouver Island (Figure 3.9) onto the visually arresting magnetic 
visualization of Raff and Mason.  The new details do more than just identify the 
geologic features of the area; the changes direct the viewer’s attention.  The arrows 
above and below the thick black band in the center of the map pull the viewer’s eye to 
this large positive anomaly; the other arrows make smaller anomalies more salient as 
well.  These additions change the mapped data from a loosely interpreted mass into a 
more structured composition that communicates a different kind of argument.  The 




arranged phenomena running parallel to the graphically identified ridge centers; the 
fault lines explain why the map is not perfectly symmetrical.  These new 
distinctions—with some textual and inter-graphical anchoring— also change the 
stasis of the argument from the conjectural to the causal.  In this review article on sea-
floor spreading, ridges are the generative engines of geologic motion.  By visually 
identifying these loci of activity, Vine identifies the primary cause of this distinctive 
pattern.  Thus, the original map (Figure 3.5 on page 139) has been adapted in Figure 
3.6 (page 140) to be consistent with the sea-floor spreading activity argued for at 






Figure 3.9: Wilson, Science, 1965, Figure 3. 
 
The consistent misidentification of the first Vine map (Figure 3.6) for the Raff 
and Mason map (Figure 3.5) could be attributed to sloppy fact checking; however, 
science-studies scholars might unconsciously (or consciously) select Vine’s version 
because it is a better theory-laden representation of the Vine-Matthews-Morley 
hypothesis.  This intuition is supported by graphics from other historical and 
philosophical treatments of “continental drift” that include (and correctly identify) the 
original Raff and Mason map but modify the map with explanatory devices that are 
similar in function to Vine’s arrows.  For example, historian H. E. Le Grand adds a 





Figure 3.10: Le Grand, Drifting Continents: Colliding Paradigms, Figure 8.2, my red 
circles.  Enlarged section shows the label details. 
 
Though this identification is helpful, it is also potentially misleading.  By marking off 
the Juan de Fuca Ridge, but not the Gorda or Explorer Ridges, Le Grand makes it 
seem as if the Juan de Fuca Ridge is the organizing feature of all the magnetic 
anomalies in the entire region, which is not the case.  A more accurate rendering 
would also identify the other ridges, whose locations Vine identified with other 
arrows.  I have identified them with red circles on Figure 3.10. 
The third iteration of the map (Figure 3.7) is also from 1966.  Vine included it 
in his Goddard conference presentation, and it was reprinted in the 1968 volume The 




map and its predecessors.  Most obviously, this version is in color; the color allows 
additional information to be layered onto the map.27  Specifically, color is a carrier for 
the age of the positive magnetic anomaly bands.  The color gradient follows the 
traditional arrangement of the color spectrum; red/pink represents the youngest 
anomalies, and blue hues represent the oldest ones.  By adding color and also adding 
the color-coded time scale, Vine has transformed the graphic into a complete 
transitivity argument: magnetism is related to distance; magnetism is related to time; 
therefore, distance is related to time.  Thus, concepts that cannot be compared directly 
are connected with a middle relational term.  As my later analysis of the profile data 
will show, this map is not the first complete visualization of this transitivity 
argument, nor is it the most effective.  But this graphic is novel for this case in using 
multiple colors to present a visual transitivity argument.   
The addition of color also adds another layer of figural logic to the graphic.  
Specifically, Vine has transformed the graphic from a simple black vs. white 
antithesis into a pair of color-coded antimetabole.  Colored elements are repeated in 
reversed order: blue-teal-green-yellow-orange-red-orange-yellow-green-teal-blue.  
The red stripes mark the two ridges that are the pivot points of each antimetabole.  
The symmetrical arrangements of colors represent the symmetrical arrangement of 
time on either side of each ridge axis.  The rationale behind this figural 
                                                 
27 There is clear evidence from the conference proceedings that this image was presented in color at the 
Goddard conference.  During the Q&A of Menard’s presentation, Vine refers explicitly to the color 
slide: “With regard to the Juan de Fuca area I think it is clear from the color slide [Fig. 4, Vine, this 
volume] that there is no single process going on” (Vine qtd. in Phinney 117).  However, it is not clear 
if the coloring of the slide was identical to the reproduced figure.  For example, in Vine’s caption text 
he explains, “Central red anomalies coincide with ridge crests” (Vine qtd. in Phinney 80).  In my 
Figure 3.7, a scanned true-color facsimile of the figure from the Phinney volume, these crests are an 
intense shade of pink.  If there was a difference in color (red vs. pink), it affects neither Vine’s 




transformation will become clearer after my explication of the magnetic profiles in 
the next section. 
The addition of color is not the only change Vine makes.  He also modifies the 
form of some of the mapped magnetic anomalies.  A comparison of the color map 
with the previous black-and-white maps reveals that Vine has removed magnetism 
data from the diagonal fault off Cape Blanco.  I have marked this redaction of 
magnetic data with a rectangle on Figure 3.11.  Figure 3.12 compares enlarged 






Figure 3.11: Vine, Goddard Conference, 1966, Figure 4.  The rectangle marks the area where 
data were redacted.  Circle A marks a magnetic feature that was divided into two colors but is 
not associated with a fault.  Other circles identify areas where color is used to divide magnetic 







   
Figure 3.12: Comparison of enlarged sections of Figures 3.6 and 3.7.  In the color map, data has 
been removed along the long diagonal line that forms a triangle with the bottom-left corner.  
 
These changes are not mentioned in the transcribed text of Vine’s talk.  Vine 
notes that his interpretation is influenced by Wilson’s 1965 article, but this article by 
itself does not necessarily justify removing the material.  If Wilson’s map of the area 
(Figure 3.9) authorized changes to Vine’s color map, there should also be material 
removed at other places than the region between the two ridges.  Also, as Wilson 
indicates, his map is conjectural and should be compared to Raff and Mason’s map.  
Moreover, the removal in Figure 3.7 was not featured in Vine’s other 1966 map 
(Figure 3.6), even though Wilson’s map was also available to inform this graphic.  
Thus, the decision to remove material from this large fault seems more rhetorical than 
evidential.  Specifically, he removes the magnetic data along the fault so he can more 
clearly arrange the features on either side of the fault with the color-coded time scale.  




studying the rhetorically motivated “arrangements” of data maps serving as important 
visual arguments. 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, Lawrence Prelli has discussed the persuasive 
effects of arrangement in visual arguments.  Specifically, he has shown how the 
concept of rhetorical taxis can help explain graphical choices.  In “Visualizing a 
Bounded Sea: A Case Study in Visual Taxis,” Prelli explains how Canadian and 
American trade representatives organized oceanic maps to “literalize” land-based 
metaphors that supported their respective arguments for fishing rights.  For example, 
the Georges Bank—a productive fishery coveted by both sides— was portrayed as a 
submarine “peninsula” extending from the American coast on the U.S. map; it was 
portrayed as an independent “island” on the Canadian map (96-98).  Each side 
adjusted contour lines so that the maps invoked familiar conceptual structures.  
Vine’s map (Figure 3.7) does not invoke metaphoric associations, but it does 
demonstrate strategic visual taxis.  Specifically, Vine taps the topos of division to 
separate the whole of the mapped pattern into two parts; he then uses color to arrange 
each part into a symmetrically organized series.  The complexities of this visual taxis 
warrant further explication of it. 
Vine’s first map (Figure 3.6) notes the existence of three ridge sections, but 
his revised map (Figure 3.7)—by conflating ridge features with the red coloration—
only visually identifies two ridges, which are separated by the new “empty space” 
along the long diagonal fault.  Similar but less noticeable divisions are created in 
locations where bands that were solid entities on the previous map must be divided 




originally placed to identify faults are now also separating two differently colored 
areas of what was formerly represented as a unified magnetic-anomaly feature.  
Figure 3.12 (page 156) compares an enlarged section of Vine’s colorized map with 
the same section of his black-and-white map to demonstrate how Vine divided his 
visualized data.  The color divisions within the positive anomaly bands help to 
explain the removal of material along the fault.  Without the removal, there would 
have been the possibility for multiple interpretations of the colorized data.  That is, 
the removed materials could have been colorized and thus time coded in multiple 
ways.  In the places where Vine has made color distinctions in what were uniformly 
black-coded anomalies, the divisions are small and visually consistent.  They mostly 
occur in places where there is a clearly identified fault or in places where two large 
features touch.  Even the small “peninsula” (Circle A on Figure 3.11) that is divided 
into pink and orange makes “visual sense,” because the division lines up with the 
small but distinct anomalies north and south of it.  However, carving up the material 
that Vine removed from the diagonal fault would have been difficult, since the color 
patterns of the two ridge systems are offset in relation to each other.  Removing the 
potentially ambiguous magnetic data creates a clear distinction between the two 
separate sets of time-graded terms, which are conceptually organized around two 
separate physical ridges.  The clean break also supports Vine’s argument that sea-
floor magnetism is less complicated than terrestrial magnetism: “The strikingly 
simple structure of the oceanic crust implied by the ‘geologic map’ presented in 
Figure 3.4 contrasts with the complexity of the continental crust” (80).  Vine 




 Vine’s Goddard Conference map is an important graphical development.  
Later studies would use this map instead of the original Raff and Mason map as the 
basis for new visual arguments.  For example, Silver (1971) as well as Hey and D. 
Wilson (1982) use a grayscale version of Vine’s Goddard map when making new 
arguments about the Juan de Fuca area (Figures 3.13 and 3.14).  Regardless of the 
accuracy of the adjustments Vine made to Figure 3.7, the image has become, in the 
terms of The New Rhetoric, a “truth.”  The account presented in Vine’s color map, as 
such a “truth,” provides a network of provisionally accepted claims that serves as a 
cohesive set of agreements on which new arguments can be built.  The articles that 
present Figures 3.13 and 3.14 each elaborate “normal science” refinements to the 
geologic processes that created this distinctive magnetic pattern in this region of the 
northern Pacific.     
 
 





Circulation and Peirce’s Semiotic Functions: “Zebra Stripes” as Icon, Index, and 
Symbol 
 In “The Verbal and the Visual in Science: A Heideggerian Perspective,” Alan 
Gross reads Heidegger’s philosophy of science against C. S. Peirce’s semiotic system 
to account for the semiotic functions of scientific images.  In Peirce’s system, an 
image is an icon when it represents the depicted thing itself; it is an index when it 
represents a related phenomenon, such as the trace of an effect; and it is a symbol 
when it becomes the representation of a broad set of ideas and/or theory by 
convention.  As Gross notes, scientific visuals, though typically indexical, can and 
often do perform all three semiotic functions (451).  The history of the “zebra stripes” 
map demonstrates how a single image performs different functions when it appears in 
different texts.   
 Raff and Mason’s original map functions as an icon.  It shows a thing that has 
not been seen before; the representation is the thing itself.  In this case, Raff and 
Mason show the remnant magnetism of a specific area.  When the image appears in 
Vine’s texts (Figures 3.6 and 3.7), the map functions as an index—the magnetic 
pattern exemplifies patterns that exist around the world.  In another graphic from the 
Goddard presentation (Figure 3.15), Vine selects a small portion of the Raff and 
Mason map to demonstrate relationships between actual data and idealized models.  
This small area of the “zebra stripes” map also functions as an index; the selection 






Figure 3.15:  Vine, Goddard Conference, 1966, Figure 1. 
 
Finally, the “stripes” image becomes an aestheticized symbol of this episode of the 
history of science.  For example, the cover art (Figure 3.16) of Glen’s The Road to 
Jaramillo—a history of the development of magnetic dating and its role in the 
development of plate tectonics—incorporates a portion of the Raff and Mason map.  
The color of this portion of the map was adjusted for the cover; the negative 





Figure 3.16:  Cover of Glen, The Road to Jaramillo, 1982. 
 
Interestingly, the aestheticized area is not the most essential data for justifying the 
Vine-Matthews-Morley hypothesis.  It is, however, a visually interesting segment of 
the “zebra stripe” map.  The section contains part of the largest anomaly stripe on the 
map.  The salience of this particular stripe was progressively reduced by the vectors 
and colors of subsequent versions that emphasized other magnetic features. 
 
Transitivity, Symmetry, and Magnetic Anomaly Profiles 
 As noted previously, the Vine-Matthews-Morley hypothesis was not 




were essential in convincing the geophysical community that the hypothesis was 
viable. 
In 1965 researchers from the Lamont Geological Observatory aboard the 
U.S.S. Eltanin collected magnetic data from the sea floor of the Pacific-Antarctic 
Ocean.  These data were digitally processed and inscribed in the form of magnetic 
anomaly profiles.  A magnetic profile is a line graph that demonstrates the remnant 
magnetism recorded by a magnetometer towed by a ship or plane traversing a specific 
path.  Magnetic profiles are essentially cross sections of magnetic anomaly maps; this 
relationship is clearly demonstrated in Figure 3.15.  One of the Lamont groups 
magnetic profiles—Eltanin 19—would become the most important piece of 
geophysical evidence supporting the Vine-Matthews-Morley hypothesis.  But this 
significance is not immediately revealed by the visualized data alone.  Rhetorical 
mediation transformed this curve into a functional visual proposition in an array of 
visual arguments. 
The saw-toothed line of Eltanin 19 does not look like much in its unmediated 
form (Figure 3.17); however, when it is enhanced with rhetorical strategies, the 
profile articulates 10 million years of geophysical activity. 
 
 
Figure 3.17:  Raw profile of Eltanin 19. 
 
The “symmetry” of the profile was the key aspect of this evidence; its symmetry 




magnetic data extending outward from a ridge center with a newly revised timeline of 
magnetic polarity epochs.  The rhetorical history of the Eltanin-19 profile begins with 
its use as primary evidence in Pitman and Hiertzler’s 1966 research article.  It was 
later circulated as a supporting figure in Vine’s review article and as a component in 
graphics for other publications.  This section will document the rhetorical life of this 
crucial curve.  
 
Training the Viewer to See Symmetry:  The Local Context of the Eltanin-19 Profile 
 Pitman and Hiertzler’s 1966 article is only four pages long, but it contains five 
remarkable images.  The first three images train the reader to identify symmetrical 
patterns that he or she might not otherwise see.  Their fourth figure compares the 
Eltanin-19 profile from the Pacific-Antarctic Ridge to magnetic profiles from the 
North Atlantic.  Their fifth graphic is comprised of diagrams similar to Tuzo Wilson’s 
diagrams of transform faults (Figure 3.3).  These diagrams explain away slight 
deviations in symmetry by offering multiple explanations for asymmetrical 
incongruities.  Graphically maintaining symmetry is important because the ideal 
prediction of the Vine-Matthews-Morley hypothesis is the existence of identical 
patterns on either side of the ridge.  
Figure 3.18 provides geographical and conceptual context for the argument.  
This map is calibrated to lines of latitude and longitude.  Unbroken lines mark the 
U.S.S. Eltanin’s collection paths across the Pacific-Antarctic ridge.  These collection 
runs produced the profiles articulated in Figure 3.19.  However, Figure 3.18 does 




symmetrically spaced anomalies on either side of the ridge crest.  These anomalies 
are marked with dashed lines; numbers (N) and prime-marked numbers (N’) identify 
allegedly corresponding phenomena.  These labels train viewers to recognize a 




Figure 3.18: Pitman and Hiertzler, Science, 1966, Figure 1. 
 
Chiasmus (XY:Y’X’) is similar to the figure antimetabole (XY:YX), which 
also repeats terms in reversed order; however, with chiasmus similar but not identical 
constructs can be substituted for the original terms.  For example, Kennedy’s “Ask 
not what your county can do for you, but what you can do for your country” is an 




In the following example of chiasmus, similar but not identical elements are in 
reversed conceptual order:  Napoleon was defeated by a Russian winter and the 
snows of Leningrad destroyed Hitler.28  As Fahnestock notes, across the history of 
rhetorical criticism, the study of antimetabole and chiasmus has focused on their 
textual manifestations, especially in Biblical passages and oratory; however, these 
figures possess argumentative power often developed in scientific contexts:  “This 
pattern is clearly discoverable in nature.  The image is found, but also constructed, by 
manipulation and selection, to approximate a familiar conceptual pattern” (Rhetorical 
Figures 137).  Fahnestock shows that the patterns of these figures are often visually 
invoked, a rhetorical phenomenon that is occurring within the Eltanin graphics. 
 The numerical chiasmus of Figure 3.18 (4-3-2-1:1’-2’-3’-4’) is reproduced by 
Pitman and Hiertzler in Figure 3.19, but the rhetorical presence of this chiasmus is 
visually complicated by the inclusion of magnetic and bathymetric data.   
                                                 





Figure 3.19:  Pitman and Hiertzler, Science, 1966, Figure 2. 
 
The chiasmus works in Figure 3.18 (at least provisionally) because nothing 
challenges the symmetry claim.  The authors present equidistantly spaced lines, 
which they label with equidistantly spaced numbers and prime-marked numbers.  
Because the terms have clear (though simplified) symmetrical form, the viewer 
accepts (or at least tentatively accepts) the similarity of the juxtaposed phenomena.  
In Figure 3.19, however, the credibility of this chiastic reasoning is stretched.  There 
are numbers in reversed order equally spaced along the profile, but the underlying 




especially the case for the Eltanin 20 and Eltanin 21 profiles; it takes several seconds 
of scanning the image to determine which features of the contrapuntal terms are 
symmetrical.  For example, on the bottom run of Eltanin 20, 3 and 3’ are not 
symmetrical at first glance, since the 3 peak is taller and more compressed than 3’ 
peak.  Once the viewer recognizes that it is the relative horizontal (peak-to-peak) 
positions that are symmetrical, the assertion is clearer; however, it is not necessarily 
visually convincing on this graphic.  Eltanin 19 is the most symmetrical of the four 
profiles, but when the profile is stripped of numerical markers (as I presented in 
Figure 3.17), this symmetry is also difficult to see.  Pitman and Hiertzler use Figure 
3.20 to amplify the symmetry of Eltanin 19.  The amplification transforms the figural 
logic of the inscription from the logic of chiasmus to the logic of antimetabole—from 
comparisons claiming similarity to comparisons claiming sameness.  The amplified 
Eltanin-19 profile, visually situated between distance and time scales, also encodes 
the transitivity argument at the heart of the Vine-Matthews-Morley hypothesis.  The 






Figure 3.20: The amplified Eltanin-19 profile. Pitman and Hiertzler, Science, 1966, Figure 3. 
 
 As noted previously, it is difficult to see the symmetry of the unmediated 
profile (Figure 3.17).  In Figure 3.20, several maneuvers amplify and emphasize the 
symmetry.  First, the top curve is the reversal of the original inscription.  This action 
is noted in the text and the caption, but it is not emphasized on the graphic itself; that 
is, the authors did not add a reversed scale to indicate that east and west are reversed 
for the top curve.  This move changes the figural logic from chiasmus to antimetabole 
by asserting that elements on either side of the profile are not merely similar—they 
are the same.  The X:X’ relationship is transformed into an X=X relationship.  The 
bottom curve, a computed model, reinforces this visual argument.  This curve 




symmetry more apparent.  Elements on either side of this curve mirror each other in 
height, area, and configuration.  Moreover, three instances of the “same” curve create 
a striking visual parallelism.  The viewer’s eye is almost forced to move along the 
vectors created by the aligned minima and maxima (the relative high and low points 
on the curves).  These vectors also create implicit visual connections between the 
scale at the top of the diagram and the elements at the bottom.  
 Below the three iterations of the curve is a representation of the sea floor.  
Magnetic anomalies are mapped onto this thick line, and the relative minima and 
maxima of the curves are transferred to mark magnetic boundaries onto physical 
space.  As was the case with the Raff and Mason map (Figure 3.5), invisible features 
of rock gain visual presence through contrasting tones.  The caption text preserves 
this visual antithesis in verbal form:  “Shaded areas are normally magnetized 
material; unshaded areas, reversely magnetized material” (1166).  This strategy for 
visually segmenting the oceanic crust into distinct sections according to the points of 
a magnetic anomaly profile is not new.  Vine and Wilson made similar maneuvers in 
a 1965 publication.  However, Figure 3.20 is novel because these segments align with 
a reliable scale of known periods of magnetic reversals.  In addition, the length of the 
Eltanin-19 profile allows the viewer to recognize an overwhelming number of 
correspondences between the marked crustal blocks and known (and previously 
unidentified) magnetic epochs.  The “blocking” of segments indexed against time 
draws on the visual tradition of the geologic column diagram.  Martin Rudwick 
documents the development of this tradition in “The Emergence of a Visual Language 




Reading Images, timelines turn phenomena into a narrative of gradual unfolding 
stages (95-97).  By making antithetical distinctions and indexing them against the 
timeline of known anomalies, Pitman and Hiertzler transform the Eltanin-19 data into 
an episodically segmented history of the spreading sea floor.   
 The persuasive force of this story relies on the transitivity argument 
encapsulated in the entire graphic.  As mentioned previously, Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca explain that “the use of transitive relations is valuable in cases 
where it is a matter of ordering beings and events which cannot be directly compared 
with each other” (229).  In the case of the developing Vine-Matthews-Morley 
hypothesis, it was impossible to relate distance and time directly (i.e., to determine a 
rate of motion) because the spreading of the sea floor was too slow and (in the 1960s) 
too deep to observe directly.  Measurement of remnant magnetism provided the 
connecting variable; magnetism could be correlated with both distance and time.  
Magnetism and distance can be correlated through the magnetometer data; potassium-
argon dating provided the timeline that allowed magnetism to be related to time.   
Several features of the graphic enhance the expression of this transitivity 
argument.  As noted previously, the aligned points of three iterations of the same 
curve create directional vectors that guide the viewer’s eye.  The authors encourage 
this process by not adding extraneous framing elements or scales that might disrupt 
the visual flow.  In similar images, this graphical parsimony is not applied.  For 
example in Figure 3.21 (Figure 3 of Vine and Wilson 1965), x-axis lines strike 





Figure 3.21: Vine and Wilson, Science, 1965, Figure 3. 
 
Though I do not want to make too much of what Pitman and Hiertzler did not include 
in Figure 3.20, I contend that the addition of lines would have reduced the 
effectiveness of the transitivity argument.  Figures 3.20a and 3.20b test this intuition 
by adding dividing lines and x-axes, respectively.  By removing the reversed and 
ideal curves in Figure 3.20c, I test my intuition that the repetition of parallel curves is 






Figure 3.20a:  Amplified Eltanin 19 with dividing lines. 
 
 







Figure 3.20c: Eltanin 19 without the sea-floor diagram, reversed curve, and model curve. 
 
Without the additional curves and the black-and-white representation of the sea floor, 
the symmetry of the data is less clear, and the transitive relationship between 
distance, magnetism, and time lacks presence.  As Figure 3.20c suggests, merely 
including the requisite elements of this transitivity series is less successful than the 
complete graphic as it was presented in Figure 3.20.  Pitman and Hiertzler’s visual 
argument was effective because it provided rhetorical amplification of the 
connections between magnetism, distance, and time.  
The overall construction of the Eltanin-19 amplification provided a transitive 
pattern that the authors used to test other data from the Reykanjes ridge in the 






Figure 3.22: Pitman and Hiertzler, Science, 1966, Figure 4. 
 
 
Though the authors do not reverse any of the profiled data from the Reykanjes, they 
do use a highly symmetrical model curve, based on the Eltanin-19 model, to aid the 
reader in recognizing the symmetry of the Reykanjes data.  The visual antimetabole is 
preserved in the seabed diagram situated between the curves and the time scale.  
Graphics in later articles will incorporate the figural logic of antimetabole to 
assimilate evidence from elsewhere in the world; these assimilations show that the 
Vine-Matthews-Morley hypothesis was a global phenomenon.  A discussion of these 







Reception and Conversion 
 The effectiveness of the amplified Eltanin-19 graphic (Figure 3.20) can be 
measured in part by the reactions of other scientists.  Some of William Glen’s 
interviews document reactions to the graphic at the 1966 meeting of the American 
Geophysical Union, the first public display of the figure.29  Allan Cox described the 
experience of seeing it as “truly extraordinary” (qtd. in Glen 337).  According to Neil 
Opdyke, Dick Doell was “stunned” and later remarked, “It’s so good it can’t possibly 
be true, but it is” (Opdyke qtd. in Glen 339).  Similarly, Xavier Le Pichon, a Lamont 
researcher who had been skeptical of sea-floor spreading but was not in attendance at 
the AGU meeting, recalls when he was “converted” by the Eltanin-19 graphic: 
Walter Pitman showed me the “magic” magnetic anomaly profile 
obtained over the South Pacific ridge crest, the Eltanin-19 profile that 
had been presented by Jim Hiertzler at the American Geophysical 
Union meeting in Washington D.C., on April 27.  My wife still 
remembers that on my way back from the laboratory, I asked her to get 
me a drink and told her: “The conclusions of my thesis are wrong: 
Hess is right.”  (“My Conversion” 212)   
Once the symmetry of the Eltanin-19 profile and its correspondence to the magnetic 
time scale were established, the curve itself and the mediation strategies used to 
articulate its symmetry would be used in other arguments that solidified the Vine-
Matthews-Morley hypothesis. 
 
                                                 
29 Though I do not have access to the display that was presented at the 1966 AGU meeting, 
descriptions of the graphic correspond exactly with the version that appeared in the December 2, 1966 




In Support of Figural Logics: The Circulation and Extensions of Eltanin 19 
 In this section I test the validity of my claims regarding the symmetrical 
antimetaboletic logic of the Eltanin-19 profile by examining how the profile was 
incorporated into other visual arguments.  As Fahnestock notes, “To the extent that a 
writer can preserve parallelism as well as repetition in the two cola, the antimetabole 
gains predictive power in the invitation it offers readers to participate in how the 
figure should be completed.  The strength of this predictive power…comes across in 
the ease with which an antimetabole can sustain an ellipsis” (Rhetorical Figures 124).  
I discuss two examples where Eltanin 19 sustains visual ellipses. 
Figure 3.23 is another graphic presented by Vine at the Goddard Conference. 
In this figure, the form of the Eltanin-19 profile is used to validate less symmetrical 






Figure 3.23: Vine, Goddard Conference, 1966, Figure 3. 
 
The bottom three curves are adapted from Pitman and Hiertzler’s Eltanin-19 graphic.  
The other curves are of profiles of ridges off the coast of Vancouver Island, which is 
the same region mapped by Raff and Mason in Figure 3.5.  Though the Juan de Fuca 
and Gorda profiles are symmetrical around their centers, this symmetry breaks down 
toward the eastern edges that abut the North American continental mass.  These 
shorter profiles do not cover enough submarine longitude to demonstrate complete 
bilateral symmetry; however, the comparison of these profiles to the Eltanin-19 
profiles invites the viewer to infer the existence or previous existence of such 
symmetry in these other curves.  Dotted lines identify similar terms across the left 
half of each of the profiled areas; the existence of similar terms on the right half can 




present perfect extended symmetry. 
 A similar process is at work in Figure 3.24.  This graphic is from a 1968 
article by Pitman, Herron, and Hiertzler that appeared in The Journal of Geophysical 
Research.  Eltanin 19 and its reversal are situated at the center of the graphic, and the 
symmetry of these profiles is extended to other profiles from throughout the Pacific 
Ocean.  Also noteworthy, the figure is topped with a numerical antimetabole and not 











Of particular interest in Figure 3.24 is the presentation of the N. PAC. curve, an 
extended version of the Juan de Fuca profile.  By presenting the observed and 
reversed iterations of this curve, the authors assert the existence of bilateral symmetry 
for N. PAC., even though the curve is not long enough to verify the symmetry of all 
the recorded data.  Also interesting is the presence of the MN 5 and SI 3 profiles.  
These profiles only cover half of a ridge flank, but bilateral symmetry can still be 
inferred because of their placement within the series.  Thus, this graphic demonstrates 
two ways to argue symmetry into a curve: compare a profile to part of a known 
standard or compare a curve to its reverse.  In the case of N. PAC., both methods are 
used.  Figures 3.24a, 3.24b, and 3.24c test if the presence of Eltanin 19 is essential for 
demonstrating symmetry.  Figure 3.24d tests whether the N. PAC. curve and its 
reversal could also be used as symmetrical standards. 
 
 Figure 3.24a:  Graphic with N. PAC. isolated. 
 
 













Figure 3.24d:  Graphic with the N. PAC. profile spliced in for the Eltanin profile. 
 
As its absence in Figures 3.24b and 3.24c indicates, Eltanin 19 is more significant for 
encouraging symmetrical readings of the half curves.  Even without the Eltanin-19 
standard, the N. PAC. profile (Figure 3.24a) looks symmetrical when compared to its 
mirror; however, as Figure 3.24d suggests, N. PAC. is less effective than Eltanin 19 
in functioning as a symmetrical standard for visually organizing the set of curves.  




these graphical experiments suggest that wise graphical choices can affect the 
acceptability of less than ideal visual data. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have shown how geophysicists in the 1960s mediated the 
output of magnetometers to solve a scientific puzzle that had thwarted scientists for 
decades.  I have also shown how this mediation is a rhetorically driven process.  The 
visual arguments presented in the “zebra stripe” maps changed as scientists used 
different graphical elements to make specific features more or less salient.  Similarly, 
the magnetic profiles of the Pacific-Antarctic Ridge were rhetorically mediated 
constructions.  Computers may have produced the curves, but scientific rhetors 
manipulated figural logics and graphical traditions to amplify symmetry and to 
connect unrelated variables.  The “zebra stripe” maps and the Eltanin-19 graphics 
demonstrate the persuasive power of data transformed into the standard visual 
patterns of rhetorical figures.  These graphics argued motion into the sea floor by 
visually reorganizing known relationships between magnetism, topography, and time.   
In the next chapter, I show how contemporary scientists at NASA used more 
sophisticated instruments and visualization practices to make explicit dissociative 
distinctions.  These scientists also faced the challenge of converging spatial and 
temporal domains while tracking the motion and properties of clouds.  They deployed 
unclear satellite data, unconventional data from robotic instruments, digitally 





Chapter 4: Revealing the “Twilight Zone”—Verbal and Visual 
Arguments about Invisible Atmospheric Phenomena 
 
Visualization is an aid to seeing relationships, and there are rhetorical situations 
which demand some kind of picturation.  Many skilled expositors will follow an 
abstract proposition with some easy figure which lets us down to earth or enables us 
to get a bearing.  There is some value then in the “incarnation” of concepts. 
 
— Richard Weaver, “The Rhetoric of Social Science,” The Ethics of Rhetoric  
 
 In 2006, a group of scientists working for NASA’s Goddard Space Flight 
Center described a previously unquantified atmospheric phenomenon that could 
significantly change climate models.  They hypothesized that invisible particles in 
areas of the sky around visible clouds reflected much more light from the sun than 
most researchers acknowledged.  More specifically, they believed that data-
processing schemes applied to reflectance data recorded by satellite instruments did 
not correctly account for the reflectivity of near-cloud atmospheric aerosols.  
Aerosols are suspended particles, such as dust, sea salt, volcanic ash, disorganized 
water vapor, and anthropogenic pollutants.  Processing algorithms were trained to 
make distinctions between cloudy and clear atmosphere and to measure reflectance 
for clouds and aerosols separately, but because some aerosol measurements taken of 
the areas near clouds were considered unreliable, the algorithms that processed that 
data treated any area that was not obviously “cloudy” as “clear.”  The researchers at 
Goddard believed that the light reflected by these operationally “clear” areas should 
be measured and modeled differently to account for the additional reflectivity caused 




regions of invisible water vapor and solid aerosols could extend for tens of kilometers 
around visible clouds and constitute a significant portion of the atmosphere.   
When these scientists articulated their twilight zone hypothesis, they supported 
their claims with data collected by several sophisticated instruments; however, their 
peers did not accept their arguments.  Colleagues were skeptical; journals rejected the 
work.  This chapter describes the means by which these scientists overcame 
significant rhetorical challenges to argue the twilight zone between clouds and 
aerosols into existence.  Specifically, I examine a series of drafts of the twilight zone 
manuscript to demonstrate how verbal and visual components were modified to 
separate rhetorically the appearance of a clear divide between cloudy and cloud-free 
atmosphere from the reality of gradually diminishing reflectance phenomena. 
 
Background:  Satellites over the Sky – 1957 – 2006 
On 4 October 1957, much of the world paused and listened to a stream of 
beeps chirping over a static-filled radio signal.  Those beeps were produced by 
transmitters on the Soviet Union’s Sputnik craft—the Earth’s first artificial satellite.  
Sputnik’s debut and the launches of the subsequent Sputnik II and Sputnik III are 
generally remembered for their social and political implications; the Sputnik satellites 
were the first substantial legs of the Space Race, and they were significant Cold War 
victories that accelerated aerospace development on both sides of the Iron Curtain.  
However, it is often forgotten that the Soviet Union’s Sputnik project and the early 
American satellite projects, such as the Vanguard and Explorer programs, were 




to the International Geophysical Year (IGY)—a period of global scientific 
cooperation that spanned from July of 1957 to December of 1958 (NASA Sputnik).  
At least on paper, Sputnik was a scientific satellite launched to support the IGY.  Its 
launch may have marked the beginning of an escalating Space Race, but it also 
marked the beginning of a new era of scientific research based on streams of satellite 
data.  
Satellite observations were first trained on celestial phenomena.  For example, 
in 1958 the instruments of the Explorer satellites recorded the data that allowed an 
American team lead by James Van Allen to discover and map features of the 
magnetosphere—phenomena now called the Van Allen belts (NASA-NSSDC 
“Explorer 1”).  Later satellites carried instruments that looked down at the Earth.  In 
1960, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) launched the 
first of a series of new weather satellites.  These Television Infrared Observation 
Satellites (TIROS) were used to map cloud cover.  As NOAA documents indicate, the 
sky-high view revealed new phenomena: 
TIROS showed clouds banded and clustered in unexpected ways.  
Sightings from the surface had not prepared meteorologists for the 
interpretation of the cloud patterns that the view from an orbiting 
satellite would show.  (NOAA)   
Satellite observations provided novel perspectives on atmospheric phenomena and 
changed the way that atmospheric scientists worked; satellites also created new 




the need for computational resources to make sense of the data.  But reliance on 
computers can and did lead to scientific conflicts.   
In 1985, researchers with the British Antarctic Survey argued that ozone 
concentrations over Antarctica were dropping to lower than expected levels at 
specific times of the year (Farman, Gardiner, and Shanklin 207-10).  These findings 
were based on data collected by ground-based instruments, but these data conflicted 
with satellite measurements.  According to Sparling, “The authors had been 
somewhat hesitant about publishing, because Nimbus-7 satellite data had shown no 
such drop during the Antarctic spring.”  In the popular account of this case, the 
programs processing the satellite data “threw out” data points lower than a specific 
threshold because such levels were “impossibly” low.30  Once the algorithms were 
adjusted, it was indeed clear that the seasonal reduction in ozone concentration was 
real and that lower spring levels could be identified as far back as 1976.  Though the 
“ozone hole” case is not the primary focus of this chapter, it demonstrates the 
complexity and potential problems of modern satellite instrumentation and the tension 
between satellites, ground-based instruments, and the expectations of scientists 
arguing about atmospheric phenomena.  Nor is it a unique case. 
In 1995, multiple studies claimed that clouds absorbed more energy from the 
sun than contemporary atmospheric models recognized (Li et al).  In the jargon of 
atmospheric science, clouds were “darker” than models acknowledged.  The technical 
                                                 
30 In conflicting accounts of the discovery of the “ozone hole,” historians and scientists disagree over 
the characterization of events.  Some claim that the algorithms processing satellite-measured ozone 
data were “throwing out” ozone data below a certain threshold because such low levels were 
impossible.  Others claim that this is a fabricated myth, a nice story that is inconsistent with the real 
science as understood by NASA insiders (Sparling).  Regardless, there was enough of a mismatch 
between what was known about the satellite data by the BAS team that they were cautious in offering 




details of what would be named the cloud absorption anomaly (CAA) are less 
significant to this chapter than the persuasive dynamics of the scientific situation.  
Specifically, some researchers suggested that models should be revised to account for 
CAA, others disagreed.  Critiques of instrumentation were central to dismissing CAA 
proponents’ main claims about discrepancies between models and the observed 
“realities” that were not in fact real (Li et al; Kerr).  Ultimately, the CAA was not a 
productive concept for thinking about the atmosphere; however, the CAA case offers 
another example of the kinds of activities that are central to the practice of 
atmospheric science.  Scientists use instruments to collect data that are used to 
challenge or support existing models.   
Tensions between models and observations and satellite and ground-based 
measurements would be successfully negotiated by the Goddard researchers in 2006.  
In this case, ground-based instruments were used to validate satellite data that were 
deemed unreliable and hence ignored by some atmospheric scientists and in some 
atmospheric models.  In other words, unlike the CAA supporters, the Goddard group 
was successful in arguing for the existence of a phenomenon defined by a new 
concept—the twilight zone between clouds and aerosols. 
  
Challenging Assumptions: Revealing the Twilight Zone: 2006-2007  
In 2006, Yoram Kaufman, an atmospheric scientist at NASA’s Goddard Space 
Flight Center, and Ilan Koren, then a postdoctoral fellow at Goddard, were 
investigating some unusual data coming back from the Moderate-resolution Imaging 




spinning parabolic mirror and several sets of sensors to collect reflected radiation in 
both visible and invisible wavelengths.  Figure 4.1 is an illustration of MODIS from 
the cover of its press brochure.  The gold foil (partially removed in the cutaway view) 
protects the components of the device from extraneous solar radiation, so radiation 
reflected from the Earth that passes through the round-cornered rectangular aperture 
is the only light to interact with the sensors.  (The large circular element on the front 
of the device is part of the cooling system.) 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Modified from cover page of the MODIS promotional brochure.  Source: NASA-
Goddard Space Flight Center.  MODIS: Moderate-Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer. 
 
Essentially, MODIS is a super-sophisticated digital camera.  Using algorithms to 
combine and compare wavelengths from the 36 different “bands,” scientists can 
transform MODIS data into 44 different data products.  Table 4.1 demonstrates the 
relationship between some of these bands and specific geographic, atmospheric, and 





Table 4.1:  The first nineteen MODIS data bands.  Modified from MODIS brochure. Inside back 
cover.  Source: NASA-Goddard Space Flight Center.  MODIS: Moderate-Resolution Imaging 
Spectroradiometer. 
 
The different data that MODIS simultaneously collects allow researchers to create 
visualizations of phenomena ranging from plankton concentrations (Figure 4.2) to 
pollution events and sand storms (Figure 4.3).  The green bands in Figure 4.2 show 
areas of high plankton levels.  The yellow regions in Figure 4.3 show aerosol events.  
In the upper map of Figure 4.3, the spot over the Atlantic Ocean is sand blowing off 
the Sahara Dessert; that sand will ultimately seed the beaches of the Caribbean.  The 
brighter regions in the lower map are smoke events.  The particularly large swaths of 
color over South America and Africa reveal the fine aerosols released by the burning 






Figure 4.2:  A visualization of ocean chlorophyll concentrations.  Chlorophyll is an index of 
plankton.  Source: NASA-Goddard Space Flight Center.  MODIS: Moderate-Resolution Imaging 
Spectroradiometer (13).  
 
 
Figure 4.3:  Visualizations of aerosol events.  Source: NASA-Goddard Space Flight Center.  
MODIS: Moderate-Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (17). 
 
The MODIS viewing field is enormous—it can image half of the continental 
United States in one orbital pass, and NASA’s two MODIS-equipped satellites circle 
the Earth so frequently that the entire planet is scanned every two days.  In contrast, 
the next best satellite only images a given area once every 16 days; a rate that is too 
infrequent to capture many rapid biological and meteorological changes—changes 




trends, such as deforestation and temperature change.  In fact, studying climate 
change was the purpose for which MODIS was designed in the first place.  It was part 
of the U.S. Global Change Research Program, a research initiative mandated by 
Congress in 1990 (NASA-GSFC “MODIS” 3).   
Kaufman and Koren were examining MODIS cloud and aerosol data to better 
understand how these two elements of the atmosphere reflect light and hence 
contribute to global temperature and temperature change.  As climate scientist Hans 
Graf noted in 2004, “[A]erosol-cloud interactions are seen as one of the most 
important single forces that drive climate change, but there are big uncertainties in the 
current understanding of these processes” (1309).  Kaufman and Koren had been 
investigating these processes, and they were particularly interested in using MODIS 
aerosol data from regions around clouds to refine their understanding of cloud-aerosol 
interactions.  For example, Koren and Kaufman (with co-authors Lorraine Remer and 
J. Vanderlai Martin) published a study in 2004 indicating that aerosols released from 
burning rainforests prevent the formation of specific kinds of clouds in Amazonia.  
This is just one example of the dozens of studies conducted by this atmospheric 
aerosol group at Goddard. 
The inspiration for what Koren and Kaufman would later call “the twilight 
zone between clouds and aerosols” was not a sophisticated visualization.  Rather, they 
believed that curves emerging from averaged MODIS data—like the one in Figure 
4.4—indicated that atmospheric reflectance did not drop off precipitously at the edges 




practices that applied “clearing” algorithms to make sharp distinctions between 
cloudy and clear atmosphere. 
At the time, it was common practice for atmospheric scientists to ignore 
MODIS aerosol measurements of near-cloud areas because of the corruption caused 
by sunlight scattering out from the sides of the cloud.  Many researchers considered 
MODIS aerosol data unreliable for an entire kilometer around the visible cloud.  But 
neglecting this data affected models of atmospheric phenomena.  Measurement 
schemes cut clear (but arbitrary and idiosyncratic) distinctions between cloudy and 
cloud-free areas despite a less than complete understanding of the region directly 
surrounding a cloud.  Ignoring the non-visible cloud and aerosol particles in this 
region reduced the accuracy of temperature models because these particles also 






Figure 4.4:  Atmospheric reflectance as a function of distance from the nearest cloud based on 
averaged MODIS data.  Modified from Koren et al, Draft 12 of “On the Twilight Zone between 
Clouds and Aerosols.”  Unpublished manuscript, 2006. 
 
Kaufman and Koren thought that a quantifiable aerosol phenomenon around 
clouds was represented in MODIS data within and beyond the 1 km threshold.  




clouds; it gradually declined, which suggested that the clear-cut distinctions between 
cloudy and clear atmosphere were not so clear-cut.  Kaufman and Koren named this 
region in between the cloudy and the clear atmosphere the twilight zone between 
clouds and aerosols.   
According to the twilight zone hypothesis, there is a region of invisible aerosol 
particles and disorganized water vapor extending for huge distances around visible 
clouds.  The wetter and hence larger particles near clouds reflect more light than the 
drier particles further from clouds.  The reflectivity of the twilight zone gradually 
decreases, though the “twilight zones” of several clouds can and often do overlap.  
According to the Goddard team’s estimates, the twilight zone could affect 30% to 
60% of the “clear” atmosphere, yet because these regions were not well defined or 
appropriately measured, they were not accounted for in contemporary atmospheric 
models.  It was clear to Kaufman and Koren that the quantification of the twilight 
zone was important to climate studies and atmospheric science.  However, they faced 
significant scientific and rhetorical challenges. 
Kaufman and Koren knew that MODIS data—their primary evidence for the 
twilight zone—were not going to be persuasive because of the alleged data corruption 
caused by light scattering out through the sides of visible clouds.  They began looking 
for other ways to corroborate the existence and extent of the “twilight zone,” and they 
thought they had found the answer in AERONET—the Aerosol Robotic Network.  
AERONET is a global, ground-based array of robotic instruments that detect aerosols 
in the atmosphere.  Each instrument in this network measures the aerosol content in 




described by one researcher as “a clean shot” (Remer).31  Figure 4.5 is a picture of an 
AERONET installation; there are dozens of similar installations at sites around the 
world. 
 
Figure 4.5: Picture of an AERONET sun-photometer installation.  Source: “AERONET Mission 
Follow Up.”  NASA Langley Research Center.  
 
As the sun moves, sensors signal the robotic arm to track it, so the measuring 
instruments stay aligned with the solar disk.  When the sun shines, a sun-photometer 
records precise measurements of aerosol particle size and aerosol optical depth—a 
measurement of the light passing through the column of airborne particles.  Solid 
particles are larger when they are wet and smaller when they are drier, and some 
particles are larger than other particles.  For example, airborne sand is larger than the 
solid particles in smoke; damp smoke particles are larger than dry smoke particles.  
AERONET data can be interpreted to distinguish these differences. 
                                                 
31 I interviewed Dr. Lorraine Remer in her office on the Goddard campus on August 29, 2007.  All 




If a cloud completely blocks out the sun, the photometer does not record data, 
which is why Koren and Kaufman were interested AERONET data.  By locating the 
times in the data records when these instruments were inactive, they could infer the 
presence of a cloud and then zero in on the aerosol measurements recorded after the 
inferred cloud passed and the instrument resumed recording.  Also, AERONET’s 
design and observation position meant that the scattering effect that allegedly 
corrupted MODIS data did not cause similar corruption in AERONET data.  The 
brightness of the solar disk overwhelms the scattering effect.  Thus, AERONET 
seemed to be the instrument that could validate what Koren and Kaufman thought 
they saw in the MODIS data.  
Interpreting AERONET data to suggest that aerosol density and particle size 
gradually decrease as clouds move away from the instrument, Koren and Kaufman 
believed they had the core arguments for what they thought was a publishable idea.  
They enlisted the aid of Lorraine Remer, also with the MODIS aerosol project, to 
help analyze the data and produce a publishable manuscript.  Like Kaufman, Remer 
had worked with MODIS from the instrument’s inception, and she was especially 
good at supporting ideas with clear, methodical written analysis (Remer).   
Tragically, on the afternoon of 26 May 2006, hours after Remer met with her 
colleagues about the project for the first time, Yoram Kaufman was struck by a car 
while riding his bicycle through the Goddard campus.  His injuries were fatal; the 
team was devastated.  The twilight zone project was put on hold while Remer, Koren, 




It would be several months before Remer and Koren returned to work on the 
twilight zone paper.  Koren accepted a permanent position at the Weizmann Institute 
in Israel, and Remer moved on to other projects at Goddard.  But as Remer 
comments, the twilight zone paper was “too good” to neglect.  Resuming work in July 
2006, Remer and Koren revised Koren and Kaufman’s original paper and circulated it 
amongst colleagues at Goddard.  They were surprised to learn that what they thought 
was a clear scientific argument was not acceptable to many of their peers.  Some 
colleagues at Goddard even told them to retract the paper after they heard that Koren 
and Remer had submitted a manuscript for publication.  
Retraction was not necessary.  The article was rejected by the journal Nature 
and then by the journal Science and then by Geophysical Research Letters.  
According to Remer, “Everyone was highly skeptical, [and they thought] that it was 
all artifice.”  A specific complaint was the paper’s casual assumption that MODIS 
and AERONET observations were equivalent.  MODIS measurements account for 
aerosol reflectance in spatial terms.  AERONET measurements record aerosol 
properties as functions of time.  The researchers were using time as a rough proxy for 
distance, which had not been done with AERONET before.  Also, they were using 
AERONET data that was not normally used to make arguments.  Other aerosol 
researchers ignored the “negative data” from dormant periods, but the Goddard team 
was interpreting these moments when the AERONET instruments did not collect data 
as an index of the presence of a cloud.  This creative interpretation is logical 





The novel aspects of the study were considered suspect by reviewers; this 
skepticism can be partially attributed to the way the authors presented their rationale 
for connecting MODIS and AERONET observations.  Remer explained that in the 
earlier submitted version of the paper they “had made a lot of hand waving 
assumptions to translate time from the nearest cloud into distance from the nearest 
cloud and those are wild assumptions.  People really objected.”  These objections are 
exemplified in the following comment from a reviewer for Geophysical Research 
Letters:  
There are also occasional examples of what I would characterize as 
incomplete science and or methodology (for example the simplistic 
discussion of near-cloud scattering effects on AERONET optical 
depths or the assumptions employed in using missing measurements in 
AERONET data as a means of crudely estimating distance to the 
nearest cloud).  (Geophysical Research Letters Correspondence)  
To overcome the doubts of their peers, Remer and Koren refined the description of 
their methodology and clarified their discussion of the data, but they also introduced 
new visual arguments to support their case.  A revision was ultimately accepted and 
published by Geophysical Research Letters, but there are significant differences 
between this last version and its predecessor drafts.   
This chapter traces the evolution of these drafts to investigate the rhetorical 
activities of these scientists.  Specifically, it describes the development of dissociation 




single instrument into a radical and accepted revision to atmospheric models essential 
to studies of climate change. 
 Before examining the verbal and visual arguments of this case, I first 
summarize the drafts that I analyze and the documents I use to support this analysis.  I 
then review the concept of dissociation, as explained in The New Rhetoric, and I 
discuss some observations that rhetorical critics have made regarding the relationship 
between dissociation and the rhetoric of science. 
 
Document Summary 
The primary text analyzed in this chapter is the published version of “On the 
Twilight Zone between Clouds and Aerosols,” which appeared in Geophysics 
Research Letters on 18 April 2007.  This analysis also incorporates earlier drafts of 
the article, which were obtained from and are used with the permission of Dr. 
Lorraine Remer.  The authors’ original draft numbers have been retained.  Draft 7 is 
the first version that Koren and Kaufman sent to Remer when she became a co-author 
on the paper; it is an incomplete draft.  Draft 9 is a significant revision that also 
includes some electronically tracked comments.  Draft 12 is the version that was 
submitted to Science and Nature and to Geophysical Research Letters the first time.  
While Drafts 7 and 9 were preliminary drafts not submitted for publication, they show 
how specific arguments were evolving as the authors revised the manuscript and 
prepared it for submission. 
 Supporting this analysis are the comments of Lorraine Remer; she was 




the comments from the reviewers for Geophysical Research Letters who rejected the 
initial submission to that journal. 
 I also examine several popularizations of the twilight zone story to track 
modifications to key images circulating into popular contexts. 
  
Dissociation Arguments 
 As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca explain, the process of dissociation 
represents a rhetor’s attempt to revise an assumed structure of reality—a belief about 
a state of affairs held by an audience—by rhetorically transforming a unitary concept 
into two entities: one which retains the value associated with the original concept and 
one which is cast away as false, artificial, or mere appearance (411-415).  
Dissociations resolve conceptual incompatibilities and paradoxes, and they are often 
invoked in definition arguments through which the “real” meaning of a term is 
established.  For example, Schiappa identifies how different rhetorical theorists have 
used dissociation techniques when arguing about the “real” definitions of rhetorical 
concepts, such as “argument fields” (75-76).  Indeed, the term “rhetoric” itself has 
been the subject of dissociative discourse since ancient times.  For example, the entire 
text of the Phaedrus clarifies “true” rhetoric from “false” rhetoric.  More recent 
discussions about the “globalization” of rhetoric have also incorporated dissociation 
arguments.  For example, one can read Gaonkar’s critique of modern rhetoric’s 
interpretive turn as a dissociation argument in which rhetoric’s “essence”—its 
productive capacity—is separated from what he sees as the “non-essential” 




At the core of a rhetorical dissociation is the identification and juxtaposition 
of paired terms.  In the generic formulation “term I” is that which is marked as 
artificial and purged; “term II” is the authentic remainder.  Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca provide several examples of common term I/ term II bundles that they call 
“philosophical pairs”: appearance/ reality; artificial/ natural; letter/ spirit; opinion/ 
fact; name/thing etc.   
 Dissociations are marked by specific argumentative activities and stylistic 
moves.  As argumentation theorist M.A. van Rees observes, dissociations are 
indicated by separation, negation, and/or revaluation of concepts.  One of van Rees’s 
examples concerning jury sports (such as ice skating and gymnastics) exemplifies 
each of these operations: 
Jury sports must go back to the circus, ice show, or freak show.  
Everything is all right, as long as we are delivered from them during 
the real sports events.  Sports are sports except jury sports, another 
word for unfair.  Jury sports are sometimes quite nice to watch, but 
they shouldn’t be made into competitive games.  (56) 
In this passage sports are separated into jury sports and non-jury sports; jury sports 
are marked as not sports; “real” sports are given a higher value than jury sports.  
In The New Rhetoric Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca identify some of the 
stylistic markers of dissociation.  These include adjectival forms of the term I/term II 
labels (e.g., real, apparent, true, illusory, etc.), dismissive prefixes (pseudo-, quasi-, 
non, etc), and typographic indicators, such as capitalization changes (e.g., Being  vs. 




 No critical work explicitly discusses the use of visuals in dissociation 
arguments.  However, there are related concepts described by some visual discourse 
analysts that are useful to consider in the light of dissociation.  Kress and van 
Leeuwen describe how ideal/real distinctions and given/new relationships are coded 
visually through top-bottom and left-right compositions respectively (181-202).  
These form-meaning relationships could potentially be used in dissociation 
arguments.  Kress and van Leeuwen also describe how color saturation can signify 
modality, though this modality marking is context dependent (168-171).  These 
linguists are using the term modality in the linguistic sense, the extent to which a set 
of signs is marked as real or unreal, possible or impossible.  In written text, the 
modality of a claim can be marked with the modal auxiliaries: may, might, must, can, 
etc.  Regarding context-specific visual modality, Kress and van Leeuwen note that in 
technical and scientific discourse, black-and-white images often have a higher 
modality, or “reality,” than images that are naturally colored or super-saturated in 
color.  In glossy magazine ads, supersaturated colors have the highest modality (170).  
(Recent preferences for super-saturated “false” color visualizations in some scientific 
imaging regimes might challenge the claim that monochromatic images have the 
highest modality in technical contexts, but even if such a shift occurs, it would not 
dismiss Kress and van Leeuwen’s observation that specific color schemes connote a 
higher “truth value” than other schemes in specific contexts).  Kress and van 
Leeuwen do not consider modality marking by color saturation in terms of 




distinction, if images of different modality levels are compared to each other to 
separate, negate, or revalue. 
An analysis of key images from the twilight zone case reveals how both 
arrangement and color saturation participate in the process of separating the 
appearance of a divided sky from the reality of a graded system. 
 
Dissociation and the Rhetoric of Science 
 The dissociative pair that is particularly interesting for the rhetoric of science 
is the appearance-reality dyad.32  As Alan Gross notes, dissociations negotiating this 
dyad are the fundamental activities of science, and scientific dissociations are a 
unique class of dissociation arguments.  Specifically, through science the 
“appearances that [lead] to diverse and contradictory speculation” are distinguished 
from a reality “that is the product of a privileged class of observations and statements 
derived from agreed-upon practices” (Starring 40).  He further explains, “The 
persuasive effect of science becomes just its ability to move from term I to term II as 
if moving from appearance to reality” (40, emphasis his).  Thus, science effaces the 
rhetorical nature of dissociation to enable the constant emergence of a more refined 
understanding of reality—an emergence that, once articulated, makes the new “term 
                                                 
32 The appearance-reality pair is not the only pair that has been considered in light of scientific 
dissociations.  Barnes (1982) explains that the accident/essence pair is commonly invoked.  Schiappa 
(1985) discusses the theory/observation pair in relation to the philosophy of science, but he explains 
that this distinction has been rejected as the fundamental activity of science:  “The distinction between 
observational and theoretical language has been rejected by many contemporary philosophers.  It has 
proved quite difficult to establish that there is a clear basis by which to distinguish between observable 
and unobservable objects—a necessity if the distinction between languages is to be based on 
ontological grounds” (76).  I mention Barnes and Schiappa here to recognize that dissociation has been 
considered in light of the operations of science, though I do not find these articulations as productive as 




II” world seem self-evident and immediately acceptable.  Gross’s example of Crick’s 
immediate acceptance of a rival’s “correct” interpretation of a biochemical structure 
demonstrates this seamless dissociative activity (Gross 39-40).  Such immediate 
acceptance would not take place in an argument about the authenticity of jury sports, 
which would not be supported by the argumentative machinery available to and 
expected of scientific discourse.  
As compelling as Gross’s description of dissociation in science is—and I do 
find it compelling—there are some aspects of it that might be extended through the 
close analysis of specific atypical situations.  For example, what dissociation 
techniques are employed when a scientific argument rests on observations and 
statements that are not provisionally agreed upon?  How do scientists invent, prepare, 
and revise arguments to accomplish a seamless dissociation under less than ideal 
conditions?  How do images, especially rhetorically mediated images, participate in 
the dissociation process? 
“On the Twilight Zone between Clouds and Aerosols” offers an opportunity to 
investigate such questions.  This article explicitly invokes dissociative distinctions to 
argue that the real structure of the atmosphere is different from accepted models; 
however, the best evidence the authors had to articulate this new reality was, at first, 
less than acceptable.  Koren and colleagues responded to these issues by invoking 
dissociative distinctions both visually and verbally throughout the text.  The authors 
use rhetorical figures, refine figurative language, and deploy a range of visual objects 




with a basic digital camera—served both evidential and demonstrative functions that 
were essential to their dissociative restructuring of reality. 33 
 My analysis of the twilight zone case might also clarify some comments on 
dissociation and science made by Alan Gross and Ray Dearin in Chaim Perelman.  In 
that book they remark, “It is not unusual for the dissociation of science to be plainly 
visible, even on the surface of its prose” (89).  I acknowledge that the markers of 
dissociation can be plainly visible in scientific texts; however, the examples chosen 
by Gross and Dearin—passages from revolutionary texts by Darwin and Einstein—
might not be the best support for the claim that explicit markers of dissociation are 
typical; i.e., “not unusual.”  While this observation may seem to be mere quibbling 
over the words “not unusual,” I think there is an interesting and under-theorized point 
here.  Specifically, a rhetorical dissociation can have lesser and greater degrees of 
salience depending on the terms the author used to mark it, and these markings will 
be more transparent in cases in which the persuasive stakes are higher, such as when 
the audience is likely to be resistant to the claim.  As both the Gross and Dearin 
examples and the example of the twilight zone case demonstrate, explicit dissociative 
language in science is the product of atypical rhetorical situations.  Though 
dissociation is always at work in scientific arguments, rhetorical dissociations are 
more overtly expressed when an argument challenges established scientific traditions 
or practices.  During periods of normal science, dissociation is still taking place as the 
fundamental persuasive activity, but it is less explicit.  When subtle dissociative 
activity is unsuccessful, rhetors take steps to make it more visible.  This extension and 
                                                 
33 Evidential images serve as records of specific traits or events.  Demonstrative images operate at a 
higher level of abstraction; they present visual information that is generalizable for multiple situations 




clarification of Gross and Dearin’s comments is supported by the examples of verbal 
and visual dissociative activities of Koren et al. became increasingly blatant as they 
revised their work in response to rejection and disbelief.  
 
Analysis Summary 
This chapter analyzes five facets of this rhetorical case.  First, I describe how 
the reasoning patterns of specific rhetorical figures were used to create conceptual 
distinctions and empower a dissociation argument; an “apparent” antithesis is 
replaced by what is “actually” a gradual phenomenon.  This replacement of one 
conception with another becomes verbally and visually clarified over successive 
drafts.  Second, I show how definitions were negotiated to make the label of this 
concept—“the twilight zone”—palatable to all readers.  Creating non-dissociative 
distinctions between definitions of the word “twilight” was important for clarifying 
the meaning of the label.  Third, I explore the atypical scientific imaging practices 
that were essential arguments supporting the existence of the twilight zone.  Fourth, I 
trace the circulation of specific twilight zone images in public spaces—such as 
NASA’s Web site, news sites, and popular science blogs.  Finally, I examine the 
composition and alteration of the Goddard team’s data graphics and describe how 





From Antithesis to Continuum: Grading the Sky, Revealing the Twilight Zone  
In Rhetorical Figures in Science, Jeanne Fahnestock surveys the range of 
strategies that rhetors use to reconnect terms that have been pried apart by the 
rhetorical figure antithesis (86-95).34  These strategies include bracketing (for 
example, Catholics and Protestants are bracketed as Christians), adding a flanking 
term (for example, the human-ape dichotomy becomes the graded human-ape-
monkey triad), inserting a middle term (for instance, Huxley incorrectly filled in the 
inorganic-organic antithesis with the protoplasmic substance bathybius), and using 
more elaborate serial logics such as the figures incrementum and gradatio.35  The 
shifts from binary distinctions to either a unitary or a graduated idea are common but 
effective patterns of conceptual change.  Figure 4.6 demonstrates how various 
strategies for rejoining terms separated by antithetical reasoning—bracketing, 
flanking, bridging, serial figures—can be rendered visually with color.  Shape, size, 
proximity, or other gradable visual variables might also be used to rhetorically 
(re)connect binary terms. 
                                                 
34 Antithesis is the juxtaposition of contrasting ideas; for example,  Lincoln’s “It has been my 
experience that folks who have no vices have very few virtues.”  
35 Incrementum is the arrangement of words or clauses in a sequence of  increasing force; for example, 
“Marcus was a captain, prince, king and emperor.”  Gradatio, also know as climax, is a series of 
clauses that increase in significance; each clause repeats at its beginning the last word from the 
previous clause.  For instance, the following example occurs in St. Paul’s letter to the Romans:  “But 
we glory also in tribulations, knowing that tribulation worketh patience; and patience trial; and trial 
hope; and hope confoundeth not, because the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy 





Figure 4.6:  Visual analogs for the verbal strategies that can undo antitheses. 
 
The rhetorical negotiation of antitheses is common in all argument fields, and 
as Fahnestock shows throughout Rhetorical Figures in Science, such maneuvers are 
widely used in scientific arguments.  The rhetorical development of the twilight zone 
offers a new and rich case for exploring the negotiation of antithetical and serial 
logics in both verbal and visual modes. 
The primary argument of Koren and colleagues is a definition argument that 
replaces a structure defined as an antithesis with a gradual phenomenon.  The twilight 
zone functions as a term that bridges the cloudy and cloud-free, but it also resonates 
both verbally and visually with incremental logic.  By its definition, the “twilight 
zone” is a graded phenomenon.  Its gradual nature is articulated in the authors’ 
primary scientific evidence, visual displays of MODIS (Figure 4.7) and AERONET 










Figure 4.7 and density and particle size in Figure 4.8) are compared to distance or 
time, respectively.36  
 
 
Figure 4.7: Visualized MODIS data Figure 4.8: Visualized AERONET Data. 
From Figure 2 of Koren et al 2007. From Figure 3 of Koren et al 2007. 
 
 
These visuals are discussed at length in later sections.  This section traces the verbal 
evolution of the authors’ figural logic and shows how this logic contributes to the 
overall dissociative activity of the paper.  That is, the appearance of antithetical 
distinctions between cloudy and cloud free atmosphere are replaced with an 
incremental reality—a gradually dissipating field of diminishing aerosol particles and 
unorganized cloud droplets.  Rhetorical figures are negotiated in both the abstract and 
the introduction of the article; it is in these compressed spaces where the argument is 
most succinctly epitomized.  A comparison of successive revisions shows how the 
                                                 
36 As mentioned previously, early drafts displayed AERONET data in terms of distance, which was a 
point of contention for the reviewers.  However, regardless of the x-axis domain, the graph serves as 




negotiation of figural patterns becomes more refined over time to foreground the 
appearance/reality separation that the authors wished to assert. 
 Across revisions of the abstract, the shift from antithesis to graded series 
moves toward a version that best articulates the twilight zone as reality and dismisses 
absolute distinctions between “cloudy” and “cloud free” as artificial, binary, and 
instrumentally idiosyncratic.  Table 4.2 includes the first four sentences of the 




Draft Sentence 1 Sentence 2 Sentence 3 Sentence 4 
7  
The mutual interactions 
between clouds and aerosols 
generate a complex system 
leading to significant 
uncertainties in understanding 
cloud's climatic effects in 
particular and future climatic 
changes, in general.   
 
To simplify the understanding 
of this non-linear system we 
usually separate cloudy and 
cloud-free areas and measure 
various clouds' and aerosols' 
properties separately.  
 
 
However, we find that clouds are surrounded 
by a “twilight zone” – a "halo" (or region) 
composed of a mixture of forming and 
evaporating thin clouds and aerosols 
extending kilometers from the clouds into 




The optical depth (OD - a 
measure of the aerosol column 
concentration) of these twilight 
clouds is proportional to the 
concentration of smoke or 
pollution aerosols, suggesting 
that anthropogenic emissions 
may influence this zone. 
9  
Cloud and aerosols affect each 
other and form a complex 
system leading to high 
uncertainty in understanding 
fundamental processes in 
Earth's climate in general and 
climate change in particular.   
 
 
To simplify this non-linear 
system we usually distinguish 
between "cloudy" and 
"cloud-free" areas and 
measure them separately.  
 
 
However, we find that clouds are surrounded 
by a “twilight zone” – a belt of forming and 
evaporating cloud fragments and hydrated 
aerosols extending tens of kilometers from 




The optical depth of these 
twilight clouds is proportional to 
the concentration of smoke or 
pollution aerosols, suggesting the 
twilight zone is an aerosol 
phenomenon that takes place in 
the vicinity of clouds. 
 
12  
Cloud and aerosols affect each 
other and form a complex 
system leading to high 
uncertainty in understanding 
climate change.   
 
 
To simplify this non-linear 
system we usually distinguish 
between "cloudy" and "cloud-




However, we find that clouds are surrounded 
by a “twilight zone” – a belt of forming and 
evaporating cloud fragments and hydrated 
aerosols extending tens of kilometers from the 
clouds into the so-called “cloud-free zone.” 
 
 
The optical depth of the twilight 
zone is proportional to the 
concentration of smoke or 




Cloud and aerosols interact 
and form a complex system 
leading to high uncertainty in 




To simplify this non-linear 
system it is customary to 
distinguish between ‘‘cloudy’’ 
and ‘‘cloud-free’’ areas and 
measure them separately.  
 
 
However, we find that clouds are surrounded 
by a ‘‘twilight zone’’ – a belt of forming and 
evaporating cloud fragments and hydrated 
aerosols extending tens of kilometers from the 
clouds into the so-called cloud-free zone.  
 
 
The gradual transition from 
cloudy to dry atmosphere is 
proportional to the aerosol 
loading, suggesting an additional 
aerosol effect on the composition 
and radiation fluxes of the 
atmosphere. 




Over successive drafts, diction shifts clarify the actions and interactions of clouds 
and aerosols.  In Draft 7, mutual interactions between clouds and aerosols are “generating 
a complex system.”  In Draft 9, clouds and aerosols “affect each other and form a 
complex system.”  By the final version, they “interact and form a complex system.”  The 
diction differences are slight, but not insignificant.  In the earliest version, the actions of 
clouds and aerosols create a system; by Draft 9 and through to the final draft they are the 
components of the system; they are part of a whole rather than generating agents. 
In the second sentence of each draft, the authors establish the antithetical 
distinction between cloudy and cloud free, which they later challenge.  Several interesting 
changes occur across revisions that indicate the authors want to affect a dissociative 
distinction.  The introduction of qualifying quotation marks to the terms “cloudy” and 
“cloud-free” in Draft 9 emphasizes the arbitrariness of the binary distinction.  Moreover, 
“usually separate” is replaced by “it is customary to distinguish” in the final draft.  
“Usually” just connotes typical, but “customary” can connote typical by means of 
tradition, which is not necessarily an acceptable warrant in scientific discourse.  As 
Perelman notes, the word “customary” can be invoked as an effective term-I marker in 
situations where the customary and the novel are marked as false and true, respectively 
(The Realm of Rhetoric 136).37  The separation of the current work from traditional 
practice is further exemplified in the change from the collective “we” in “we usually 
separate” (Draft 7 and 9) and “we usually distinguish” (Draft 12) to the empty subject of 
“it is customary” in the final version. 
                                                 
37 Perelman notes that “all the definitions which Charles Leslie Stevenson, in a thought-provoking article, 
called “persuasive”—and which contrast a novel, “true” meaning to a customary but specious one—set up 





In sentence three of each draft, the authors explicitly introduce a “fuzzy middle” 
to bridge the antithesis.  The authors explain that their twilight zone is situated between 
the cloudy and cloud-free terms, thereby arguing that the atmosphere around clouds is 
graded with respect to humidity and aerosol concentrations.  Changes in the description 
of the twilight zone over successive drafts reflect the development of a more precise 
figural logic—a more nuanced bridging of the cloudy/cloud free dichotomy.  In Draft 7, 
the authors describe a “mixture of forming and evaporating thin clouds and aerosols.”  By 
Draft 9, there are no longer two things being mixed, but rather a continuous entity, “a belt 
of forming and evaporating clouds and hydrated aerosols.”  The belt serves as a 
bracketing term.   
The addition of the word “hydrated” is also significant; it acts as a descriptive 
counterpart to the word “evaporating,” emphasizing the bidirectional process of this 
graded phenomenon.  As formations of water vapor, clouds are inherently wet.  Aerosols 
can be completely dry.  For example, windstorms blow huge quantities of dry sand from 
the Sahara desert to the beaches of the Caribbean.  As the authors articulate it, the 
twilight zone is a liminal space where drying clouds and moist aerosols coexist 
proportionally.  Articulating the presence of this space changes the structure of reality by 
replacing a stark “cut” distinction with this complex intermediate space.  The dissociative 





Diagram 4.1:  Appearance/reality distinctions in the twilight zone article. 
Significant textual markers of the evolving dissociation include the change from “usually 
considered as ‘cloud free zone’” to “‘so called’ cloud free zone” in the third sentence.  
Like the shift from “usually” to “customary” in the second sentence, this change 
emphasizes the arbitrariness of the antithetical distinctions.  The qualifying quotation 
marks disappear in the last version, but the term is still marked as an artificial construct 
by the “so-called” modifier.        
 In the fourth sentence of each version, the authors further define the twilight zone 
concept.  A comparison of how the term is described demonstrates how the concept 
changed with revision to generate a more effective dissociative distinction.  In Draft 7, 
the twilight zone is paraphrased as “these twilight clouds,” a phrase which suggests that 
the zone is more cloud than aerosol or that the zone is part of the cloud.  In Draft 9, the 
twilight zone is described as an “aerosol phenomenon that takes place in the vicinity of 
 
 
Appearance - Binary        
  
 Cloudy (Wet)      Cloud free (Dry)   





Reality - Continuum         
 
 Cloudy   Twilight zone   Cloud free 
  
 Clouds   Forming clouds  Aerosols 
     Evaporating clouds 




clouds.”  This definition implies it is more aerosol than cloud.  In Draft 12 of the 
unpublished manuscript, the term twilight zone is repeated in the fourth sentence, though 
the qualifying quotation marks disappear, suggesting that the authors want to promote the 
“reality” of the concept; the zone itself is not redefined, but the authors emphasize a 
potential anthropogenic contribution.  By the final iteration, the “twilight zone” is simply 
paraphrased as a “gradual transition from cloudy to dry atmosphere.”   
 The bridging of the cloudy/cloud-free dichotomy is stated in more technical 
language in the body of the paper.  It is best exemplified by the following passage from 
the introduction of the final draft:   
Clouds are defined as clusters of condensed droplets formed when aerosol 
particles are activated to droplets in a super saturated environment.  
However it is not clear what is the minimal amount of condensed water 
that could be considered a cloud.  Discriminating between aerosols and 
clouds and the demarcation of cloud boundaries have been exceedingly 
difficult independent of the measurement system employed.  We suggest 
that the shift between clouds to cloud-free atmosphere contains an 
additional component, a ‘‘Twilight Zone’’ or a gradual transition zone that 
depends on both the presence of nearby clouds and on the aerosol loading.  
(Koren et al. 1) 
By questioning the “absolute” threshold between cloudy and cloud free, the authors open 
a space for their twilight zone.  Interestingly, the final version is more subtle in its 




previous versions.  For example, the same passage from Draft 12 (the submitted and 
rejected manuscript) is a more blunt criticism of current practice: 
Commonly, cloud identification is forced to be binary: either there is a 
cloud or there is not.  This decision can be made by an automatic 
algorithm that applies an absolute threshold to an observed parameter such 
as droplet concentrations measured in situ or reflectance measured by 
satellite.  However, developers of such algorithms are often hard pressed 
to define a single threshold, because the identification is seldom truly 
binary.  For example, in the MODerate resolution Imaging 
Spectroradiometer (MODIS) aerosol procedure, clouds are determined 
from a threshold based on variability of observed reflectances, because 
there appears to be a clear separation between cloud and cloud-free scenes 
in this variable (Martins et al., 2002).  Even so, closer examination shows 
a range of reflectance variability between distinctly identified clouds and 
distinctly identified non-cloudy scenes.  (Draft 12, 1-2) 
 
Communicated in both versions is the notion that current practices are arbitrarily and 
incorrectly bifurcating what is actually a scalar phenomenon.  The conceptual shift from 
antithesis to series is part of a scheme of distinctions contributing to the overall 






Appearance Cloudy  Cloud Free  Antithesis         Customary 
             
Reality  Cloudy—Twilight Zone—Cloud Free Series       New/Correct 
  
Diagram 4.2: Scheme of dissociative distinctions. 
 
From the abstract and introduction, it is clear that the authors are working with 
and against figural logics to elicit a dissociative definition.  But their articulation of this 
phenomenon faced two rhetorical hurdles: (1) a name with multiple technical and popular 
resonances and (2) what some considered dubious evidence based on novel methods.  
Some clever definition work solved the first problem; clever imaging solved the second. 
 The name twilight zone was, according to Remer, the label for the phenomenon 
from the very beginning.  However, many people, including Remer herself, were initially 
uncomfortable with Kaufman and Koren’s term.  While twilight zone is an evocative 
term, it has multiple meanings, some of which carry problematic cultural significance.  It 
is, after all, the same name as a science-fiction television series and several classic rock 
songs from the 1970s and 1980s.  Each of these “twilight zones” connotes a separation 
from reality, rather than a graduated phenomenon.  A scan through the Oxford English 
Dictionary reveals even more definitions of the term.  It can connote aging, imperfect 
perception, earlier times, and degradation, among other meanings that would infuse 
inappropriate connotations for Koren’s phenomenon (OED).  Moreover, “twilight” has a 




night and sunrise or between sunset and full night produced by diffusion of sunlight 
through the atmosphere and its dust” (American Heritage).   
Ilan Koren named the twilight zone with Yoram Kaufman during the project’s 
early stages, and he insisted that the name stick.  Obliging her colleague, Remer 
proceeded to make the term work by making some conceptual distinctions within the text.  
Specifically, she needed to distinguish the team’s understanding of “twilight” as an 
intermediate state from other technical and popular understandings of twilight.  To make 
this distinction, Remer tapped a source that is not usually cited in a scientific paper: 
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary.  Webster’s second definition of twilight is “an 
intermediate state that is not clearly defined.”  This was precisely the connotation they 
wanted to express; thus, the dictionary entered the paper’s bibliography. 
While the citation of the dictionary to clarify the meaning of twilight is 
interesting, it is not a dissociative activity.  As argumentation theorist M.A. van Rees 
notes, “Through dissociation a number of aspects is [sic] placed outside a given domain, 
while through a non-dissociative distinction they are kept within a given domain” (54, 
van Rees emphasis).  In this case, an operational definition of twilight is established but it 
does not supersede all other definitions of twilight.  Still, it was an important distinction 
to make, since the rhetorical creation of the phenomenon requires that readers understand 
it as an intermediate state.  The dissociation work is accomplished verbally through the 
management of figural logic (as shown previously) and visually through an array of 





Imag(in)ing the Twilight Zone 
 For the authors, images were essential tools used to produce a dissociative 
distinction between an artificially separated atmosphere and a gradual reality.  Images 
were also important elements of popular accounts of the twilight zone story.  This section 
examines the imaging practices of the authors and describes how their images were 
changed by other authors for different audiences.  First, I look at the major visual 
addition between Drafts 12 and publication—a sequence of photographs taken with a 
basic digital camera and modified with over-the-counter software.  I then examine how 
these photographs were changed when they circulated to non-specialist audiences.  The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the other visuals of the twilight zone article—a 
series of more technical visualizations and data graphics.  Though these other graphics 
are largely the same in both the initially submitted manuscript and the final accepted one, 
there are rhetorically motivated differences that warrant further explication. 
 
The Little Cloud that Could: The Rhetorical Power of Demonstrative Images   
Disappointed but undaunted by the initial rejection of their manuscript, Koren and 
Remer proceeded to rewrite the paper.  Remer explains that Koren was especially 
frustrated that others did not recognize the data patterns that were so clear and significant 
to him.  During our interview, Remer paraphrased a statement from Koren:  
People aren’t seeing the patterns that I see in this MODIS imagery or the 
AERONET data, but it’s right there, and I can see it every day when the 




Koren decided to reproduce his perceptual experience through a visual artifact.  One 
afternoon, he walked out of his office and took a picture of a cloud with a simple digital 
camera.  Using basic photo-adjusting software, Koren subtracted out the background 
reflectance.  In other words, he took the blue out of the photographed sky.  He then 
blotted out the obvious cloud pixels (i.e., the bright white pixels within the cloud’s edges) 
and extended the dynamic range to draw out elements reflecting less light than the 
formerly bright cloud.  Each step of this digital transformation was presented as a 
photograph in the final paper (Figure 4.9).  
This set of pictures was displayed on a poster at the winter meeting of the 
American Geophysical Union and on slides for other conference presentations.  It was 
also included in the revised manuscript submitted to Geophysical Research Letters in 
January 2007.  While the addition of these pictures is not the only change between Draft 
12 and the final document, Remer’s comments on the reactions of others to the image set 
indicate that it was a significant contribution to the argument.  In the following passage, 
Remer comments on the reception of the photographs at conference talks: 
People saw that picture and they finally understood what we were talking 
about— that yes there is something around this cloud that we can see.  It’s 
not a MODIS artifact, and that it’s not something weird we’re doing with 
AERONET, but there’s something real.  And we finally managed to 
convince them. 
This image is rhetorically interesting because of its participation in the rhetorical 




the twilight zone was real.  This reaction is interesting to consider in the light of Richard 
Weaver’s observation on the rhetorical role of visualization:   
Visualization is an aid to seeing relationships, and there are rhetorical 
situations which demand some kind of picturation.  Many skilled 
expositors will follow an abstract proposition with some easy figure which 
lets us down to earth or enables us to get a bearing.  There is some value 
then in the “incarnation” of concepts.  (203) 
In this case, the cloud photo series grounds the abstract concept of the twilight zone with 
a picturation of the twilight zone surrounding a specific cloud.  A closer reading of the 









 As noted previously, Kress and van Leeuwen assert that an ideal-real relationship 
can be carried by placing the constituents of an image into a top-bottom relationship 
(193-202).  They also note that a vertical triptych arrangement can encode an ideal/real 
distinction; in this kind of composition, the middle term serves as a mediator.  These 
relationships are demonstrated in Diagram 4.3.  The diagram also shows how a horizontal 
arrangement can encode given-new relationships in either dyadic or triptych forms. 
 
Diagram 4.3.  The relationships between image composition and modality.  Top-bottom compositions 
connote ideal-real relationships (a and b).  Left-right compositions connote given-new relationships (c 
and d).  The triptych figures are based on Figure 6.24 of Kress and van Leeuwen. 
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If the ideal-real/top-bottom relationships can be generalized as visual renderings of term 
I/ term II pairs, they could also be applied to other dissociation arguments, such as 
appearance-reality distinctions.  The cloud photo series seems to support this extension; 
the “real” twilight zone is placed in the bottom position and the typical “appearance” of a 
white cloud on blue sky is in the top position.  The middle image—the cloud photo with 
only the blue removed—mediates between the illusory blue-sky image and the “real” 
twilight zone.  This “mediator” function is supported by Remer’s comments on this visual 
argument:  
You needed A [the first image] because you needed to connect people 
directly to the real world.  You might have done it with just A and B [the 
second image], but to stretch [from A to C] is a big leap.  You have to 
make two steps there. 
Another factor that could have contributed to the power of this series is the adjustment of 
color saturation.  As Kress and van Leeuwen also note, for scientific contexts 
monochromatic images often have a higher modality or truth value.  Thus, the top-
bottom/ideal-real juxtaposition is reinforced by the natural color of the top cloud and the 
higher-modality black and white coloration of the other two photographs.38    
Also important to consider when reading this image set are notions of visual 
syllogisms and visual enthymemes.  As Finnegan describes in “The Naturalistic 
Enthymeme,” viewers bring specific assumptions about the truth of photographs to the 
                                                 
38 Though false color can also have high modality in scientific contexts, it would likely not have been as 
effective in this particular instance.  False color is deployed to show readers that which they cannot see but 
that an instrument and the subsequent false color visualization can reveal.  The purpose of the cloud photo 
was to reveal to readers that the twilight zone is part of a reality they already know—a reality they see but 




viewing experience.  Specifically, a photograph is accepted as “natural” based on 
unstated propositions of ontological, representational, and mechanical realism.  An 
image’s claim to represent nature depends on the viewer’s belief that the depicted scene 
really existed, that the image represents what it claims to represent, and that it was not 
unusually altered by people either before or after the photographic rendering.  If a reader 
has any reason to doubt these unstated propositions, the argumentative value of the image 
as “natural” can be compromised.  In the case of the cloud series, mechanical adjustments 
were made for purposes of demonstration, but the authors prevent challenges to the 
realism of their images by explaining premises governing the adjustments to the 
photograph.  These explanations appear in both the figure caption and the body text.  The 
body text is as follows: 
Figure 1a shows a small dissipating cloud.  Subtracting the background 
reflectance, mostly Rayleigh scattering, causes the background to become 
black (Figure 1b).39  Then by masking out the obvious cloud pixels and 
stretching the dynamic range (to be sensitive to low reflectance), it is 
clearly shown that the cloud’s optical influence extends far beyond the 
borders of the cloud (Figure 1c).  Other cloud masks could be defined, but 
there is no perfect mask that will unambiguously determine the cloud.  (1) 
The authors demonstrate how they are drawing out elements that are in the photograph 
but not seen by the naked eye.  Thus, they maintain the mechanical integrity of the image 
while making effective rhetorical adjustments, adjustments that reveal the previously 
                                                 
39 In this case, Rayleigh scattering is the scattering of sunlight by molecules in the atmosphere; this 




invisible twilight zone.  Thus, the adjustments are to be read as informative and not as 
deceptive. 
Though the photo series is an effective conceptual demonstration, it is not the 
primary evidence for the twilight zone.  It epitomizes the appearance-reality distinction, a 
distinction that is supported inductively with the bulk data of instruments that were 
reduced into the other visual arguments presented in the article.  Though photographs can 
function as evidence in scientific arguments, this particular graphic is not functioning in 
this way.  As Remer explained, the qualitative aspect of the photo series was understood 
and even appreciated by her peers: 
People liked it.  It was just accepted that this is an image that explains.  
It’s not the thing that you are building the quantitative case from, but it’s 
what explains what that quantitative data means. 
The graphic was not seen as evidence but as an illustration.  The rhetorical influence of 
this graphic in this case suggests that visual rhetoric in scientific contexts can be more 
than the presentation of quantitative data or evidentiary images. 
Later sections show how the argument epitomized in the photo series is built 
through quantitative data graphics.  Before commencing with that discussion, I describe 
and comment on the adaptation of the cloud series for non-expert audiences. 
 
The Cloud that Could in Popular Contexts 
 After the article’s publication in Geophysical Research Letters, news of the 
twilight zone spread quickly.  NASA produced a popular summary on its Web site, which 




picked up the story, presumably because of the twilight zone’s potential to revise climate 
models and climate predictions.  These online news outlets included Fox News and other 
lesser-known Web sites, such as the environmental news site Terra Daily.  The selection 
and adaptation of the cloud images in these popular accommodations demonstrate how 
the same images were modified for different contexts.  
 In the NASA accommodation, the entire cloud sequence is presented, but the 
arrangement is different.  Rather than a vertical arrangement, the series is organized 
horizontally.  Figure 4.10 is the photo series as presented on the Web site. 
  
 
Figure 4.10: The cloud photo series as reproduced in the accommodation on the NASA Website.  
Source: Cole, Stephen.  “Widespread ‘Twilight Zone’ Detected around Clouds.” National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration.  3 May 2007. 
 
The choice to change from a vertical to a horizontal arrangement could have been 
motivated by multiple factors.  First, a horizontal arrangement is more suitable for a Web 
text; the entire sequence can be viewed at one time.  A vertical arrangement could require 
a viewer to scroll down to see the final image, disrupting the reading process.  Second, as 
Kress and van Leeuwen’s work indicates, the more narrative structure of left to right 
composition can encode a given to new relationship.  The “novelty” argument could be a 
more powerful argument for a lay audience than the rhetorical dissociation coded in a 




images and contexts where vertical and horizontal compositions are substituted when 
presenting the same information to different audiences and in different media.   
Regardless of the motivation for the arrangement change, the text still presents a 
dissociation argument through the caption text:  
What appears as clear sky around a cloud as seen from the ground through 
a digital camera (left) actually has a twilight zone of light-reflecting 
particles around it (right).  To see this, the blue light from the atmosphere 
in the original image is first subtracted (middle).  The twilight zone is 
revealed after the darker parts of the image are enhanced (right).  (Cole, 
my emphasis) 
 
The circulation of the cloud image is not uniform across the Web sites reporting 
on the story.  For example, Fox News only included the final image in the sequence—the 
image revealing the full extent of the cloud’s twilight zone (Figure 4.11).  Terra Daily 
included a modified comparison that removes the middle image (Figure 4.12).  
 
 
Figure 4.11: Image of the twilight zone, FoxNews.com. Source: Thompson, Andrea.  “Atmospheric 







Figure 4.12: Image of the twilight zone, Terra Daily.  Source: “Widespread Twilight Zone Detected 
Around Clouds.”  TerraDaily.com.   5 May 2007.   
 
Figures 4.11 and 4.12 suggest that for popular contexts the entire visual argument 
is not needed.  In the case of Fox News, only the visual conclusion is presented.  For 
Terra Daily, only the major premise and conclusion are presented.  These adaptations 
raise interesting questions about visual reasoning as it moves from specialist to lay 
contexts.  Specifically, do popular audiences accept obvious rhetorical mediation if that 
mediation is backed by credible scientific authorities (e.g., NASA scientists)?  Does the 
visual burden of proof change when the argument moves from the forensic setting of the 
peer-reviewed journal to the epideictic setting of popular news outlets?  Plausible 
interpretations of such issues require additional comparisons with other cases.  
Another issue raised by the cloud series and its circulation is the relationship 
between demonstration, example, and induction in various contexts.  As Aristotle notes, 
the use of examples is the rhetorical equivalent of inductive reasoning in dialectic 
(Rhetoric i. 2. 1356b).  But how is the cloud series functioning?  In the technical research 
report, the photo series is an illustration of a phenomenon otherwise argued into place by 




such as pictures of an AERONET instrument (e.g., Figure 4.5).  Thus, in these texts, the 
modified cloud image serves as the primary visual evidence and not as a mere supporting 
demonstration.  The next section examines the relationship between example and 
induction in the data graphics of Koren and Remer’s research report.  
 
Visual Reasoning in the Twilight Zone Data Graphics 
 Though the data graphics did not circulate into the popular press, they were 
essential to the success of the research report.  This section discusses how the series of 
graphics follows the paper’s overall argument, and it describes the differences between 
the graphics of the initially submitted version and the final published version.   
Table 4.3 is a side-by-side comparison of all the data graphics in Draft 12 (the 
rejected manuscript) and the published manuscript.  Larger versions of each graphic 
appear after Table 4.3.  Figures 4.13a and 4.13b are enlarged versions of the first row of 
Table 4.3.  Figures 4.14a and 14.4b are the figures from the second row.  Figures 4.15a 
and 4.15b are larger versions of the third row.  While there are differences between them, 



















Figure 4.13a: Figure 1 from Draft 12. 
 
 


















The first row of Table 4.3 reproduces the first data graphic of both the rejected 
and accepted manuscripts (i.e., my Figures 4.13a and 4.13b).  (The figure numbers are 
different because the cloud photo series [my Figure 4.9] was Figure 1 in the published 
version; thus, Figure 1 of Draft 12 became Figure 2 in the published text.)   
The purpose of the graphics in the first row of Table 4.3 is to identify the twilight 
zone in the MODIS satellite data.  Each version presented a triptych that contains three 
panels: (1) a MODIS image based on reflectance data, (2) a color-coded visualization of 
the spatial distribution of a cloud field, and (3) a graph of reflectance as a function of 
distance.  The third panel in each triptych—the line graph—is actually an aggregate of 
thirty MODIS images and not just a graph of data from the images presented in the first 
two panels.  This third panel is the most important from an evidentiary perspective.  The 
first two panels visually describe the two axes of the third panel; i.e., the first image is the 
reflectance of a cloud field and the second is a visualization of distance from the nearest 
cloud.  Like the cloud photo series, the first two panels of the triptych are not primary 
evidence.  They merely prime the reader’s understanding, so the significance of the third 
pane is more readily apparent. 
The center panel of the triptych—the hyper-saturated color visualization of each 
pixel’s distance from the nearest cloud—also demonstrates Koren’s skill in programming 
data visualization software.  Koren wrote a special program that separates cloud pixels 
from non-cloud pixels and indexes each pixel against a color-coded distance scale; the 
bluest pixels (0 km) are the cloud pixels, and the reddest pixels are as much as thirty 




visualizing pixel-distance from the nearest cloud was “hard to do.”  Koren wanted to 
“show off” this accomplishment. 
The graphics in row two of Table 4.3 present data collected from a single 
AERONET instrument in Brazil.  Though the x-axis variable changes from “distance” to 
“time” between versions, the function of the graphic is the same.  It identifies the twilight 
zone in terms of AERONET data, i.e., aerosol density and particle size.  The two curves 
are inversely related since particle size is measured by a variable called the Angstrom 
exponent, which is a negative exponent.40  Larger exponents indicate finer particles; 
hence, the upward slope of the Angstrom exponent measurement indicates a decrease in 
size.  Significant differences between these similar graphics include the change in the x-
axis domain: the first uses distance, the second time.  There is also a change from 
standard to logarithmic scales; this change allows a greater range of time values to be 
included into the graph. 
The final figure in each version is composed of two graphs that fill similar 
functions.  The first graph plots data from several AERONET stations to demonstrate that 
the rate of tapering in the twilight zone for any given cloud is dependent on the overall 
aerosol content of the area.  For example, changes in the twilight zone are more 
pronounced in areas with higher aerosol concentrations (for example, regions where 
deforestation by burning is prevalent) than they would be in an area of low concentration 
(for example, a “clean” marine environment).  The purpose of this graphic is to show that 
the twilight zone is at least partially dependent on aerosol concentrations; the graphic also 
shows that the twilight zone is a global phenomenon by including AERONET data from 
                                                 
40 A negative exponent represents the reciprocal of its positive counterpart.  For example, x-2 equals 1/x2.  
Therefore, in equations involving negative exponents, a larger negative exponent results in smaller 




points around the globe.  The second graph presents particle-size data in relation to cloud 
position, which is plotted as distance in Draft 12 and as time in the final version.  
Differences in the graphic from version to version represent differences in the variables 
and calculations.  Also, the first version is more complicated because the authors were 
making additional claims.  As Remer notes, “There was a lot in there that did not have to 
be there.” 
As a group, the series of images accomplishes what Alan Gross would call a 
complete rhetorical description.  In The Rhetoric of Science and its revision Starring the 
Text, Gross shows how a new species of hummingbird is brought into existence through 
converging vectors of description:  detailed verbal description, statistical analysis, 
illustration, etc.  Each of these elements is used to synthesize the identification of the new 
species within the framework of evolutionary biology (Starring 49-62).  Arguably, a 
similar activity is happening with the twilight zone.  Multiple instruments are used to 
measure and visualize the same phenomenon; in addition, visualizations of individual 
clouds, cloud fields, and the data from single-instrument installations are supported with 
graphics that aggregate data from multiple points around the world.  The series of data 
graphics (especially in the final version) emphasizes the gradual nature of the twilight 
zone through the multiple iterations of gradual linear relationships.  These graphical 
descriptions are supported with the article text.  Moreover, reading these graphics as 
rhetorical “over-description” is supported by comments from Lorraine Remer.  In the 
following passage, she describes the conclusion to her many presentations on the twilight 




I would finish the talk with, “The twilight zone, we measure it in MODIS, 
we measure it in AERONET, this other group we know has measured it 
with LIDAR, we see it with our eyes.  It’s real.”  And it was that kind of 
statement that people took with them.  And you never know who your 
reviewers are, and I’m sure some of them were sitting in the audiences of 
these talks.   
In these concluding comments, Remer explains that several different instruments 
converge to support the existence of the twilight zone.  Thus, she emphasizes the 
significant corroboration for this novel, high-stakes claim.  Remer’s reference to “seeing 
it with our eyes” refers to the cloud picture series.  The presence of the photo series also 
supports my claim that this article offers a “complete rhetorical description,” similar to 
the hummingbird speciation described by Gross. 
 Reading down the table of images also reveals an interesting pattern of argument.  
Specifically, for each instrument the authors move from individual examples to larger 
collections of data.  In the case of the MODIS triptych, a single cloud field is presented in 
the first two panes, and an aggregate is presented in the third pane.  For the AERONET 
data, the first graphic presents averages for a single station and the later graphs present 
data of multiple stations either as individual data points or as aggregates.  Thus, for both 
instruments the authors move the view from the local to the global and from specific 
exemplars to broader patterns.  In other words, the authors use both example and 





Reviewer Comments and Visual Revisions 
 Changes between the graphics of Draft 12 and the published version also reflect 
the comments of reviewers.  As noted previously, colleagues and reviewers objected to 
the presentation of AERONET data in terms of distance.  That instrument measures in 
time, so a distance-indexed graphic seemed deceptive.  In the revised version, the 
AERONET graphics plot aerosol values as functions of time.  This aspect of the paper 
and its production is rhetorically interesting.  The authors initially felt they had to present 
MODIS and AERONET data in the same domains of measurement to demonstrate the 
similarities between MODIS and AERONET data.  Thus, they used a calculation to 
convert time to distance in the early draft:  “Assuming a mean transport wind-speed of 
10m/s (Archer and Jacobson, 2005) we translate a time interval into a distance interval” 
(6).  But this simplifying assumption was not acceptable to their peers, and thus the 
graphic—a visual argument resting on this premise—was not acceptable either.  In their 
attempts to make their argument clearer, the twilight zone authors created an 
untrustworthy visual argument.  Moreover, this mathematical simplification was 
unnecessary for the case. 
The twilight zone paper presents an argument about the existence of a 
phenomenon and not an argument about its precise measurable extent.  The AERONET 
data only needed to corroborate the observations recorded by MODIS by showing that 
the MODIS data was not faulty as some researchers thought it was.  Such corroboration 
does not require measuring in the same domain.  The revised time-scaled AERONET 
graphic presents data that cannot be directly compared on a numerical basis with the 




similarity of the data patterns.  Both instruments are generating curves with similar 
patterns even though they measure aerosol variables in different domains.  
 Modifications to the first data graphic—the MODIS triptych (Figures 4.13a to 
4.13b)—also seem motivated by reviewer comments.  One reviewer objected to the 
configuration of the middle pane of Figure 4.8 (Figure 1 of Draft 12): 
One should at least come away from Figure 1 with an appreciation of the 
qualitative relationship between the left most figure and the middle figure.  
There are two larger red spots in the top half of the image for which the 
nearest cloud is ~ 20 km according to the color scale.  A very short 
distance below and a little to the right of the rightmost red spot (maybe 15 
km distance using a crude scaling) the distance to the nearest cloud drops 
to something like 1 or 2 km. How could there be such large changes in the 
distance to the nearest cloud across such a short distance if there doesn't 
appear to be a cloud in the vicinity of these red spots? 
In the revised version, the authors present a similar triptych, but they select a portion of 
the sky that more clearly shows distance relationships within a cloud field.  Specifically, 
they choose an example that includes a larger region of cloud-free atmosphere.  In the 
revised graphic, the distance relationships are less ambiguous, which averts the visual 
incommensurability of the previous draft.   
Publication and Reception; Resources and Acceptance 
 As noted previously, “On the Twilight Zone between Clouds and Aerosols” was 
ultimately accepted by Geophysical Research Letters, and the twilight zone concept 




Though it is still too early to tell how influential the twilight zone will be for atmospheric 
science, there are indications of the authors’ extended rhetorical success within several 
communities.  First, their colleagues at Goddard who initially wanted Koren and Remer 
to retract their paper are now supporting it.  These former skeptics have even offered to 
help collect higher resolution AERONET measurements to refine the research.  Second, 
the twilight zone paper is beginning to be cited in other articles.  As of 21 April 2008, 
Google Scholar searches revealed that only one paper had cited the Koren et al piece, 
though this is not unusual, considering the time it takes for a new concept to percolate 
into new projects whose manuscripts then need to be reviewed and revised before 
publication.  Though the first report to cite the twilight zone paper (Zuidema et al, in 
press) does not extend or challenge the concept, it does acknowledge it: 
In reality, particle growth varies as a function of relative humidity so that 
there is a continuum from dry aerosol, to humidified haze particles and 
finally cloud droplets as the relative humidity increases and eventually 
reaches saturation (Charlson et al. 2007; Koren et al. 2007).  We made no 
attempt to account for these effects.  (Zuidema et al, 5, in press, my 
emphasis) 
Though Zuidema and her colleagues do not account for the twilight zone in their study, 
the reference suggests that it is a concept that the atmospheric scientists who study clouds 
and aerosols need to consider.  That is, the reference is evidence of the legitimacy of the 
concept.  The opening prepositional phrase—“in reality”—suggests that the dissociation 




and visual articulation of atmospheric phenomena, I plan to continue to track the 
circulation and extensions of the twilight zone. 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has shown how an invisible atmospheric structure was argued into 
existence through verbal and visual strategies.  The authors negotiated verbal rhetorical 
figures and a range of visual artifacts to demonstrate that the twilight zone is a real 
phenomenon and that the atmosphere cannot be neatly sorted into cloud and cloud-free 
categories.  These rhetorical activities demonstrate the importance of dissociation 
arguments to the rhetoric of science.  They also demonstrate that the visual rhetoric of 
science is more than just data graphs and the regurgitation of instrument output.  These 
scientists altered images and developed lines of visual reasoning to change the structure 
of reality.  And they were persuasive.  The same colleagues who had told them to retract 
the paper are now offering to help further substantiate the twilight zone. 
 I end this chapter with two quotations from Remer, both of which relate to the 
reading of science as a dissociative activity and the relationship between rhetoric, 
science, and knowledge:  
We get criticism that we haven’t done anything new: “We’ve known about 
this since eternity.”  But no one had sat down to quantify it. 
   * * * 
This is not new, people see this all the time. They inherently know this is 
true, but no one had quantified it, no one had put into print that “this is 




The first quotation can be read as indicative of the scientific dissociation that Gross 
describes in Starring the Text.  That is, in hindsight the twilight zone is obvious to 
everyone, even former critics.  However, no one saw it before, or if they did see it, they 
did not act on the knowledge.  Such a reading supports my argument, but is it the whole 
story?  Was the twilight zone always known but not quantified?  Or is this evidence of a 
dissociation that was so successful that it asserts itself on the reading of previous 
understandings?  Regardless, I am intrigued by the relationship between quantification, 
rhetoric, and reality that is expressed in the quotations.  We might intuit the existence of 
phenomena, but in modern science it is data described in print that create a reality we can 
act on, and thus the visual rhetoric of science has “real” consequences.  It is through 
images, the ultimate expression of quantifying instruments, that things are “really” made 
real.   
 Scientific images can be powerful arguments, but such power must be used 
responsibly.  When instruments and images are literally recasting our world, unethical 
imagining practices are more than deception; they are assaults on reality itself.  The next 
chapter examines the ethical implications of mediating images in scientific contexts.  By 
examining recent science scandals, ethics violation reports, and editorial responses to 





Chapter 5:  (Ir) Responsible Mediation of Scientific Images— 
Enthymemes, Ethics, and the Visual Rhetoric of Science 
 
 
What was observed by us in the third place is the nature of the Milky Way itself, which, 
with the aid of the spyglass, may be observed so well that all disputes that for so many 
generations have vexed philosophers are destroyed by visible certainty, and we are 
liberated from wordy arguments. 
 
  —Galileo Galilei, The Sidereal Messenger 
 
 
However, to say that “the camera cannot lie” is merely to underline the multiple deceits 
that are now practiced in its name. 
 
  —Marshal McLuhan, Understanding Media 
 
 
It thus appears that rhetoric is an offshoot of dialectic and also of ethical studies.
41
 
 —Aristotle, Rhetoric   
 
The last three chapters examined the persuasive dynamics of individual historical 
and contemporary cases in which visual arguments were essential for rhetorical success.  
This chapter examines issues of visual rhetoric in science more broadly.  Specifically, it 
examines responses to both the proliferation of digital imaging technologies and the 
escalation of digital fraud in scientific settings.  Analyses of new image-preparation 
guidelines, journal feature stories on visualization practices, and editorial responses to 
imaging misconduct reveal otherwise tacit beliefs about the rhetorical functions and 
                                                 
41 I am not the first person to include these passages from Aristotle and Galileo as epigrams.  Richard 
Weaver uses the Aristotle quotation as the epigram to The Ethics of Rhetoric (1985).  Edward Tufte 
includes a modified version of the Galileo passage as an epigram to Beautiful Evidence (2006).  Regardless, 
as far as I know, these two passages have not been paired as epigrams, nor have they ever been included 




epistemic value of scientific visuals.  Such an analysis also reveals that these assumptions 
are unfixed, evolving, and context dependent.   
A rhetorical approach to scientific images and scientific ethics can plumb the line 
between an impossible ideal of universally transparent visual certainty and an equally 
impossible default skepticism that assumes all images are deceptive.  In other words, a 
rhetorically prepared and rhetorically situated image can be effective and ethical in 
scientific contexts.  Rhetorical concepts including ethos and the enthymeme are 
productive terms for framing a discussion of the ethical manipulation of visual artifacts in 
science.  Before describing how these terms can be applied productively, I first describe 
recent cases that demonstrate the problems and possibilities of digital mediation in 
science. 
    
Fakes, Frauds, and Ethical Enhancements: Digital Visuals and the Rhetoric of Science  
A 2005 investigation by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ 
Office of Research Integrity (ORI) revealed that Xiaowu Li, a postdoctoral fellow at UC–
San Francisco, falsified three digital images in a paper on pancreatic cancer cells.  Li 
claimed that the images were human pancreatic cancer cells plated with a specific 
compound of interest.  In fact, the images were of mouse melanoma cells plated with an 
entirely different chemical.  The ORI case summary describes the ramifications of Li’s 
misconduct: 
The misconduct was significant because pancreatic cancer has a poor 
prognosis for patients, since it tends to invade other tissues and to 




cancer cell invasion and metastasis, which was the focus of the questioned 
figure and paper, is crucial to attempts to develop better treatments for 
pancreatic and other cancers.  Thus, the falsified figure could have misled 
other investigators in this important area of medical research.  (ORI “Li”) 
Li was excluded from working on federally supported projects for three years; however, 
this damage to his career is far less severe than the damage his deception might have 
done to the field and to pancreatic-cancer patients anxiously awaiting new therapies. 
In May 2006, ORI banned renowned cancer-cell researcher Steven Leadon from 
federally funded projects for a period of five years (ORI “Leadon”).42  The ORI 
investigation revealed that Leadon had falsified DNA samples and constructed falsified 
figures in eight articles and four grant applications over a seven-year period.  For 
example, the autoradiogram in “A” of Figure 5.1 was a convincing falsification.  
                                                 
42 Technically, Leadon and Li were not “banned,” but they did sign voluntary exclusion agreements.  This 
situation is equivalent to an employer asking an employee to resign instead of firing the person.  However, 
Leadon accepted the terms of his agreement under protest.  He never admitted to the charges of 
misconduct, and he claimed he only accepted the voluntary exclusion agreement because he could not 






Figure 5.1.  Figure 1 from Gowen et al. 1998.  Leadon was the fifth author on the paper, but he was 
responsible for the graphics, and he was the author of correspondence.  The autoradiogram (part A) 
is a falsification. 
 
Leadon’s work on cellular repair of oxidative damage to DNA—such as the damage 
caused by the sun—had enormous influence on cancer research and investigations of the 
rare but debilitating Cockayne syndrome.  The fraud devastated both those with whom 
Leadon collaborated and others who built research programs around his 
“groundbreaking” work.  According to Leadon’s former collaborator Priscilla Cooper, 
“The subfield that is working on oxidative damage is really having to redo everything 
from scratch” (qtd. in Check 1015). 
In January 2006, after months of rumor, accusation, and investigation, the editors 
of the journal Science retracted two papers on embryonic stem cell research.  The papers, 
authored by the research group of celebrity scientist Woo Suk Hwang, documented 
remarkable advances.  The first paper (2004) claimed to have extracted viable pluri-




The second (2005) documented the creation of patient-specific stem cells by inserting 
cellular material from adult subjects into “hollowed out” egg cells—a process called 
Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer (SCNT).  SCNT promised to revolutionize stem-cell 
research by removing the need to destroy fertilized embryos to develop stem cells and by 
allowing stem cells to be cultivated from the patients’ own cells.  Thus, Hwang’s research 
seemed to skirt many of the ethical quagmires that have made stem-cell research a hot-
button political issue in the United States. 
Unfortunately, Hwang’s claims were based on fraudulent data presented in 
fraudulent images.  For example, in the SCNT paper, Hwang provided photographic 
evidence of eleven distinct lines of stem cells allegedly derived through SCNT, but nine 
of these photo sets were complete fabrications.  These nine photo sets were modified 
versions of just two photo sets.  The cells of these two sets of “original” digital 
photographs were in fact stem cells, but they were derived from another cloning process, 
not SCNT.  Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 are two different demonstrations of Hwang’s 
fraudulent practices.  Figure 5.2 shows how multiple images were layered to create the 
illusion of a distinct “new” cell.  Figure 5.3 shows a more blatant display of using the 
same image to represent two different cell lines.  The duplication was masked by the 
medium of “negative staining,” a microscopy technique in which cells are plated with 
dark ink and thus appear brighter than the dark background.  In Figure 5.3, forensic 











Figure 5.3.  Figure 1 from Rossner.  “Hwang Case Review Committee Misses the Mark.”  
Journal of Cell Biology 2007.  NT-hESC-5 and NT-hESC-6 are identical images and do not 
represent what they claim to represent. 
 
Before the revelation of the fraud, Hwang was lauded as a national hero in South 
Korea for his intrepid work on stem cell research and animal and human cloning.  His 
work was so convincing that other researchers had abandoned stem-cell projects because 
Hwang seemed to have control of the field (Wade and Sang-Hun). 
Digital photographs may seem especially vulnerable to unethical adjustments; 
however, they are not the only visuals implicated in technology-enabled misconduct.  For 
example, post doc Jason Lilly—in addition to claiming that figures represented replicated 
studies that he had not actually replicated—manipulated the color of visualized mRNA 
accumulation data (ORI “Lilly”).  Figure 5.3 is one of Lilly’s falsified visuals from an 




graphic, the visualization for the Sac1 gene has been modified to represent higher levels 
of mRNA; a closer look reveals that two of the Sac1 blocks that are black in the longer 
sequence are shades of red in the enlarged portion.  As punishment for his misconduct, 




Figure 5.4.  Figure 4 of Lilly, Maul and Stern.  The Plant Cell.  2002.   My red circle in the enlarged 






Each of these cases of scientific misconduct demonstrates that unethical research 
practices in science are often based on visual components and that such visual 
misconduct can have significant scientific, social, and professional consequences.   
Arguably, new visualizing technologies and their digital processing have 
increased the prevalence of imaging misconduct by providing expedient means for 
committing fraud.  According to one analysis of ORI reports, less than 3% of allegations 
of research misconduct in 1990 involved images; by 2001 more than 25% of ORI 
investigations involved images (Kreuger qtd. in Pearson 952).  As the editors of Nature 
noted in 2006, such a trend is more a matter of opportunity than motive:  “It is doubtful 
that scientists were more angelic then than now.  It is more likely that, when it came to 
image manipulation, they wouldn’t because they couldn’t” (“Not Picture-Perfect” 891-
892).  According to others, the increase in imaging misconduct suggests generational 
differences.  An editorial in Nature Cell Biology laments “a whole generation of scientists 
has known nothing but the magical world of Photoshop and regularly use [sic] tools with 
fashionable names such as clone and healing” (“Appreciating Data” 203).  Figure 5.5 is 
an example of “cloning.”  The “rubber stamp” tool, which is also known as the “clone 
stamp,” was used to tidy up the background of the photographed gel; however, this 
tidying also removed real data—faint lines indicating the presence of molecules (Rossner 






Figure 5.5.  Figure 4 from Rossner and Yamada.  Journal of Cell Biology.  2004.   
 
But should younger generations and new technologies take all of the blame?  
After all, there were frauds involving scientific images long before the digital revolutions 
of the latter half of the twentieth century, and there were image-enabled frauds long 
before photographs were even a major mode of science communication.  For example, 
Ernst Haeckel’s 1866 drawings of embryonic development (Figure 5.6) are now infamous 
both for their strategic inaccuracy and for the significant ramifications of the fraud (see 
commentary by Paul Dombrowski; Michael Richardson and Gerhard Keuck; Stephen Jay 




similarity of embryonic forms, and he left out or masked important differences in his 
drawings.  Haeckel’s “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny” argument—the idea that a 
developing embryo “relives” evolutionary history—was visualized better with drawings 
that left out real differences between the embryos of different species.  Opponents of 
evolutionary theory consistently point to Haeckel’s fraud when attacking the credibility 
of the Darwinian paradigm (Dombrowski 317).   
Moreover, even in the Age of Photoshop, scientists can use low tech means to 
fabricate results.  Xiaowu Li—the researcher who presented images of mouse cells as 
human cells—could have perpetrated that fraud without digital technology.  In another 
ORI investigation, a medical student “created” visual results by modifying 
autoradiographic films with nothing more than a black marker (ORI Zhao).   
 
 
Figure 5.6:  Haeckel’s embryo drawings as reproduced in Richardson and Keuck (144).  These 
images are gross simplifications of embryos across species.  Creationists continue to use Haeckel’s 





Digital adjustments do not have to be unethical; they can also improve scientific 
practice.  For example, in 1997 Richard Levenson and Daniel Farkas developed a system 
to “spectrally classify” the pixels in digital micrographs of cells.  The images in Figure 
5.7 demonstrate the utility of this digital imaging procedure.  The top image is a 
contemporary micrograph of cells from a pap smear; the bottom image has been 
spectrally classified by the Levenson and Farkas system.  Science writer Gary Taubes 
reported the details of the differences:  
The cells [in the top image] have been stained to bring out the contrast 
between different types: Mature epithelial cells are pink-orange, while 
younger cells stain blue-green, as does the precancerous dysplastic cell in 
the middle.  A pathologist would identify it by its abnormally large 
nucleus, but it wouldn’t be hard to miss.  
On the bottom is the same image, spectrally classified.  […]  The 
[SpectraCube] microscope divides light from each pixel into beams that 
travel along paths of varying lengths, then are recombined and allowed to 
interfere.  Mathematical analysis of the resulting interference patterns 
yields a spectrum.  […]  By comparing each pixel's spectrum to those of 
reference pixels (boxes on original micrograph), Levenson and Farkas's 
system identifies groups of pixels with similar spectra and assigns them 
distinctive colors, making them much easier to tell apart than they are in 
the original stained micrograph.  The nucleus of the dysplastic cell, only 




micrograph, is here colored a unique and fiery red, befitting its threatening 
nature.  (1990)   
In the spectrally classified image, the red-colored nucleus of the precancerous cell is 
much more salient.  Thus, this digital enhancement could help pathologists identify 
precancerous cells more quickly and with greater accuracy. 
 
 
Figure 5.7:  The top image is a micrograph of stained epithelial cells.  The bottom micrograph is the 
same image with spectrographic classification applied.   Source: Taubes, Gary.  “Spectral Technique 





The first sentence in Taubes’ report on the Levenson-Farkas system is also interesting in 
the light of the history of digital rhetorical mediation.  Taubes wrote, “You can think of 
image enhancement as the art of helping the eye do what it does naturally” (1990).  After 
a decade of high-profile scandals involving “enhanced” images, Taubes’ 1998 statement 
might seem quaintly naïve.  However, many would agree that digitally enhanced images 
are useful for a range of purposes in a variety of contexts.  For example, science 
photographer Felice Frankel often uses digital tools to enhance technical science images 
and to create inspiring science photographs.  Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.9 are reproduced 
from Frankel’s Envisioning Science: The Art and Craft of the Scientific Image, a 
handbook on creating scientific images.  In Figure 5.9, Frankel has adjusted the color of a 
scanning electron micrograph (SEM) of nanowires (Figure 5.8).  The color adjustment 
makes the specific feature of the nanowires and their stringers more visible.  
 
              
Figure 5.8: Figure 8.28 from Frankel (270).     Figure 5.9.  Frankel (back cover). A larger version 
appears as Figure 8.33 of her text (272). 
 
Some of Frankel’s comments suggest that she has a highly developed rhetorical 




digitally altering images, Frankel suggests that the decision to apply artificial color to a 
SEM should depend on the rhetorical situation: 
Although many researchers digitally color their SEMs, I am not convinced 
that all images benefit from adding color.  If coloring a SEM clarifies the 
structure of the image or if it helps make the image more attractive, 
thereby making the work more accessible, then you should consider doing 
so. (269)   
“More accessible” can be read as “more persuasive.”  Frankel also recognizes the ethical 
problems that can accompany image manipulation:   
Think seriously about whether the change, or “enhancement,” you make to 
an image is appropriate.  What might be a well-intentioned adjustment to 
clarify the structures and forms could actually create a significant change 
in the data showing something new in the image that is not there.  (268)   
She follows this cautionary advice with several examples of image enhancements that 
could be ethically problematic.  However, Frankel’s text seems to skirt many of these 
ethical issues because, as she acknowledges, her work focuses primarily on digital 
alterations to “communicative” photographs; i.e., photographs for popular 
accommodations of science, museum installations, journal covers, etc (268).  But as the 
cases described in my previous chapters show, creative visual enhancements are often 
vital to the success of scientific persuasion in technical settings.  For example, the 
Goddard researchers creatively enhanced digital photographs to create a conceptual 




legitimate and thoroughly explained digital alteration that helped convince skeptical 
audiences.   
Still, many scientists struggle to locate the line between legitimate and fraudulent 
enhancement.  The Journal of Cell Biology and the journal Blood—two journals that are 
especially vigilant in verifying the integrity of submitted images—have separately 
reported that more than 20% of submissions include inappropriate figures, though only 
1% of all submissions are truly fraudulent (Rossner qtd. in Pearson 953; Shattil 2275).  
For the 19% of submissions that are not purposeful frauds, the adjustments intended to 
make good data more persuasive actually compromised their credibility.  Thus, there 
appears to be a significant disconnect between the expectations of journals and scientists’ 
understandings of those expectations; this disconnect is indicated in editorials and reports 
on digital enhancement in 2005 and 2006.  As Nature reporter Helen Pearson observed in 
2005, “[S]cientists say they feel under pressure to produce faultless images to present 
convincing experiments that reviewers and editors want to publish” (953).  By early 
2006, the editors of Nature were calling “to end the fetish of the perfect image” (892).  
My research has not revealed an extensive written record supporting the extent of such a 
“fetish,” though some journal guidelines allude to the clarifying power of digital 
adjustments.  For example, the 1993 guidelines of Molecular and Cellular Biology state 
“computer-generated content can be manipulated for better clarity,” but this statement is 
far from an explicit expectation of “perfect” images (“Instructions” v).  However, the 




value of “warts and all” images indicate that there were—and perhaps still are—
significant misconceptions regarding the ethical rhetoric of scientific images. 43   
 
This chapter takes a rhetorical approach to ethical problems of arguing with 
images in science.  I argue that rhetorical concepts—such as enthymemes, ethos, 
presumptions, values, and hierarchies—can clarify the often tacit relationships between 
instruments, images, authority, expectations, and ethical disciplinary practices.  In 
examining these relationships, I develop a conceptual framework for approaching 
scientific visual cultures; such a framework can be useful for future rhetorical analyses 
and for advising scientists on ethical practices for visual argumentation. 
 
Document Summary 
This chapter discusses evidence from two sets of documents: (1) editorials and 
feature stories on visual ethics and (2) journal guidelines on appropriate images.  In some 
cases, these documents are combined; for example, an editor might include selections 
from new guidelines as part of a commentary on ethical imaging.  These kinds of 
documents were chosen because they make tacit assumptions explicit and thus reveal the 
expectations of specific scientific visual cultures.    
The dates of these documents range from 1993 to 2006.  I begin with 1993 
because that is the year that Molecular and Cellular Biology released new submission 
                                                 
43 The  following editorials are just a few of the calls for more ethical digital imaging practices:  “Gel 
Slicing and Dicing: a Recipe for Disaster,” Nature Cell Biology, 2004; “What’s in a Picture? The 
Temptation of Image Manipulation,” The Journal of Cell Biology, 2004; “Not Picture-Perfect,” Nature, 
2006; “Beautification and Fraud,” Nature Cell Biology, 2006; “Appreciating Data: Wrinkles, Warts and 




guidelines on using digital enhancement software.  These guidelines were developed 
during the journal’s 1992 editorial board meeting, and they appear to be the first mention 
of the digital editing of scientific images.  I end with 2006, a year when scientific editors 
were reacting to the wake of the Hwang stem-cell scandal.  This scandal made digital 
visual fraud a salient issue, and hence there was keen interest in (re)establishing clear 
ethical boundaries with respect to image manipulation.   
Unlike the previous chapters, which examined particular cases, this chapter 
explicates relationships between rhetorical concepts, ethical standards, and technological 
changes.  Though the chapter ends with a brief chronological survey of evolving editorial 
policies on imaging, most of the chapter draws on textual evidence in the editorial 
documents to explicate usually unstated conceptual relationships that were brought to the 
surface during this period of technological change.   
 
Images, Ethos, Ethics, and Enthymemes: An Examination of Interrelated Concepts 
 This chapter examines explicit statements about imaging ethics to reveal typically 
unstated assumptions about images, ethics and, argumentation.  My starting premise is 
that the explicit descriptions of the relationship between images and ethics rests on four 
other conceptual relationships: (1) the relationship between the enthymeme and the 
scientific visual, (2) the relationship between the scientific visual and the ethos of the 
author, (3) the relationship between ethos and ethical norms, and (4) the relationship 
between ethics and enthymemes.  Diagram 5.1 is a visualization of these relationships.  In 
the diagram, each circle represents a rhetorical concept of interest; each dotted line 




relationships have been elaborated separately by rhetorical theorists.  Some of these 
rhetorical critics approach the concepts in the light of broadly defined rhetorical 
situations whiles other approach scientific situations specifically.  Each of these 























on Visual Ethics           
 
Diagram 5.1:  A visual representation of the argument for this chapter: Explicitly stated expectations 





Enthymemes and Images 
As noted elsewhere in this dissertation, the enthymeme can be a productive 
concept for explaining visual arguments.  The enthymeme, as Aristotle describes it, is a 
rhetorical syllogism—an informally logical argument supported by unstated, uncertain, or 
probabilistically acceptable premises (i. 2. 1357a-b).  Rhetors use enthymemes to argue 
in situations in which audiences do not need or want every premise stated explicitly.  
Enthymemes can be powerful tools of argument because audiences activate implicit 
assumptions.  As James Raymond observes, “Because enthymemes presume upon what 
an audience already knows or believes, they can express in a condensed or elliptical 
manner chains of logical connections that would be complex indeed if the assumptions 
themselves had to be demonstrated” (144).  Thus, enthymemes are economical as well as 
powerful. 
Cara Finnegan applies the concept of the enthymeme to documentary 
photographic arguments.44  She explains that photographs succeed as “naturalistic” 
arguments—as representations of the real world—when three unstated premises are 
acceptably satisfied for the audience.  Finnegan labels these premises ontological, 
representational, and mechanical realism.  That is, these arguments succeed when 
viewers have no reason to doubt that (1) the photograph depicts a scene that really 
existed, (2) the depicted scene is of the subject that the author claims it depicts, and (3) 
                                                 
44 Finnegan is not the only scholar to note the role of enthymemes in visual processes.  Keith Niall notes 
that geometrical figures also rest on networks of unstated propositions.  Specifically, he notes that for 
centuries Euclid’s first theorem was not visually “proven” by the graphic used to represent it; the viewer 
had to fill in a number of unstated propositions to derive meaning from it.  Niall asserts, “The original proof 
of Euclid’s first theorem is incomplete, and this gap in logic is undetected by visual imagination.  While 
cognition involves truth values, vision does not: the notions of inference and proof are foreign to vision” 
(202).  Niall is not a rhetorician, and he is looking at these issues from the perspective of cognitive science.  
Nonetheless, his more philosophical account of the enthymeme in visual perception and cognitive 




human intervention has not interfered with the “normal” production of the image (“The 
Naturalistic Enthymeme” 143).  As Finnegan demonstrates through her account of the 
infamous Farm Security Administration (FSA) “skull” photographs,45 an explicit 
challenge to any of these propositions can refute a photograph’s claim to represent the 
real.   
 In later work, Finnegan extends her enthymemic conceptualization of photographs 
through the term image vernaculars—“…the enthymematic modes of reasoning 
employed by audiences in the context of specific practices of reading and viewing in 
visual cultures” (“Recognizing Lincoln” 34).  Finnegan uses the concept of the image 
vernacular to account for the ways in which letter writers responded to a rediscovered 
photograph of Abraham Lincoln published in 1895.  These texts reveal tacit assumptions 
regarding facial physiognomy, moral character, ethnicity, and national identity at the end 
of the nineteenth century.  Viewers brought a set of assumptions to the viewing of the 
photograph, and they reveal this enthymemic viewing when articulating equally 
enthymemic verbal arguments.   
Finnegan’s terms and methods are conceptually rich; however, she focuses 
specifically on photographs and specifically on broad instantiations of visual culture.  
Considering the theoretical machinery of visual enthymemes and image vernaculars in 
the light of other kinds of images and more narrowly defined visual cultures raises some 
interesting questions.  If the enthymeme underlies the structure of “naturalistic” 
photographic arguments in documentary situations, can it structure similar visual 
arguments making claims about reality, such as scientific visuals?  Can an enthymemic 
                                                 
45 In 1936, FSA photographer Arthur Rothstein took a set of photographs of a sun-bleached cow skull in the 
South Dakota badlands.  The photographs were used in newspaper articles as evidence of the effects of 




account apply to other kinds of scientific visual artifacts that reference reality indirectly 
through physical and mathematical tools that transcribe features of the natural world?  
How can we account for the tacit parameters of the image vernaculars of scientific visual 
cultures to teach future scientists how to produce both creative and ethical visual 
arguments?     
Starting from Finnegan’s work, I offer a generic schema for an instrumental 
enthymeme for scientific visuals that can begin to approach these questions.  Such an 
enthymemic frame must be generic since the matrix of unstated propositions will be 
context dependent, field dependent, and instrument dependent.  That is, the unstated and 
provisionally acceptable propositions for a given visualization depend on the physical, 
mathematical, and graphical conditions by which data are collected, processed, and 
reproduced; the success of the argument also depends on the audience’s conscious or 
unconscious acceptance of those conditions.  For example, a magnetic resonance map of 
the sea floor rests on tentatively established premises about magnetism and its capacity to 
be measured through the proton-precession process.  The unstated and accepted 
propositions of this instrument and the mathematical premises that convert magnetic data 
into a visualization are different from the tentatively accepted premises governing the 
collection and processing of sun photometer data about atmospheric aerosols.  However, 
despite such differences, understanding the “instrumental” enthymeme at a generic level 
can provide a framework for explaining the successes, failures, and frauds of scientific 
visuals.   
 Like Finnegan’s naturalistic enthymeme, what I call the instrumental enthymeme 




integrity.  (I substitute the word integrity for realism because I think it better reflects the 
expectations of science.)  The reader assumes that the image or visualized data (1) refers 
to a phenomenon that really existed and (2) that the graphic represents what it claims to 
represent.  Though mechanical integrity (3) is also a component, this concept becomes 
more complicated in scientific imaging situations.  Finnegan’s mechanical realism refers 
specifically to the material circumstances of staging and producing photographs; 
however, scientific photographs are usually staged, especially in experimental contexts.  
Thus, the mechanical integrity of the “real” scientific image is dependent on accepted 
assumptions of the integrity of the imaging process.  In contrast, the documentary 
photograph’s mechanical realism largely rests on the assumption that the camera captured 
a candid moment.  Moreover, the “reality” claims of some scientific images depend on 
additional components, such as mathematical transformations.  Thus, viewers expect that 
instrument “data”—whether they are patterns of light encoded chemically (or digitally) in 
a photograph, indices of particles counted by a scintillation counter, or signs of some 
other phenomena—are collected and transformed into visual form according to accepted 
principles.  Mechanical integrity could also consider the principles of graphical integrity 
articulated by Tufte (1983).46  For example, Tufte notes, “The representation of numbers, 
as physically measured on the surface of the graphic itself, should be directly 
                                                 
46 In Visualizing Quantitative Information, Edward Tufte outlines six principles of graphical integrity that 
should be considered when making honest representations of numerical data:   
(1 )The representation of numbers, as physically measured on the surface of the graphic itself, 
should be directly proportional to the numerical quantities represented. Clear, detailed, and 
thorough labeling should be used to defeat graphical distortion and ambiguity.  
(2) Write out explanations of the data on the graphic itself. Label important events in the data. 
(3) Show data variation, not design variation. 
(4) In time-series displays of money, deflated and standardized units of monetary measurement are 
nearly always better than nominal units. 
(5) The number of information-carrying (variable) dimensions depicted should not exceed the 
number of dimensions in the data. 





proportional to the numerical quantities represented” (77).  While Tufte presents his 
“principles of graphical integrity” as prescriptions, they (or contextual variations of them) 
can also be considered as expectations—components of enthymemes.  That is, scientists 
expect that represented data were not deceptively distorted, even if the data are 
mathematically altered either by necessity or for presentational/argumentative purposes.   
 A plausible distinction between Finnegan’s naturalistic enthymeme and what I 
call the instrumental enthymeme concerns the epistemological relationship between 
images, time, and novelty.  The documentary photograph, whose persuasive 
“naturalness” rests on the naturalistic enthymeme, can only represent a singular moment 
in time.  The scientific visual can reflect a specific moment, but it can also reflect 
multiple moments, as is the case with visualized data measured in the time domain.  More 
importantly, most scientific images tacitly promise to be reproducible.  For most 
experimentally derived visuals and many observationally derived visuals, viewers assume 
that the same visual artifact would be produced were the experiment to be repeated under 
the same controlled conditions or if the data were collected under similar field conditions.  
In other words, unlike the image supported naturalistic enthymeme, which must be 
unique to be real, the scientific image cannot be unique if it is to be received as real.            
 Two good examples that demonstrate the possibility of specific instrumental 
enthymemes come from the twilight zone case described in Chapter Four.  In both cases, 
the inscribing instruments are observational rather than experimental.  First, Koren et al. 
initially failed to persuade their peers because their work seemed to defy the expectations 
of representational and mechanical integrity.  Reviewers and local colleagues were 




that were not measured by that instrument.  The aerosol data in the graph were presented 
in terms of distance from the nearest cloud; AERONET only measures in terms of time.  
The authors were making a simplifying assumption about rate of movement for 
argumentative purposes; however, reviews and local reactions indicated that this 
transformation was not acceptable, even though the premise governing the data 
transformation was explained in the text.  Thus, even though these authors were 
presenting valid data, the means of the presentation pushed against the expectations of the 
audience.  As Lorraine Remer explained, this small change was significant for her 
colleagues at Goddard who worked closely with AERONET:   
The AERONET people who are up here [at Goddard] were very critical of 
our first draft, and a lot of the changes we made were because of their 
comments because (1) they’re our friends and we want to remain friends 
and (2) they know their data a lot better than we do.  But we went over 
that hump, and it was as simple as staying in the time domain, and 
everybody was friends again, and now they are supporting our paper.  (My 
emphasis) 
Remer’s comment indicates that graphical conventions and graphical choices have 
significant rhetorical, personal, and political implications. 
A second possible example of a visual enthymeme in the twilight zone case is 
suggested by the authors’ awareness of the unstated premises governing how others 
would view their MODIS data.  Specifically, an understood “fact” of the MODIS device 
was that its aerosol reflectance data were unreliable near clouds.  Koren and Kaufman 




clouds would dismiss the argument.  That data did not have ontological integrity; 
therefore, any data pattern would be considered an “artifact” of the instrument.  In the 
contemporary image vernacular of atmospheric-aerosol scientists, that data did not 
“really” exist.  Koren, Kaufman, and Remer sought out ways to give that data ontological 
status through independent instrumental verification (i.e., the AERONET data) and 
conceptual priming (i.e., the cloud photo series).   
 
Ethos, Norms, and the Scientific Image 
 In “The Rhetorical Construction of Scientific Ethos,” Lawrence Prelli juxtaposes 
the “norms” of scientific ethos proposed by Merton—universalism, community, 
disinterestedness, organized skepticism, originality, and humility—against the identified 
counter-norms identified by Mitroff and others—particularism, solitariness, 
interestedness, and organized dogmatism (87-89).  This juxtaposition allows Prelli to 
show that the scientific ethos is constructed contextually; scientists activate specific topoi 
to project an appropriate and effective ethos for specific situations.  When a norm-based 
ethos is not rhetorically successful or expedient, a scientist can project a more 
revolutionary ethos based on counter-norms.   
I summarize Prelli’s work on scientific ethos in general as a starting place for 
thinking more specifically about ethos, scientific visuals, and image enhancement.  In an 
idealized conception of science, the scientific image should reflect the norms identified 
by Merton.  A scientific visual should be an original but universally reproducible artifact 
created by communally sanctioned means that limit the biases of the scientists producing 




align with Mitroff’s counter-norms if the enhancements are undocumented (and hence 
irreproducible), inconsistent with community standards, or biased toward preformed 
conclusions even in light of plausible counterarguments.  
As one might expect, editorial reactions to image manipulation indicate a strong 
affinity for the Mertonian norms, and their characterizations of unethical practices 
correspond to the counter-norms.  However, as other rhetorical theorists have observed, 
the relationship between ethos and images in science is more complicated than just 
consistent conformity to norms.  Some of these complicating factors can explain why 
scientists are motivated to manipulate their images.    
As Anne Richards has shown, there is a reciprocal relationship between images 
and the authority of scientific knowledge claims; images can build authority, and 
authority can bolster the persuasiveness of images.  Richards shows that the quality and 
number of visuals in a botany article can build the credibility of the author.  She also 
shows that otherwise uncompelling or even potentially questionable images will be 
acceptable if the author is well respected.  In one of the samples read by the subject in her 
think-aloud protocol, a botanical drawing was inserted but not identified in a collage of 
botanical photographs.47  Such a collage is a typical graphic practice for this discipline, 
but mixing media was not typical.  The expert reader participating in Richard’s study did 
not find the insertion to be problematic because the authors were respected botanists 
(200-202).  Thus, the scientists’ ethos preserved the “truth value” of the image even 
though it was a drawn construction.   
                                                 




 Tacit assumptions about the relationship between image quality and scientific 
ethos are sometimes explicated in editorial commentaries on imaging ethics.  In 2004, 
two editors of The Journal of Cell Biology allude to these implicit relationships:     
The quality of an image has implications about the care with which it was 
made, and a frequent assumption (though not necessarily true) is that in 
order to obtain a presentation-quality image you had to carefully repeat an 
experiment multiple times.  (Rossner and Yamada 11) 
Essentially, these editors invoke two concepts that are well explained in The New 
Rhetoric:  presumptions and the rhetorical index.48  In this case, a common presumption 
identified by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca— “the quality of the act reveals the quality 
of the person responsible for it”—clearly pertains (70).  That is, the quality of the image 
reflects on the quality of the science and hence the scientist.  A “clear” or “faultless” 
image entails clear science and hence a conscientious scientist; a sloppy image entails 
sloppy science and hence a careless scientist.  Regarding the rhetorical index, a 
“presentation-quality” image can serve as an index not just of a single experiment but 
also of the multiple replications of it.  Thus, the “clear” image can indicate the 
thoroughness once required to obtain a presentation-quality image.  Though Rossner and 
Yamada note that this assumption is not always true, in the light of their  comment it is 
clear why scientists are tempted to “beautify” their visual arguments despite calls for 
                                                 
48 In the system of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, presumptions are universal objects of agreement like 
facts and truths, but adherence to presumptions is “less than maximum” (70).  A presumption obtains so 
long as there is no evidence to the contrary.  For example, we presume that a speaker is telling the truth as 
long as we are given no reason to doubt his or her honesty (71). 
The rhetorical index is like a sign in that it is a “phenomenon capable of evoking another 
phenomenon”; however, the index “makes it possible to evoke another phenomenon in what we may call an 




“warts and all” artifacts.  So much is riding on their images—including the perception of 
credibility.   
 The observations of Richards and the comments from the editors of The Journal 
of Cell Biology suggest that there are multiple values associated with scientific images 
and that perhaps digital technology has affected the relationship between those values.  
With digitally generated and manipulated images, values of verisimilitude and clarity 
now compete for hierarchical supremacy.  Presumably, before the advent of digital 
manipulation, these two values were inseparable or at least coincident in the minds of the 
scientists.  The clear or “faultless” scientific image accurately recorded a scene as it 
existed.  As one editorial observes, this verisimilitude was a product of available 
technology:  
In days gone by, whether we liked it or not, data acquired at the bench 
were not much different from what was published.  In a biomedical lab, 
for example, samples that had been radio-labeled and separated on a gel 
were recorded on X-ray film.  Composite figures were assembled, with 
lettering carefully placed around the mounted film.  If a control was 
forgotten or a gel was uneven, the graduate student or postdoc was sent 
back into the lab to get it right “for publication.”  If a speck of dust on the 
film obscured data in the original photograph, another picture was taken.  
Slicing films to rearrange the order of samples, or to splice in a control 
group that was actually part of another gel, was not common because it 
took almost as much skill to do that as to rerun the experiment.  (“Not 




Digital tools decoupled the value of verisimilitude from the value of clarity, which allows 
these values to be arranged (consciously or unconsciously) into a hierarchy.  In ranking 
these values, some scientists rank clarity above verisimilitude.  They remove “artifacts” 
not contributing to their arguments even if these features were legitimate, or perhaps, 
contradictory parts of the scene.  The rhetorical project of many scientific editors has 
been to re-establish verisimilitude as the preferable value in the hierarchy.  Such an 
activity is demonstrated in the following passage from an editorial Nature Cell Biology: 
There is a myth that editors only like clean data that show striking 
effects.49  What we actually like is solid data that provides striking 
conceptual advances.  Effects may be small, but statistics and controls are 
needed to make them believable.  Data should be clearly presented and 
concise, but not at the expense of important information.  Let’s celebrate 
real data — wrinkles, warts and all.  We want to publish gritty 
documentary movies, not digitally beautified yarns!   
(“Appreciating Data” 203) 
This passage is representative of a host of similar arguments made in journal editorials.  
These documents have become more prevalent in recent years (2002–2006).  It is unclear 
if such arguments are changing the visual rhetorical practices of many scientists, though 
there is some anecdotal evidence of change.  For example, in the following passage, a 
scientist interviewed for a 2006 feature on image manipulation describes changes in his 
rhetorical behavior: 
                                                 
49 In this context, data includes images.  For example, the following sentence appears in the paragraph 
preceding the passage that is excerpted above: “For now, we have focused on two types of data that are 
subject to manipulation most often: gels and immunoblots, and light microscopy” (“Appreciating Data” 





Hayden… wrestles with the fine line between appropriate and misleading 
image alterations.  “We’ve all seen gels that look like a complete disaster,” 
with “splotches” everywhere from artifacts related to processing.  “In the 
past, I would take those out,” says Hayden.  “I wouldn’t do that now.”  
(Couzin 1866)   
Some scientists are even correcting much older images in light of newer standards.  The 
following passage from a 2007 correction of a 2002 Science article describes why the 
authors needed to update an image from 1997:   
It has come to our attention that Fig. 3B gives the appearance that lanes 
might have been spliced or possibly duplicated.  The experiments that 
yielded this figure were carried out in 1997 using autoradiography when 
the authors were at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Similar 
experiments were rerun after the authors had moved to the California 
Institute of Technology.   Because more stringent standards for handling 
electronic images have arisen more recently [see, e.g., M. Rossner, K. M. 
Yamada, J. Cell Biol. 166, 11 (2004)], we provide a recently created 
figure based on data from a similar experiment (right), as well as an image 
of the full gel (below) captured with a Molecular Dynamics 
Phosphoimager.   
(“Corrections and Clarifications,” 1550, bracketed phrase in original) 
This passage is interesting with respect to the relationship between ethos and images.  In 
this case, there is no suggestion of fraud or misconduct; the correction does not change 




the image and (2) to insert additional markers of their credibility into the correction by 
identifying the names of their institutions, two premiere American research universities.  
Moreover, they attempt to restrain the act-person association that a sloppy image equals a 
sloppy scientists by emphasizing (1) the age of the image, (2) the fact that the experiment 
had been reproduced, and (3) the circumstance that imaging standards are now different 
than they were when the article was published.  Finally, they reproduce a new version of 
the original figure, but they also include an image of the entire gel; thus, they provide 
more visual evidence than was initially published to demonstrated that the original results 
are credible (Figure 5.10).     
 
 





This retraction and Hayden’s comments suggest that editorial responses to image 
manipulation have been successful.  With time, more extensive reception evidence should 
become available.  This evidence should allow rhetorical scholars to verify the long-term 
effects of the editorial messages that have attempted to negotiate the value hierarchy of 
digital images. 
 
Ethics and Enthymemes  
 Martin Jacobi (1990) elaborates on the connection between the enthymeme and 
ethics in the context of professional writing instruction.  Though he is interested in 
professional discourse in general and not in visual arguments in science specifically, 
Jacobi’s comments offer insight into the use of enthymemes in the ethical practices of 
professional discourse communities.  Specifically, Jacobi advocates using the enthymeme 
to “reintegrate ethics” into professional writing instruction.  He uses the concept of the 
enthymeme to guide students through the process of determining the shared assumptions 
of professional audiences.  His students then use knowledge of those shared assumptions 
in creating arguments based on enthymemes.  Jacobi explains the benefit of this 
approach: 
The crucial benefit of the enthymeme…is that it avoids the opportunity, 
available when rhetoric is perceived as a technology, of having no 
investment in what is said.  Rather, it requires writers to think about 




for coductive truths and values, truths and values that are—and ought to 
be—shared by the writer and the audience. 50  (285) 
Visual arguments in science rest upon shared truths and values.  Scientists expect visual 
arguments that accurately reflect the situation described in the text, and they expect that 
those visuals are generated by reliable means of representation.  What counts as an 
ethically appropriate visual mediation will vary by discipline, but the general descriptors 
of scientific misconduct—fabrication, falsification, and plagiarism—provide a good 
baseline.  The ethically produced scientific text presents original, real results that have 
not been modified inappropriately.  Appropriateness, however, is a relative term, and its 
value depends on the assumptions about “appropriate” practices shared by members of 
the discourse community.  But these shared assumptions are often unstated, and this lack 
of explicit guidelines can lead to ethically ambiguous situations.  The following anecdote, 
included in a Science feature story on imaging ethics, demonstrates the ambiguity that 
can emerge from the enthymemic nature of visual arguments in science: 
A member of [a] biologist’s lab had created a collage of images.  Editors 
of the journal in which it was published, tipped off by a reader, deemed 
the collage unethical because it was presented as a single picture.  A 
correction was subsequently published, noting that the modification, 
although inappropriate, did not affect the paper’s conclusions.  “We 
thought it was obvious that it was a collage,” says the biologist, adding 
that he vehemently opposes altering images.  (Couzin, “Don’t Pretty” 
1867) 
                                                 
50 Jacobi uses Wayne Booth’s definition of coduction, which Jacobi paraphrases as “the comparing of one’s 




This anecdote suggests that a range of stakeholders approach visuals with different 
assumptions.  The image was peer reviewed and published, so at least three people saw 
and “approved” the collage.51  One cannot know if each of these readers thought the 
figure was a collage or a single image.  That is, did they share the authors’ assumption 
that the collage was intuitively obvious, or did they just not notice or not care?  However, 
some readers of the published piece found the image inappropriate; it needed elements to 
divide the visualized objects that were presented together.  The biologist and his team are 
portrayed in the narrative as ethical and responsible scientists who failed to consider how 
their visual would be received.  They failed to situate the image in a way that was 
consistent with the visual enthymeme governing some readers’ expectations about a 
specific class of visual artifact.  This failure created an awkward situation; they had to 
publish a correction to their paper with an updated figure (Couzin 1867)  
Clearly, scientists need rhetorical guidance when planning and executing visual 
arguments.  Individual journals often provide specific advice, and some journal 
guidelines are quite specific about what is acceptable for different image types and data 
visualizations.  For example, a 2004 editorial in The Journal of Cell Biology reiterated 
guidelines that would apply to the “collage” situation discussed in the previous 
paragraph.  After demonstrating an unethically spliced micrographic collage (see Figure 
5.11), the editors explain how images can be combined appropriately and within 
rhetorical constraints:  “You may want to combine images from several fields into a 
single micrograph to save space, but this assembly should be clearly indicated by thin 
                                                 
51 In this context, a collage is a digital image in which portions of several images are combined in a single 
field; i.e., it is a composite photograph. The top image in Figure 5.10 is an example of an unethical collage. 





lines between the different pieces”(Rossner and Yamada 14).  This statement is a less 
formal wording of the journal’s submission guidelines regarding composite images:  
“The grouping of images from different parts of the same gel, or from different gels, 
fields, or exposures must be made explicit by the arrangement of the figure (e.g., dividing 
lines) and in the text of the figure legend” (Rossner 837).  Following these guidelines 
would preserve the ontological and representational integrity of the image; the marked 
image would reflect the “reality” of what was actually observed and depict what the 
author claims that it depicts.  The image would be an explicitly marked micrographic 






Figure 5.11:  Figure 6 from Rossner and Yamada, 2004.  The figure demonstrates how 
misrepresentations of image data can be revealed through digital forensics. 
 
Similarly, the editorial policies of the journal Nature now stipulate specific and 
extensive requirements for visual artifacts of microscopy and electrophoretic gels and 
blots (Nature “Image Integrity”).  I will discuss these and other guidelines later in this 
chapter, but first I examine how an understanding of enthymemes can help rhetoricians 





Enthymemes and Standards of Ethical Conduct in Science 
 As mentioned previously, there are three main categories of scientific misconduct: 
fabrication, falsification, and plagiarism.  The National Science Foundation defines 
fabrication as “making up data or results and recording or reporting them.”  It defines 
falsification as “manipulating research materials, equipment, or processes, or changing or 
omitting data or results such that the research is not accurately represented in the research 
record.”  Plagiarism is “the appropriation of another person’s ideas, processes, results or 
words without giving appropriate credit” (NSF).  These categories are used by ORI and 
other authorities that investigate research misconduct.  Juxtaposing these terms with the 
components of the visual instrumental enthymeme is one way to conceptualize the ethical 
boundaries of visual argumentation in science. 
Table 5.1 demonstrates the relationships between a violated assumption of the 
instrumental enthymeme—ontological, representational, or mechanical integrity—and the 
specific types of ethical misconduct.  Fabrication contradicts the proposition of 
ontological integrity; a visual artifact refers to something that did not exist.  Falsification 
contradicts the proposition of mechanical integrity; a visual has been modified in an 
excessive way through embellishment or omission; thus, it is not an accurate depiction of 
the visualized object or data as indexed by the instrument.  Both fabrication and 
falsification can also contradict representational integrity; a falsified or fabricated visual 
does not necessarily represent what the author claims it represents.52  Plagiarism 
                                                 
52  It is possible that a falsified or fabricated image could maintain representational integrity.  For example, 
an ornithologist could claim that a fabricated photograph depicts a new species of bird.  Technically the 
photograph does not violate representational integrity because indeed it does represent a new species; 
however, such an argument would lack ontological integrity, and a photographic argument without 




contradicts representational integrity; a figure plagiarized from the work of another 
researcher could not possibly represent what the author claims it represents if the graphic 







Graphical  Integrity 
Fabrication X X  
Falsification  X X 
Plagiarism  X  
Table 5.1: Ethics violations and the instrumental enthymeme. 
 
Considering the ethical facets of each component of the instrumental enthymeme 
can help clarify the line between what can only be outright fraud and modifications that 
are liminally ethical and thus rhetorically interesting.  Situations in which ontological or 
representational integrity are compromised are clearly fraudulent in scientific contexts.  
This is the case with each of the most egregious frauds mentioned previously in this 
chapter.  Li presented mouse cells as human cells, violating the assumption of 
representational integrity.  Leadon and Hwang each presented visuals that did not 
represent ontologically real phenomena.  What Leadon presented in his autoradiographic 
films never existed in that form.  Hwang’s composite images of cells were never “real.”  
However, in cases involving only mechanical “misconduct” the line between appropriate 
and inappropriate modification is less clear.  For example, Figure 5.12 shows how 
contrast adjustments can be either ethical clarifications or mechanical misconduct 
depending on the extent and results of the adjustment.  As Rossner and Yamada observe, 
                                                                                                                                                 
It is interesting that representational integrity is a component of each kind of misconduct.  The 




the change in contrast from B1 to B2 is acceptable because no data is obscured; however, 
the change from B2 to B3 is not acceptable because specific features are obliterated.  
Hence, the image in B3 has lost ontological integrity because removing data has created 








Figure 5.12:  Demonstrations of brightness and contrast adjustments.  Source: Rossner, Michael and 
Kenneth M. Yamada. “What’s in a Picture? The Temptation of Image Manipulation.” The Journal 





Images, Ethics, and the Objects of Agreement 
In The New Rhetoric Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca explain that all arguments 
are based on common starting places, what they call the objects of agreement.  These 
objects of agreement include facts, truths, presumptions, values, hierarchies, and loci.  I 
have already used some of these terms to account for ethical issues in the visual rhetoric 
of science.  For example, the notion that the quality of an image is indicative of the 
quality of a scientist rests on a common presumption: the nature of an act reflects on the 
nature of the person who performed the act.  One could argue that the various digital-
imaging policies of science journals are attempts to maintain the status of specific 
premises as objects of agreement.  I use the case of digital photography as an example. 
Before the development of digital imaging and image manipulation software, 
photographs had a relatively stable epistemic status.  Of course, there were plenty of 
“retouched” photographs before digital imaging, and as many critics have observed, the 
photograph has never been a transparent window to the real.  However, as previously 
cited comments indicate, for science, the photographic process (not necessarily any 
specific photograph) was a truth—an uncontested reference to the real based on a 
network of facts that would be accepted by any member of the universal audience.  In this 
case, the truth of photography is based on an interlocking network of physical and 
chemical facts.  Despite McLuhan’s comments about photographic deceit, the traditional 
photograph was and is epistemically reliable (though not infallible) from a rhetorical 
perspective, as long as the premises of Finnegan’s naturalistic enthymeme are not 




modifying traditional photographs is relatively difficult and that scientists are relatively 
honest.   
Enter digital imaging.  Digitally produced images look like regular photographs; 
however, with the exception of some shared physical facts (for example, they both 
inscribe reflected light), each medium rests on different networks of facts and activates 
different sets of probabilities.  For instance, one could assume digital photographs will be 
modified because it is easy to modify them or because they can be modified 
unconsciously.  Images can also be modified with far greater subtlety than regular 
photographs, making the adjustments harder to spot with mere visual inspection.  A fraud 
that is difficult to detect is more likely to occur.    
When the two media shared the same space, it was necessary to differentiate 
them.  As the next section explains, in the 1990s the first response of journals was to 
require that information about software and hardware be added to the figure captions of 
digital images.  Separating digital from analog marked the digital as different and 
preserved the epistemic status of the analog image.   
The development of complete digital workflows and increased evidence of 
unethical image adjustments led to more extensive and more specific requirements.  
These new guidelines can be interpreted as requirements that help authors, editors, and 
reviewers separate fact from claim.  For example, a small contrast adjustment made to an 
entire image is a fact, especially if it is documented in some way.  This fact interacts with 
the network of facts that support the reception of an image as the record of a “real” event.  
A selective contrast adjustment—one that is applied to only part of an image—is an 




might minimize or obliterate important information.  Essentially, the adjustment applies 
an additional terministic screen to the image.  If a selective contrast adjustment is made 
but not acknowledged in the text, the author is passing off an arguable premise as a fact.  
Thinking about visual arguments in relation to the objects of agreement helps to explain 
why some editors were compelled to promote ethical digital imaging practices so 
explicitly. 
 
Enthymemes, Ethos, and Editorial Reactions in the Age of Photoshop 
Adobe’s Photoshop was released for the Apple Macintosh operating system in 
1990, and soon thereafter it was available for Microsoft Windows (1992) and Sun 
Microsystems’ Solaris operating system (1993) (Story “From Darkroom to Desktop”).  
By 1993, the popular image-editing program and others like it were already influencing 
scientific editorial policy.  During their 1992 meeting, the members of the publications 
board of Molecular and Cellular Biology decided to include language on digital 
adjustments in their submission guidelines.  These guidelines debuted in January of 1993.  
Though much of the text is concerned with technical details for submitting reproducible 
digital images, the guidance document also recognized the positive benefits of digital 
enhancement:   
Since the contents of computer-generated images can be manipulated for 
better clarity, the Publications Board at its May 1992 meeting decreed that 
a description of the software/hardware used should be put in the figure 




Compared to later editorial language on image manipulation, this statement is highly 
positive.  Digital manipulation is characterized as a means to achieve greater clarity and 
not as a means for fraud.  But what are the rhetorical effects of meeting the editors’ 
request?   
Figure 5.13 is a group of images from a paper that also appeared in the January 
1993 issue of Molecular and Cellular Biology.  The caption follows the 1992 guidelines 
and frankly states that panels A and B were composed in Adobe Photoshop and Adobe 
Illustrator.  This mere mention does not provide any significant details about any 
“enhancements,” nor did the editors or reviewers expect such details.  Presumably, if 
readers knew that an image was digitally produced, such knowledge could change the 
modality of the photograph for them; i.e., they might be less certain of the images’ claims 
than if the images were traditional photographs.  Yet this does not appear to be the case 
for Molecular and Cellular Biology in 1993; that is, I have not found any direct evidence 
to indicate that these first digital images were any less persuasive than their chemically 
produced counterparts.  However, some scientists, editors, and other stakeholders were 
becoming increasingly anxious of the impending age of the digital image, and this 







Figure 5.13:  Figure 1 from Ryan et al. Molecular and Cellular Biology, 1993.  Selected text enlarged. 
NB: This is not an unethical image. 
 
 A 1994 “News and Comment” piece in Science summarized the debate over 
digital imaging in the early 1990s.  Some scientists were increasingly anxious about 
digital manipulation; others were not concerned (Anderson 317).  At that time, scientific 
digital fraud was still hypothetical.  Major cases of digital fraud had not yet occurred, and 
many journals had not taken a position on the issue.  Science reporter Christopher 




So far scientific journals have received only a trickle of digital 
photographs (as opposed to computer-generated digital images of 
molecular structures, which are ubiquitous).  As a result, only a few 
journals have set polices for handling digital photographs.  Nature does 
not have such a policy, but its two spin-off journals, Nature Genetics and 
Nature Structural Biology, have both adopted the requirement that authors 
submitting a digital image list what software and hardware they used in 
the methodology section and in the caption.  Science has discussed but not 
adopted such a policy…. (Anderson 317) 
This passage indicates that there were different tacit standards for different kinds of 
digitally supported graphics.  Digitally rendered models of invisible molecules were 
“ubiquitous” and ethically unproblematic, whereas even the potential emergence of 
digital photographs as a visualization technology prompted discussions of ethics and 
policy.  The comment in context also demonstrates that editors were anxious about digital 
imaging but unclear on how to accommodate it rhetorically; they were not sure how to 
preserve the epistemic value of scientific photographic arguments with digital imaging as 
part of the equation.  Some journals and associations raised the possibility of more 
rigorous auditing of digital images.  For example, the Council of Biology Editors (CBE) 
had discussed approaches to ethical issues of digital imaging in 1993; possibilities 
included the maintenance of electronic histories of the changes made to an image 
(Anderson 317).  However, by 1998 CBE still did not have a written policy on the 
publication of digital images.  A 1998 “CBE Views” article recognized this lack of clear 




application that was used to create the image should be included in the figure legend” 
(Rossner et al 189).  This suggestion is almost identical to the suggestion in the 
Molecular and Cellular Biology guidelines developed in 1992.  As noted previously, 
merely knowing the program name is not very helpful for replicating an experiment or 
verifying the integrity of an image, though it could potentially affect the viewer’s 
perception of the image.  As time passed, it became clear that mere software 
identification was insufficient.  Two developments drew attention to digital manipulation 
and encouraged changes to imaging standards:  the proliferation of digital manuscript 
submission and the Hwang scandal. 
In December 2001, The Journal of Cell Biology began requiring that all 
manuscripts and image files be submitted electronically.  By September of 2002, the 
journal’s editor, Mike Rossner, had begun what would become a veritable crusade for 
more ethical digital imaging.  In response to a deluge of questionable images in submitted 
manuscripts, Rossner’s journal and its publisher Rockefeller University Press developed 
new guidelines on image manipulation.  Rossner’s Journal of Cell Biology also 
implemented a new policy—all digital images are forensically analyzed for improper 
manipulation.  The submission guidelines for The Journal of Cell Biology list four points:  
No specific feature within an image may be enhanced, obscured, moved, 
removed, or introduced.  
Adjustments of brightness, contrast, or color balance are 
acceptable if they are applied to the whole image and as long as they do 
not obscure, eliminate, or misrepresent any information present in the 




The grouping of images from different parts of the same gel, or 
from different gels, fields, or exposures must be made explicit by the 
arrangement of the figure (e.g., dividing lines) and in the text of the figure 
legend. 
If the original data cannot be produced by an author when asked to 
provide it, the acceptance of the manuscript may be revoked.  
 (Rossner 837) 
A 2003 policy update added requirements regarding the submission of specific 
information about image acquisition and modification.  The required information 
includes such details as the makes and models of microscopes, microscopy settings, 
temperature measurements, acquisition software, modification software, and all digital 
adjustments (Rossner 837).  In essence, The Journal of Cell Biology demanded explicit 
documentation of typically unstated features of an image’s production. 
Guidelines similar to those of The Journal of Cell Biology are now part of the 
editorial polices of Science (“Preparing Efficient Figures”).53  Essentially identical to the 
guidelines of Rossner’s The Journal of Cell Biology, the guidelines of Science address 
concerns about selective adjustment of images (a change may be made only if it is made 
to the entire image) and issues related to false continuity (composite images must be 
clearly marked as composites).  Science also reserves the right to have authors supply 
                                                 
53 The Science guidelines are as follows:  
Modification of figures.  Science does not allow certain electronic enhancements or manipulations 
of micrographs, gels, or other digital images.  Figures assembled from multiple photographs or 
images must indicate the separate parts with lines between them.  Linear adjustment of contrast, 
brightness, or color must be applied to an entire image or plate equally.  Nonlinear adjustments 
must be specified in the figure legend. Selective enhancement or alteration of one part of an image 
in not acceptable.  In addition, Science may ask authors of papers returned for revision to provide 





primary data to support specific visual arguments.  However, unlike The Journal of Cell 
Biology, the editorial staff of Science does not forensically analyze submitted digital 
images.  Some critics, including Mike Rossner, blame the Hwang stem-cell scandal on 
insufficient editorial oversight by Science (Rossner “Hwang Case”).   
In the wake of the Hwang scandal of 2005–2006, the Nature Publishing Group 
published even more specific guidelines regarding image integrity.  The guidelines of 
Nature are similar to but more extensive than those of both Science and The Journal of 
Cell Biology, but they also reflect the need for flexibility:  “A certain degree of image 
processing is acceptable for publication (and for some experiments, fields and techniques 
is unavoidable), but the final image must correctly represent the original data and 
conform to community standards” (“Guide for Digital Images”).  In other words, Nature 
recognizes that there are technical and rhetorical reasons to modify an image; the journal 
also recognizes that there are field specific differences regarding imaging practices.  That 
is, the boundaries between ethical modification and unethical manipulations are context 
dependent.  Including such language was necessary for Nature because it publishes 
articles on topics in a wide range of scientific fields.  (One wonders why Science does not 
have a similar statement in its guidelines.) 
The guidelines of Nature also stipulate that additional descriptions of 
visualization methods must be included with a submission:  “Manuscripts should include 
a single Supplementary Methods file (or be part of a larger Methods section) labeled 
‘equipment and settings’ that describes for each figure the pertinent instrument settings, 
acquisition conditions and processing changes...”(“Image Integrity”).  Though these 




used to evaluate and validate the veracity of evidence—the basis of the visual argument.  
Thus, the journal’s reputation also certifies the credibility of the images that ultimately 
appear.     
This brief survey of evolving journal requirements demonstrates significant 
changes in approaches to scientific visuals over a thirteen-year period.  The guidelines 
vary over time and from journal to journal; however, all of these policies can be read as 
reactions to technological changes that threatened to undermine specific kinds of visual 
arguments because they could undermine the objects of agreement at the heart of these 
visual arguments.   
  
Conclusion 
Though rhetoricians have been studying science in earnest for the last twenty 
years, and though ethicists and moral philosophers have been examining the ethics of 
science for decades, there has not been a concerted effort by rhetorical scholars to think 
about the confluence of rhetorical and ethical issues with respect to scientific visuals.54  
This chapter has attempted to account for the ethics of visual mediation in scientific 
contexts by identifying typically tacit relationships between visual artifacts, individual 
credibility, scientific cultures, and epistemic rhetoric.  Rhetorical concepts such as the 
enthymeme, ethos, facts, values, hierarchies, and presumptions help to explain the causes 
of liminally ethical visualization and the motivations for editorial responses to image 
                                                 
54 A noteworthy exception is the work of Mary Rosner who rightfully criticized rhetoric and composition 
scholars for taking an overly simple position on technical visuals.  She notes how scientific imaging 
reinforces ideologies, specifically the ideology of patriarchy.  My project does not engage issues regarding 
the ideologies supporting scientific visuality; however, the intersections of ideology, enthymemes, 




manipulation.  The crises of confidence that resulted in the advent and abuses of digital 
imaging caused editors and commentators to create texts that explicated competing 
assumptions about images as arguments.  An examination of these texts shows how 
scientific editors attempted to reestablish the “real” over the “clear” in the hierarchy of 








Chapter 6:  Refutations and Revelations: Reflections on the Visual 
Rhetoric of Science 
 
 
Any refutation—whether it be of an accepted proposition, of one’s opponent’s argument, 
of an unexpressed argument, or of an objection to an argument—implies an attribution to 
what is refuted of a certain force deserving attention and effort.   
 
—Chaim Perelman and Lucy Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric 
 
This dissertation has considered the rhetorical dynamics of a number of cases in 
order to approach five questions: (1) How are new visualization practices established as 
scientifically credible?  (2) How do scientists modify existing instrument output to make 
new visual arguments?  (3) How do scientists use verbal and visual means to transform 
problematic data into acceptable support for novel claims?  (4) What are the practical and 
ethical boundaries of modifying visual artifacts for scientific arguments?  (5) How do 
scientists refute established (but incorrect) visualizations that have been widely accepted 
as accurate representations of reality?     
I have considered each of the first four questions in some detail in previous 
chapters.  This concluding chapter will review significant observations from those 
chapters, but it also considers issues of refutation in greater detail.  It presents a recent 
case in which an established visual argument required visual refutation.  The case also 
engages rhetorical issues related to automatic and algorithmic visualization in science.  
Aspects of this case are then discussed along with points from previous chapters to frame 





Visual Refutations of Visual Arguments in Science 
 In 2006, protein crystallographer Geoffrey Chang, a researcher at the Scripps 
Research Institute, had to retract five papers that described the structures of complex 
cellular proteins.  At a basic level, Chang’s methods were the same as those used by Max 
von Laue and the Braggs in the early days of x-ray crystallography.  Chang used x-ray 
diffraction to generate data about the positions of atoms in crystallized proteins.  But 
almost one hundred years of technological and scientific development have changed 
many aspects of the process.  Indeed, even the x-ray photographs that Watson and Crick 
used to determine the structure of DNA seem antiquated when compared to the digital 
tools for data collection, analysis, and visualization that are available today.  But as the 
circumstances of Chang’s retraction demonstrate, these tools bring their own problems—
even when scientists are using them ethically and with good intentions. 
 In the first and most influential of the retracted papers (2001), Chang and his 
colleagues described the structure of MsbA, a protein of the bacterium E. coli.  MsbA is 
an ABC transporter protein—a biochemical mechanism that moves other molecules 
between the layers of a cell’s membrane.  ABC transporters are proteins of interest 
because pathogen cells might use these mechanisms to “pump” antibiotic molecules out 
of themselves.  Thus, this class of proteins could be a crucial factor in the development of 
antibiotic resistance in bacteria strains.  Chang’s paper presented the results of his 
crystallographic study through elegant and convincing visuals.  These visuals include 
visualizations of MsbA electron density generated from x-ray diffraction data (Figure 





Figure 6.1: Figure 2 of Chang and Roth 2001.  Stereo views of electron density maps of MsbA for E. 
coli. 
 
This breakthrough work appeared in Science in 2001; it was the first 
determination of an ABC-transporter structure.  Chang used this structure as the basis for 




(Molecular Biology, 2003) and Salmonella typhimurium (Science, 2005).  Unfortunately, 
the base structure presented in 2001 is inaccurate, and hence the other structures are also 
inaccurate.  As Science journalist Greg Miller reported, a blip in the code of an in-house 
data analysis program “…flipped two columns of data, inverting the electron density-map 
from which his team had derived the final protein structure” (1856).  This small error 
propagated through the visualization process, resulting in a faulty “determination” of the 
protein’s structure.  This error was not intentional, but it had serious consequences for the 
scientific community studying ABC transporters.  MsbA was the first ABC transporter to 
be mapped successfully, and other crystallographers studying this class of proteins used 
Chang’s work as the basis for new research on homologous structures.  In light of 
Chang’s retraction, they had to reconsider their work (Greg Miller 1857).  But Chang’s 
work had significant consequences even before the error was revealed.  Researchers 
working with different protein characterization methods also faced hurdles.  Greg Miller 
notes that biochemist David Clarke “…had a hard time persuading journals to accept [his 
group’s] biochemical studies that contradicted Chang’s MsbA structure...”; and grant 
applications that did not agree with Chang’s structure were, in Clarke’s words, “given a 
hard time”(Greg Miller 1857).   
The errors in Chang’s MsbA structure were not formally recognized until Kaspar 
Locher, a researcher working on a similar bacterial protein (Sav1866), compared his 
work with Chang’s structure.  According to Miller, “after pulling up Sav1866 and 
Chang’s MsbA from S. typhimurium on a computer screen, Locher says he realized in 
minutes that the MsbA structure was inverted” (1856).  Locher and co-author Roger 




on Sav1866.  The MsbA structure is presented as a purple wire structure; the Sav1866 
structure is presented in green. 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Figure 4S in Dawson and Locher (Nature 2006).  The original caption text is as follows:  
Superposition of Sav1866 and MsbA.  a, Stereo views of protein backbones of the transmembrane 
domains of a single subunit of Salmonella typhimurium MsbA (pdb entry 1Z2R, purple) and Sav1866 
(green) after manual superpositions of the entire transporters. No agreement in the helix 
arrangement is apparent.  b, The structure of MsbA was inverted using the coordinate manipulation 
program pdbset
5
, and the resulting molecule was superimposed onto Sav1866.  The transmembrane 
domain of a single monomer of inverted MsbA is shown in purple, while that of subunit A of Sav1866 
is shown in green and transmembrane helices TM1 and TM2 of subunit B are shown in yellow.  The 
approximate superposition of TM helices is evident.  The differences in helix directionality and 




Part a of Figure 6.2 demonstrates the significant but unexpected differences 
between the two structures; part b demonstrates how similar the two structures could be if 
the MsbA structure is inverted.  Both part a and part b are stereo views; if you stare at 
them long enough a three-dimensional images should appear to hover in between the 
doubled images. 
The purpose of Dawson and Locher’s paper was to define the Sav1886 structure 
and not to contradict Chang’s MsbA structure specifically, so the visual was included in a 
supplemental document and not in the body of the paper.  Still, the visual comparison 
serves three purposes: (1) it demonstrates the incompatibilities between the structures as 
they are defined, (2) it preempts the rejection of the Sav1886 structure on the grounds 
that it does not agree with Chang’s structure, and (3) it shows that Chang’s structure can 
be compatible with Sav1886 if the underlying data of the MsbA structure is corrected.  
The article text presents a verbal refutation: 
The arrangement of transmembrane helices observed for Sav1866 is 
consistent with recent cross-linking data that identified neighbouring [sic] 
helices in human MDR1.  In contrast, the reported X-ray analyses of 
another ABC exporter, the bacterial lipid flippase MsbA, show an 
arrangement distinctly different from the one we describe here 
(Supplementary Fig. S4 and Supplementary Table S2).  With respect to 
the nucleotide-binding domains, the structure of Sav1866 exhibits close 
structural agreement with that of MJ0796, whereas in MsbA of Salmonella 
typhimurium, the analogous domains appear laterally offset and at a 




remain incompatible, even when considering that the proteins may have 
been trapped in distinct states, and the differences—if real—would 
indicate a convergent evolution of the two proteins.  (182) 
An explicit refutation was clearly necessary given the authority that the Chang 
structure had accrued, and Dawson and Locher’s refutation is brief but thorough.  They 
present their structure as consistent with similar proteins; hence, it is more accurate than 
the Chang structure, which is inconsistent with these other findings.  Moreover, inverting 
the MsbA structure brings it in line with previous expectation for both it and analogous 
proteins.  Thus, Locher and Dawson do not dismiss the entirety of Chang’s work, just the 
faulty premise that led to a faulty structure.   
In the passage, the implausibility of the visual incompatibility between the MsbA 
and Sav1886 structures is reinforced verbally.  The authors point out what such 
differences would logically entail if they were “real.”  Specifically, significant structural 
differences would suggest convergent evolution.  In other words, if the incompatibility is 
“real,” then Sav1886 and MsbA independently evolved to perform similar functions.  
Such convergent evolution is unlikely in this case.   
Dawson and Locher were rhetorically successful.  Not only did they persuasively 
define the Sav1866 structure, but they also revealed the errors in the Chang structure, a 
revelation that resulted in Chang’s retraction and revision of the five ABC-transporter 
papers.  The case of the Chang retractions suggests that in some cases it can take a visual 
to refute a visual.  The case also reveals contemporary problems of visuals and visuality 
within the protein studies community.  In a letter to the editor entitled “Pretty Structures, 




elaborating on what he sees as systemic problems in the culture of protein-structure 
scientists: 
The mistake so clearly illustrates two lessons that we aging baby boomer 
professors ram down the throats of our proteomically aroused graduate 
students: (i) that those lovely colored ribbons festooning the covers and 
pages of journals are just models, not data, and (ii) that you invite disaster 
if you don’t know what your software is actually doing down there in the 
computational trenches. Students have a hard time subsuming these dicta 
into their souls for two reasons: the tyranny of authority (the vanity 
journals occupying the vanguard) and the inherent beauty of the 
macromolecular models that emerge, as if by magic, from the user-
friendly crystallographic software accumulated over decades through the 
generous labor of the field’s talented reciprocal space-cadets.55 
Miller’s comment raises some interesting points about the status and power of visuals in 
constructing the “real” and the unstated premises that can support or sink a 
crystallographic argument.  These points will be revisited throughout the rest of this 
chapter as I put the details of the Chang/Locher case in dialogue with the general 
observations and broader implications of this dissertation.  
 
Rhetorical Themes, Discursive Evidence, and Considerations of Counter Arguments 
 This project has applied a range of tools for rhetorical analysis to specific cases in 
which scientific visuals were important or problematic in arguments.  While the analysis 
                                                 
55 The final phrase is a play on words.  The concept of “reciprocal space” is a crystallographic concept 




described in each chapter develops specific conclusions for its specific case, taken 
together, the analyses also demonstrate three common conceptual threads:  (1) the 
applicability of The New Rhetoric to scientific arguments that depend on visuals; (2) the 
importance of considering scientific visual arguments in the light of context, reception, 
and circulation evidence; and (3) the distinct value of a rhetorical approach to scientific 
visuals.  The remainder of this dissertation considers and then mitigates arguments which 
would refute the validity of these threads.  I elaborate on the most striking evidence 
supporting each theme.  For the first two threads, I also elaborate on a special case or 
“fiber” of each.  Specifically, the section on The New Rhetoric is followed by an 
amplified consideration of dissociation and presence; the context and reception section 
includes an amplified consideration of the terministic screen.  Each elaboration follows 
the sequence of research questions outlined at the start of this dissertation.56  Thus, this 
process of refutation and summary both defends and frames the foundations of a 
comprehensive visual rhetoric of science.  
 
The Applicability of The New Rhetoric to Visual Argumentation  
 There are several grounds on which one could dismiss Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca’s The New Rhetoric as an insufficient system for explaining scientific visuals.  Its 
application faces the same challenges that rhetoric has encountered previously when 
approaching science and visuals separately.  That is, one could claim that The New 
                                                 
56Five research questions were listed at the beginning of this dissertation:  (1) How are new visualization 
practices established as scientifically credible?  (2) How do scientists modify existing instrument output to 
make new visual arguments?  (3) How do scientists use verbal and visual means to transform problematic 
data into acceptable support for novel claims?  (4) What are the practical and ethical boundaries of 
modifying visual artifacts for scientific arguments?  (5) How do scientists refute established (but incorrect) 




Rhetoric provides tools meant only to guide the production of texts and/or that these tools 
were never intended for analyzing scientific situations.  The latter objection has been 
sufficiently refuted by the many textual studies of scientific rhetoric that deploy the this 
rhetorical theory convincingly; Perelman’s own admission that the scope of The New 
Rhetoric has extended beyond its initial intent as a treatise on legal and philosophical 
argumentation also supports its applicability to scientific discourse (“The New Rhetoric 
and the Rhetoricians” 189-194).  The former objection is not as clearly dismissed by 
precedent.  The New Rhetoric has been far less popular in studies of visual rhetoric than 
other rhetorical texts have been.  For example, the index of the 2006 collection, Rhetorics 
of Display, lists only two lines of references for both Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
respectively, and all but three of the nine references in those lines point to brief mentions 
in endnotes.  In comparison, Aristotle has more than eight lines of index references, and 
Kenneth Burke has more than twenty lines of references.  Similarly, the ten-essay 
collection Ways of Seeing, Ways of Speaking: The Integration of Rhetoric and Vision in 
Constructing the Real (2007) has no references to Perelman or Olbrechts-Tyteca in its 
index.  They are mentioned only three times in the thirty essays of Carolyn Handa’s 
anthology Visual Rhetoric in a Digital World (2002).  Of course, the extent of index 
references in a few essay collections is not definitive evidence of the critical neglect of 
specific texts or theorists; however, this anecdotal evidence at least suggests that The New 
Rhetoric has not been wildly popular with scholars of visual rhetoric.  But does lacking a 
groundswell of citations mean that the text cannot be productively applied to visual 




 Though this project has not justified the applicability of every concept in The New 
Rhetoric to visual rhetoric in science, it has successfully covered large swaths of 
conceptual ground.  The concepts of presence and dissociation are discussed at length in 
the next section.  Other terms, such as the Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s argument 
classes and the “objects of agreement,” have also been conceptually productive for 
explaining the rhetoric of scientific visualization.   
In attempting to establish the new visualization regime of x-ray diffraction 
photography, Laue and the Braggs each worked with and against visual artifacts when 
developing arguments establishing the structure of reality, arguments based on the 
structure of reality, and quasi-logical arguments.  Specifically, Laue’s analogy between x-
ray diffraction and traditional diffraction was supported both with causal arguments 
based on the comparison of photographs and with visually supported incompatibility 
arguments meant to fend off refutation.  The Braggs used a similar combination of 
incompatibility, analogy, and causality arguments to establish a different interpretation of 
the x-ray images; and each of their claims required visual articulation or visual support.  
The Braggs ultimately instantiated their reflection analogy in the physical design of a 
new instrument—the x-ray spectrometer. 
The analyses of the other cases also benefit from the conceptual richness of The 
New Rhetoric.  The visuals supporting the Vine-Matthews-Morley hypothesis show how 
existing visualized data were adapted to fit specific quasi-logical argument forms.  
Specifically, the Eltanin-19 profile was mediated in ways that both enhanced the 
symmetry of the profile and reinforced the transitive relationship between distance, 




the primary argument at work in the twilight zone case.  (Dissociation is described at 
length in the next sub-section as a special case of the visualized New Rhetoric.)  The 
editorial responses to the ethics of digital-image manipulation demonstrate how the 
starting points of argumentation—what the Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca call the 
“objects of agreement”—operate visually.  A visual’s ability to function as an argument 
about reality depends on networks of facts, truths, presumptions, loci, and hierarchically 
arranged values.  In some contexts, the proliferation of digital imaging destabilized 
formerly reliable objects of agreement, and scientific editors responded with revised 
guidelines, new editorial practices, and candid discussion of the ethics of image 
adjustment. 
The Chang case demonstrates concepts from section in The New Rhetoric on the 
interaction of arguments.  Locher’s refutation of Chang’s protein structure exemplifies 
refutation strategies described by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, such as the following 
passage: 
To make the refutation of consequence and deserving of consideration, 
one has to make a sufficiently high estimate of what one is attacking: This 
is necessary not only for purposes of prestige, but in order to better gain 
the attention of the audience and secure certain strength for the future for 
the arguments one uses.  And one has to make a sufficiently low estimate 
of what one is attacking, so that the refutation is strong enough.  (470) 
Locher and Dawson make a “sufficiently high estimate” of Chang’s structure by 
recognizing it in the text and addressing the incompatibility of his established structure 




(1) refuting Chang’s arguments briefly and (2) placing the visual refutation in a 
supplemental section.  Though the visual refutation was necessary, it did not need to have 
the enhanced visual presence that placement in the main text could entail.  Those 
positions were filled with Dawson and Locher’s positive visual arguments that establish 
the structure of their protein, Sav1886. 
 Clearly, the rhetoric of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca is comprehensive enough 
to account for a range of persuasive situations involving visuals.  As the next section will 
show, specific concepts from The New Rhetoric are also help to explain the role of visual 
artifacts in the fundamental epistemic processes of science.   
 
Presence, Dissociation, and the Rhetoric of the Real  
 Presence and dissociation are two terms from The New Rhetoric that are 
especially productive for thinking about visual rhetoric and science.  Regarding presence, 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca note, “…by the very fact of selecting certain elements 
and presenting them to the audience, their importance and pertinency to the discussion 
are implied.  Indeed, such a choice endows these elements with a presence, which is an 
essential factor in argumentation and one that is far too much neglected in rationalistic 
conceptions of reasoning” (116).  Recall that the process of dissociation revises the 
structure of reality by rhetorically transforming a unitary concept into two entities: one 
that retains the value associated with the original concept and one that is cast away as 
false, artificial, or mere appearance (411-415).  As Alan Gross notes, both of these 
processes are essential to the practice of science.  For example, Gross’s examination of 




multiple discursive vectors bring a species into existence through rhetorical presence.  As 
mentioned previously, Gross also remarks that dissociation—the process of separating 
appearance from reality—is the fundamental activity of science.  The speciation of the 
bonobo offers a parallel case to Gross’s example of hummingbird speciation.  Until 1933, 
bonobos were considered chimpanzee variants.  They were sometimes referred to 
colloquially as pygmy chimpanzees, dwarf chimpanzees, or gracile chimpanzees, but 
taxonomically they were treated as identical to the common chimpanzee, Pan 
troglodytes.  The work of Ernst Schwarz (1929) and Harold Coolidge (1933) separated 
the appearance of a common group of visually similar animals from the reality of two 
distinct species.  Consequently, the bonobo received its own Linnaean taxonomic label, 
Pan paniscus (de Waal 82-88).  As was shown through the explication of the twilight 
zone case, the salience of dissociation markers in a scientific text is proportional to the 
challenge of the rhetorical situation.  Higher rhetorical stakes evoke more emphatic 
dissociations.  Koren et al. made their dissociation argument more salient verbally over 
successive drafts of a text that did not initially make convincing claims about reality.  
Though Gross notes the role of the visual in creating rhetorical presence, he does not 
mention how visual elements participate in dissociation specifically.  This is not a 
criticism, just a clarification.  The cases from this dissertation clearly demonstrate that 
visual arguments are involved with rhetorical processes related to both dissociation and 
presence.  These cases also suggest that there might be a consistent link between the two 
concepts in visual scientific argumentation.  
In the x-ray diffraction case, the interplay of presence and dissociation was 




his mathematical arguments to create visual traces of two invisible phenomena: x-rays 
and atoms.  Though Laue’s diagrammatic proof was a mathematical “reconstruction” of 
the photograph’s pattern and not an analysis of individual spots, his coded graphic 
directed the attention of his readers to specific aspects of the spots—the five wavelengths 
that he believed accounted for them completely.  To replace Laue’s interpretation of the 
photographs, the younger Bragg directed the attention of readers in different ways.  He 
used visual arguments that stressed aspects of the photographs that were more compatible 
with his interpretation of the photographs and less compatible with Laue’s.  Specifically, 
he showed how a reading based on “reflection” could account for the more elliptical spots 
that formed when the crystal was set further from the x-ray source.  Bragg invokes a 
rhetorical dissociation by separating the “appearance” of Laue’s simple cubic structure 
revealed by five discrete wavelengths from the reality of a face-centered cube diffracting 
a heterogeneous x-ray beam.  Bragg’s means: arguments from incompatibility and 
compatibility backed by mathematical and visual arguments supported by geometry.  He 
used math to cast doubt on the veracity of Laue’s reading because if Laue’s reading were 
correct, additional spots would have been in the photograph, and they were not there.  
Bragg uses the “complete series” of his tables to demonstrate the mathematical 
completeness of his reading, and he uses the circular inscriptions on his key to the 
photograph to visualize why the invisible “reflected” waves selectively darken particular 
parts of the image. 
 In considering the developing Vine-Matthews-Morley Hypothesis, dissociation 
and presence help explain the rhetorical process of adjusting existing visualized data.  




stripes of magnetism on magnetic maps; those stripes were eventually read as distinct 
periods of magnetic time.  Pitman and Hiertzler’s visualization of the Eltanin-19 profile 
enhanced the presence of the curve’s symmetry.  In both graphics, invisible features of 
the sea floor were given visual presence, and then those salient features could participate 
in arguments that separated the appearance of a static sea floor from the reality of 
continents in motion.   
With the cloud case, the outputs of multiple instruments (MODIS, AERONET, 
and a normal digital camera) were combined to bring the twilight zone into rhetorical 
existence.  Just as the ornithologists described by Gross “constructed” a new 
hummingbird species through verbal and visual means, the Goddard scientists 
rhetorically constructed a new atmospheric phenomenon through a multi-vectored 
description that gave their twilight zone visual presence.  Moreover, the cloud photo 
series epitomized their dissociation argument visually; the appearance of a distinctly 
bound cloud is replaced with the visible reality of a complex reflectance phenomenon.     
 To summarize, presence can rhetorically construct new phenomena by directing 
the attention to specific aspects of reality; dissociation is used to revise the structure of 
reality by rhetorically separating the apparent from the genuinely real.  Clearly, 
visualization participates in these rhetorical processes, but advances in visualization 
technology—either imaging technology or information visualization technology—can 
cause significant scientific and rhetorical concerns.   
The editorial reactions to digital images reveal ethical and epistemological 
tensions related to presence and dissociation in scientific argumentation.  To make 




attention of the reader and hence add visual presence to the arguments expressed 
textually.  These representations are always motivated rhetorical selections.  Even the 
“unmodified” photograph is chosen and situated in a text for persuasive ends.  However, 
digital tools allow scientists to adjust the rhetorical presence of particular features in 
ways that were formerly difficult; for example, a few mouse clicks on a contrast button 
can enhance or obliterate the faint trace of a molecule in an autoradiogram.  Editorial 
responses to the proliferation of both digital technologies and digital misconduct indicate 
how visuals participate in rhetorical dissociations.  Specifically, the texts spawned by 
editorial anxiety suggest that scientific visuals act as term II markers—the “real” term in 
an appearance-reality dyad.  Technological developments threatened to undermine the 
dissociation process at the heart of scientific persuasion because images were no longer 
the “self-evident” products of accepted objects of agreement.  New imaging guidelines 
are attempts to reaffirm the visual starting points essential to scientific argumentation.   
The Chang case demonstrates the power and problems of the data visualizations 
that both guide scientists working with invisible phenomena and influence those who 
read and believe their work.  As Chris Miller noted, protein visualizations can be 
perceived as reality and not as models of data.  Thus, this class of visuals can possess 
significant ontological status, a status they do not automatically deserve.  Chang’s 
interpretation of the MsbA protein obtained an ontological status it did not deserve based 
on the rhetorical presence established through the visual model.  This inaccurate 
visualization had more authority than the accurate biochemical evidence that contradicted 




distinguish appearance from reality.  This dissociation shares some interesting similarities 
with the rhetorical dissociations analyzed in Chapters 2, 3, and 4.   
Like the x-ray case, a lack of understanding of the underlying premises caused the 
creation of an inaccurate reading in the first place.  In the Chang case, computational 
premises were the problem rather than physical premises; however, the results of these 
faulty premises still needed to be considered and reinterpreted in the refutation and 
replacement.  By inverting the structure visually and supporting that inversion with data 
in a table, Dawson and Locher demonstrated why their reading of Sav1886 and their 
proposed interpretation of MsbA are more compatible with reality.   
Like the visual arguments of the cloud case, this graphic (Figure 6.2) takes 
advantage of top-bottom/term I-term II image arrangement to indicate the dissociative 
distinction.  The more “real” reading is placed in the lower position; the false pretender is 
placed in the upper position.   
Figural logics participate in the presence-dissociation dynamic of Figure 6.2, as 
they did in visuals from the tectonics and cloud cases.  However, instead of a chiasmus-
to-antimetabole transformation or an antithesis-to-series transformation, this graphic 
offers a chiasmus-to-analogy transformation.  The top structure (part a) can be read as a 
chiasmus (XY:Y’X’) if color is read as marking recurring terms and shape as marking 
cognates.57  That is, from left to right it is a purple to green sequence across the upper 
portion of the structure (with overlap in the middle); across the bottom, it is a green to 
purple sequence (with overlap in the middle).  In other words, purple - green: green’ - 
                                                 
57 In the following example from Fahnestock’s Rhetorical Figures in Science the recurring concepts of 
“invader” and “winter” are arranged in a chiasmus; historically distinct figures and weather events as the 





purple’.  As my red markings in Figure 6.3 suggest, the graphic is visually X-like; X is 
the Greek letter chi, the etymological root of the rhetorical figure chiasmus.  The false 
contrastive symmetry in part a of Figure 6.2 (page 301) is contrasted with the visual 
analogy in part b.  Though structures are not identical, they are visually like each other.58  
This similarity is consistent with all the other supporting evidence, including the 
biochemical studies that were once dismissed because they were inconsistent with 
Chang’s interpretation of MsbA.  
 
 
                                                 
58 A textual analogy equivalent to the chiasmus in the previous note is as follows:  “The Russian winter 




 Figure 6.3: Modified version of Figure 4S (part a) of Dawson and Locher 2006.  My red markings. 
 
 
Context, Reception, and Circulation 
 As noted in the introduction, scholars of visual rhetoric and the rhetoric of science 
have raised important concerns about the accountability of their rhetorical analyses.  
Wanting to be sure that their claims accurately reflect the rhetorical situations in which 
the artifacts they analyze are operating, rhetoricians have emphasized the importance of 
understanding the complexities of context and reception.  Given the validity of successful 
approaches, I can invent no plausible counter argument that would not be a “straw man.”  
Understanding context and reception is important; this point is born out in my analyses of 
the previous cases.  Studying the context and reception of scientific arguments dependent 
on visuals helps tease out the issues and implications of establishing new visual practices, 
adapting existing images, validating suspect data, and guiding ethical practices.   
In the Chang case, reception evidence is limited but revealing.  For example, even 
cursory citation analysis demonstrates the impact of Chang’s work.  As Greg Miller 
reported, a 2006 Google Scholar search showed that more than 350 publications had cited 
Chang’s first MsbA paper before the retraction.  Clearly, it was persuasive for some 
readers.  On the other hand, anecdotal evidence reveals that some scientists were not 
convinced by Chang’s visual arguments.  As British biochemist Christopher Higgins 
recalls, “When the first structure came out, we and others said, ‘We really don’t quite 
believe this is right’.  [...]  It was inconsistent with a lot of things” (qtd. in Miller 1857).  
Juxtaposing these pieces of reception evidence reveals the rhetorical effects of the Chang 




journal Science, the paper and its structure were not accepted in all quarters, and thus 
there was room for refutation and replacement. 
While context and reception have been important components in the analyses in 
my previous chapters, I have also examined the circulation of specific artifacts and 
arguments.  The concept of circulation is related to issues of context and reception 
because studying the circulation and adaptation of visuals reveals (1) aspects of scientific 
cultures, (2) the evolution of arguments, and (3) the conceptual traction of specific ideas 
in different contexts.  While one could argue that tracing circulation is frivolous, the 
explication of these cases shows otherwise.   
 Max von Laue’s photographs of x-ray diffraction circulated through formal and 
informal channels.  Recall that the image was first revealed through Laue’s presentations 
at various symposia; the Braggs first saw that artifact after a copy of it was mailed to the 
elder Bragg by Lars Vegard.  Both Laue and the Braggs mediated that image to 
instantiate their differing arguments about x-rays and crystal structures.  The now iconic 
image of ZnS served different rhetorical functions when it circulated within Laue's own 
work.  It first served as evidence supporting a wave interpretation of x-rays.  It then 
served as the logical conclusion to Laue’s mathematical reconstruction.  W. L. Bragg’s 
revision of the ZnS photogram demonstrates that foundational propositions and 
assumptions are malleable, especially in the early period of a new visualization 
technology. 
Visual arguments from the case of the Vine-Matthews-Morley hypothesis 
demonstrate how subtle changes in visual form can connote significant conceptual 




was later incorporated as evidence in a review article and transformed into a colorized 
representation of a hypothesis for a conference slide.  The argument of that color slide—
that magnetism is an index of time for the areas near the Juan de Fuca ridge—ultimately 
became transformed into a visual truth replicated in new claims about other geophysical 
activity.  Tracing the circulation of this map across these contexts revealed important 
connections between visual signifiers and evolving scientific concepts. In this case, visual 
cues such as vectors, color, and selective redaction were used to rearrange the same static 
magnetic data for different rhetorical purposes.  
Chapter 4 offers an example of an argument’s circulation from specialist to 
popular contexts.  The dissociation argument epitomized in the cloud photo series was 
maintained as the twilight zone circulated into non-specialist contexts; however, the 
composition of that epitome changes from a vertical triptych to a horizontal triptych and 
from a horizontal triptych to both a side-by-side comparison and a single representative 
image.  Thus, tracing the photographs’ circulation reveals a range of strategies used to 
convey the same argument for different audiences.     
The Chang case offers an interesting comment on the circulation of refutation 
arguments.  In their paper, Locher and Dawson minimized the salience of their visual 
refutation of Chang by placing it in a supplemental document; however, when the visual 
was incorporated into a feature story on the case, it was literally the center of attention 
(Figure 6.4).  As in the cloud case, what had been a vertical comparison was transformed 
into horizontal comparison.  The chiastic mismatch of molecules is in the left/given 
position; the visual analogy is in the right/new position.  The formal similarity between 




composition and modality, or “truth value” in images.  Also, the stereo views that were 
conventional for the specialist audience were removed in this news piece written for the 
broadest readership of the journal Science. 
  






Figure 6.4: The first page of Greg Miller’s “A Scientist’s Nightmare: Software 





Using Burke’s Terministic Screen to Explain Visual Arguments in Science 
Kenneth Burke had both science and visualization in mind when developing the 
terministic screen.  It was a series of photographs taken through different filters that 
brought Burke to think of the concept, and his scientific examples of verbal terministic 
screens include both Darwin and various flavors of early twentieth-century psychology 
(120; 122).  As Burke himself observed, the necessarily partial selection of 
terminological systems also applies to scientific instruments (115; 120).59  The variables 
that are measured by a recording instrument and the ways those measurements are 
reported limit what a scientist can know about a phenomenon.  Any inscription can 
constrain the new claims that scientists can make based on collected evidence, but 
scientists also apply additional terministic screens in creating visual arguments.  
Scientists and their algorithms select (and hence limit) the data that becomes visualized; 
in many cases scientists can then determine which data will be highlighted or diminished 
visually.  Thus, a given visualization technology has the potential to be both an asset and 
a liability because it can focus and divert the attention of both the scientists developing 
new knowledge and those who receive rhetorically selective images.   
Burke’s terministic screen is a useful notion for thinking about the general 
operation of science visuals, but it is also a powerful concept for recovering and 
explaining context and reception for specific scientific rhetorical situations.  In the cases 
examined in this study, both perceptual and instrumental terministic screens affected the 
interpretation, mediation, and reception of visuals.  In the case of the x-ray diffraction 
photographs, preconceived notions of x-rays, optics, crystal structure, and geometry 
                                                 
59 Burke remarked, “And since all laboratory instruments of measurement and observation are devices 
invented by the symbol-using animal, they too necessarily give interpretations in terms of either continuity 




skewed the interpretations of both Laue and Bragg, and hence it skewed the 
representations they used to direct the attention of their audiences.  Differences show the 
assumptions each brought to “reading” the visuals, but assumptions also limited the kinds 
of claims that each could make about the structure.  In this case, equations derived from 
analogical processes created the screens, and those equations were developed in light of 
both certain and uncertain premises about molecules and crystal formations.  Once a 
given screen was established, seeing the evidence differently became difficult.  For 
example, historians point to Laue’s overlooking of specific features of the photographs as 
“signs of exhaustion,” and they explain specific misinterpretations in his 1913 addendum 
as “indications of confusion.”  Thus, in hindsight parts of Laue’s reading do not make 
sense, so they are dismissed.  However, one can also interpret Laue’s commitment to his 
hypothesis through the concept of the terministic screen.  Once he accepted an analogy 
between the x-ray effects and traditional diffraction, his vision and his reasoning were 
guided by the constraints of that analogy.  
The case of the sea-floor spreading hypothesis shows how terministic selection 
can deflect attention.  The “terms” that Raff and Mason selected to highlight data in the 
first map of the Juan de Fuca area deflected attention from other aspects of the 
topography.  Indeed, the paper sat largely ignored for more than two years; it could not be 
interpreted as support for the Vine-Matthews-Morley hypothesis until it could be read in 
the light of more detailed topographic data and more developed geophysical premises.   
Some of the images of the twilight zone case—had they been made decades 
earlier—could have been Burke’s inspiration for the very idea of terministic screens.  The 




Koren’s “filters” were digital computational transformations.  Such transformations 
selected some details of the image and ignored others to draw the twilight zone out of the 
digital shadows and into existence.  More important from the perspective of context is the 
role of terministic screens in the more standard rhetorical activities of atmospheric 
science.  Satellite instruments like MODIS collect so much data that selection must 
involve digital processing.  Atmospheric scientists, such as those at Goddard, are 
constantly refining these data “masks,” so they can create better models of the 
atmosphere.  However, as was the case with the “twilight zone,” sometimes the settings 
of those algorithmic screens can deflect attention away from important phenomena.  
Correcting such deflections after they have become conventionalized can take tenacity 
and rhetorical skill.  
The ethical problems of digital imaging are also illuminated by considering the 
terministic screen; the proliferation of digital manipulation brought issues of selection 
and deflection to the editorial pages of major journals.  Editorial accounts raised concerns 
about fabrication of data, but they were frequently more worried about selective 
omission; for example, removing seemingly artifactual objects that are actually real data.  
These concerns are as rhetorical and epistemological as they are ethical.  A scientific 
image is received as the product of acceptable terministic selection that reflects reality in 
sanctioned ways.  These visual selections are the visual equivalent of discipline-specific 
vocabularies.  However, the digitally manipulated image can be a screen that is 
idiosyncratic.  An individual who is motivated to change an image to highlight one aspect 





 The Chang case demonstrates that the visualization tools of modern 
crystallography act as powerful terministic screens that can produce artifacts that eclipse 
other data.  As Chris Miller’s letter to the editor suggests, the practice of visualization has 
become so regularized, implicit, and uncritical that some scientists cannot see when the 
visualization created by the terministic screen is inaccurate.  With the MsbA structure, 
the reflection of reality encoded in Chang’s graphic was more powerful than the 
terministic screens applied by other scientists in different sub-disciplines.  For five years, 
Chang’s x-ray diffraction reality was more real than other scientists’ biochemical 
realities.  
 
The Value of a Rhetorical Approach to Scientific Visuals 
 Though rhetorical scholars have been studying the discourses of science for 
decades, they are still considered the “new kids” on the block of science studies.  As Leah 
Ceccarelli observed in 2005, some historians, philosophers, and sociologists of science 
continue to resist the claims of rhetoricians studying science.  In her analysis of the 
responses of historians of science to her scholarship, Ceccarelli identifies two specific 
complaints:  (1) her rhetorical reading misrepresents the history of science literature, and 
(2) her rhetorical analysis presumptuously assumes that historians are not already doing 
rhetorical scholarship (i.e., close textual analysis) (“A Hard Look” 262-263).  Though 
Ceccarelli deftly and fairly mitigates these criticisms, refutation is not the primary 
exigence for her analysis.  Her purpose is to examine “how audiences from various 
science studies disciplines are responding to the arguments for academic significance that 




arguments for interdisciplinary relevance” (258).  This is indeed a goal that any 
rhetorician of science needs to consider, and I consider myself a rhetorician of science. 
Rhetoricians of science need to recognize the contributions to their cases by 
scholars of allied fields, but they also need to demonstrate the value of a rhetorical 
approach to science.  For the purposes of this dissertation, the first of these tasks has been 
addressed.  For each of my historical cases, I have examined the valuable contributions of 
historians, philosophers, and sociologists.  My most recent cases are too new to have 
significant support from allied fields.  For example, I am the first person to write about 
the twilight zone case from any science studies perspective.  
To demonstrate rhetoric’s ability to make a distinct contribution to science 
studies, I summarize observations made in this dissertation that have been unrecognized 
by other scholars because of their disciplinary orientations and commitments.  Regarding 
the x-ray diffraction case, important elements of Laue’s visual arguments had never been 
explicated in detail.  Specifically, the entire series of photographs is typically ignored 
even though these images reveal how Laue developed his larger claims.  Similarly, the 
nuances of his diagram had been overlooked.  Often, Laue is portrayed as blinded by 
preconceived assumptions; however, close attention to his texts demonstrate that he was 
merely persuaded by provisionally acceptable arguments that even he recognized would 
need to be refined.  
 In the case of the Vine-Matthews-Morely hypothesis, many studies do not cite 
specific visuals appropriately.  For example, the different iterations of the Raff and 
Mason map are either intentionally treated as equivalent or the differences are merely 




visuals informed by their rhetorical situations reveals subtle semiotic differences.  For 
example, when Fred Vine first appropriated the image, he removed Raff and Mason’s 
unhelpful labels and added new features that could better explain his hypothesis.  A 
rhetorical approach that emphasized the importance of circulation and reception revealed 
these significant differences. 
 The twilight zone case is perhaps my best evidence for the distinct value of a 
rhetorical approach to science studies.  This is a new case that historians and philosophers 
would not choose to analyze because it is so new.  Sociologists would not have found it 
unless they were already in place to observe the culture of the Goddard group.  While I 
found this case accidentally, a rhetorical approach led me to capture this fascinating 
story.  When a popular accommodation of the twilight zone case appeared in my daily 
news feed, I was intrigued by the accommodated visual arguments.  I traced the 
circulation of the twilight zone back to the original article.  This article is a remarkable 
rhetorical artifact on its own, and an analysis of it is only enhanced by parallel analyses 
of preliminary drafts and the illuminating comments provided by Dr. Lorraine Remer.  
Taking a rhetorical approach to these artifacts revealed important details about how 
modern scientists develop and refine arguments of critical contemporary importance. 
 Rhetoric also helps to explain the ethics of digital image manipulation by 
providing terms for the typically tacit understandings at the heart of most argumentation.  
Scientists are sometimes tempted to modify images digitally because clear and striking 
images have traditionally enhanced a scientist’s ethos, and because they want to reveal 
patterns that are ultimately persuasive.  However, digital technologies have enabled 




visual culture.  Rhetorical readings of new image submission guidelines and editorial 
comments on ethics reveal that the scientific visual is not an ethically or 
epistemologically “pure” object.  That is, scientific visuals and visualization technologies 
are not good or bad, right or wrong, true or false at any essential level.  Instead, they are 
socially situated objects whose status as facts, truths, and premises depends on networks 
of tacit assumptions.  When it was clear that such assumptions were not understood 
uniformly by members of their discourse communities, journals responded to 
(re)establish expectations for the ethical use of images.  A rhetorical approach provided 
the vocabulary to explain these processes. 
  
The Visual Rhetoric of Science:  More than the Regurgitation of Images and Data 
The visual rhetoric of science is more than just stark photographs, data plots, and 
the regurgitation of instrument output.  Instruments collect traces of phenomena, but for 
traces to become evidence, and for evidence to become argument, some rhetorical 
processing is always necessary.  Scientific visuals are always contextually situated and 
they are often actively mediated to make convincing knowledge claims.  The following 
comment from a response to the Chang retraction demonstrates that scientists themselves 
recognize the rhetorical nature of their visual artifacts:   
Inherent in structural analysis is a degree of subjectivity, which is 
particularly relevant in low-resolution studies such as those made by 
Chang and co-workers.  Essentially correct structures have been built at 
4.5 Å resolution, but it is not surprising that some of them turn out to be 




readers must be provided with the original experimental data, not only the 
derived atomic coordinates.  Only armed with these data can an 
investigator conduct an independent evaluation that may result in a 
reinterpretation of the published structure.   
(Jones and Kleyget 194) 
Even with the advances of modern technology, crystal structure determinations are 
initially unfixed and probabilistic arguments; hence, they reside in the realm of rhetoric.   
Science is an inter-subjective rhetorical activity that now relies on visual 
arguments more than ever.  Rhetoricians need a comprehensive visual rhetoric of science 
to enable the interpretation of visual scientific arguments and to support science-writing 
instruction.  This project has moved toward this goal by applying concepts from the most 
thorough modern system of argumentation to an array of visual rhetorical activities that 
scientists encounter.  This analysis has yielded important insights on the relationships 
between visuals, rhetoric, reality, and knowledge; however, there is still much work to be 
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